Building a capable farmers’ organisation towards livelihood improvement: Evidence from three Thai rice farmers’ organisational models by Aaltonen, Wanida
R
Aaltonen, Wanida (2021) 
Building a capable farmers’ organisation towards livelihood improvement: Evidence from three Thai rice 
farmers’ organisational models 
PhD thesis. SOAS University of London.
https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/35778/
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other 
copyright owners. 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior 
permission or charge. 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the copyright holder/s. 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. 
When referring to this thesis, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding 
institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full 










Building a capable farmers’ organisation 
towards livelihood improvement 





















Department of Development Studies 
SOAS, University of London 
 3 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... 6 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... 7 
List of Photo ...................................................................................................................... 8 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... 9 
Abstract: .......................................................................................................................... 10 
Chapter 1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 11 
1.1 Problem statement: policy interventions encourage dependency instead of freedom ............................... 11 
1.2 The quest for improved livelihoods through a capable farmers’ organisation ............................................. 14 
1.3 Research question and contribution .............................................................................................................. 18 
1.4 Originality and contribution to the literature ................................................................................................ 22 
Chapter 2 Literature Review ............................................................................................ 24 
2.1 Farmers’ livelihood, capability and resources ............................................................................................... 24 
2.1.1 Improving basic capacity ........................................................................................................................ 25 
2.1.2 Livelihood assets ..................................................................................................................................... 27 
2.1.3 Above poverty line, but below good livelihood ..................................................................................... 29 
2.1.4 Means to improved livelihoods of Thai rice farmers: Organisations, resources and capabilities ........ 31 
2.2 Literature on Farmers’ Organisations ............................................................................................................ 33 
2.2.1 Farmers’ organisations ........................................................................................................................... 35 
2.2.1 How does an organisation create value? ............................................................................................... 39 
2.2.3 Entrepreneurship and resources ............................................................................................................ 42 
2.2.4 Learning organisation ............................................................................................................................. 43 
2.2.5 Organisation as the basis for growing heterogeneous resources and capabilities ............................... 46 
2.2.6 Building organisations for value creation .............................................................................................. 48 
2.3 Value chain approach and improved livelihood ............................................................................................ 50 
2.3.1 An evolving and expanding field of value chain approach from business to development studies ..... 51 
2.3.2 The role of value chains in rural poverty reduction ............................................................................... 58 
2.3.3 Value Chain Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 60 
Chapter 3 Conceptual Framework .................................................................................... 64 
3.1 Major concepts guiding agricultural value chain .......................................................................... 64 
3.1.1 Value chain governance and models ..................................................................................................... 65 
3.1.2 Agricultural value chain upgrading and innovation ............................................................................... 67 
3.1.3 Agricultural value chain finance ............................................................................................................. 68 
3.2 Value chain research methodology ............................................................................................... 74 
3.2.1 Rice value chain framework for improved livelihoods .......................................................................... 77 
3.2.2 Rice value chain analysis ......................................................................................................................... 81 
Chapter 4 Methodology ................................................................................................... 86 
4.1 Case study research design ........................................................................................................ 86 
4.1.1 Case selection .................................................................................................................................... 89 
4.1.2 Challenges in case selection: fieldwork, logistics and parenting ........................................................ 93 
4.2 Data collection ........................................................................................................................... 96 
 4 
4.2.1 Preliminary value chain mapping ....................................................................................................... 97 
4.2.2 Stakeholder Interviews .................................................................................................................... 101 
4.2.3 Some limitations of the data collection ........................................................................................... 110 
4.2.4 Qualitative data analysis .................................................................................................................. 111 
Chapter 5 Case Context ................................................................................................. 119 
5.1 Farmers’ settings .......................................................................................................................... 119 
5.2 Vulnerability evaluation ............................................................................................................... 125 
Chapter 6 Creating a shared value partnership as a means to improving farmers’ 
livelihood: the case of BSCM Dibbling Initiative ............................................................. 139 
6.1 Case profile ................................................................................................................................... 140 
6.2 The structure of rice value chain ................................................................................................. 142 
6.3 Rice value chain analysis .............................................................................................................. 158 
6.3.1 Governance and coordination .............................................................................................................. 158 
6.3.2 Upgrading ............................................................................................................................................. 163 
6.3.3 Distributional outcomes ....................................................................................................................... 169 
6.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 172 
Chapter 7 Enhancing farmers’ organisational capabilities as a driver towards improved 
livelihoods ..................................................................................................................... 175 
7.1 Case profile .............................................................................................................................. 176 
7.2 The structure of rice value chain .............................................................................................. 177 
7.3 Rice value chain analysis .......................................................................................................... 190 
7.3.1 Governance and coordination ......................................................................................................... 190 
7.3.2 Upgrading ........................................................................................................................................ 195 
7.3.3 Distributional outcomes ................................................................................................................... 197 
7.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 202 
Chapter 8 Learning from experienced farmers’ organisations to improving organisation 
performance: the case of Sisaket Agricultural Marketing Co-operative limited .............. 205 
8.1 Case profile: The Sisaket Agricultural Marketing Co-Operative Limited (AMC) ......................... 206 
8.2 Data collection ............................................................................................................................. 207 
8.3 Lesson learned from other farmers’ organisation to advance the Sisaket AMC ........................ 210 
Chapter 9 Discussions and Conclusion ........................................................................... 219 
9.1 A capable farmers’ organisation as a mechanism for resource mobilisation ............................. 219 
9.2 Cross-case analysis ....................................................................................................................... 222 
9.3 The development process for building a capable farmers’ organisation towards livelihood 
improvement ...................................................................................................................................... 230 
9.3.1 The precursor factors ........................................................................................................................... 231 
9.3.2 The process and outcome of a capable farmers’ organisation influenced by the precursors ........... 239 
9.4 Policy recommendations ............................................................................................................. 249 
First policy recommendation: Conditional offer on cash subsidy link to capacity building ......................... 249 
 5 
Second policy recommendation: Optional offer on switching cash subsidy to post-harvest infrastructure 
development. ........................................................................................................................................... 249 
9.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 253 











































List of Tables 
 
TABLE 2. 1 INTEGRATED RICE POLICY AND SUBSIDY MEASURE 36 
TABLE 2. 2 TYPICAL ORGANISATIONAL MODELS OF SMALLHOLDER PRODUCTION 37 
TABLE 2. 3 PRODUCER AND BUYER DRIVEN CHAINS COMPARED 38 
TABLE 2. 4 EXAMPLES OF LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL AND EXECUTIVE VALUE CHAIN GOVERNANCE 55 
 
TABLE 3. 1 DESCRIPTION OF AGRICULTURAL VALUE CHAIN FINANCE INSTRUMENTS 71 
 
TABLE 4. 1 THE LIST OF CATEGORIES TO BE COMPARED BETWEEN CASES 88 
TABLE 4. 2 INTERVIEWED STAKEHOLDERS’ AFFILIATIONS (INTERVIEWED) 100 
TABLE 4. 3 ACTORS/INFORMANTS MAPPED TO KEY ANALYTICAL CATEGORIES 106 
TABLE 4. 4A EXAMPLE OF DATA ORGANISATION FROM INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTIONS, CASE 1 107 
TABLE 4. 5 STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEW LABELLING SYSTEM 112 
 
TABLE 5. 1 THE PRODUCTION OF 4 MAJOR RICE VARIETIES IN THE CROP YEAR OF 2017/18 120 
TABLE 5. 2 PRODUCTION COST (SUPPLY COST ONLY) OF PROCESSING ONE TON OF MILLED RICE 124 
TABLE 5. 3 A BRIEF VULNERABILITY EVALUATION FOCUSING DROUGHT AND RAINSTORM 127 
TABLE 5. 4 A BRIEF VULNERABILITY EVALUATION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ECONOMIC AND 
POLITICAL SHOCKS 132 
TABLE 5. 5 AVERAGE FULL COSTING OF RICE PRODUCTION (2016/17 CROPPING SEASON) OF LOCAL 
FARMERS (WHO USED THE BROADCASTING METHOD) 134 
TABLE 5. 6 BREAKEVEN QUANTITY OF RICE PADDY 135 
 
TABLE 6. 1 AVERAGE FULL COSTING OF RICE PRODUCTION (2016/17 CROPPING SEASON) OF THE 
BSCM DIBBLING INITIATIVE AND LOCAL FARMERS (WHO USED THE DIRECT SEEDED RICE METHOD) 147 
TABLE 6. 2 POTENTIAL VALUE-ADDED EARNINGS BY PARTICIPATING IN THE BSCM DIBBLING 
INITIATIVE 149 
 
TABLE 7. 1AVERAGE FULL COSTING OF RICE PRODUCTION BY THE BAN UM SANG ORGANIC RICE 
COMMUNITY ENTERPRISE 181 
TABLE 7. 2 FARM PERFORMANCE 183 
 
















List of Figures  
 
FIGURE 2. 1 THE ASSET PENTAGON 27 
FIGURE 2. 2 LIVELIHOODS ASSETS HEXAGON FRAMEWORK FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 29 
FIGURE 2. 3 PORTER’S GENERIC VALUE CHAIN 52 
FIGURE 2. 4 A TYPICAL AGRICULTURAL VALUE CHAIN 61 
 
FIGURE 3. 1 RICE VALUE CHAIN PROCESS (MAP) 66 
FIGURE 3. 2 RICE VALUE CHAIN FRAMEWORK 77 
FIGURE 3. 3 AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH FOR RICE VALUE CHAINS 83 
 
FIGURE 4. 1 MAP OF THAILAND (A) AND MAP OF SISAKET PROVINCE (B) 91 
FIGURE 4. 2 RICE VALUE CHAIN FRAMEWORK 99 
FIGURE 4. 3 TEMPLATE FOR DATA ANALYSIS, ADAPTED VERSION OF PORTER’S GENERIC VALUE CHAIN 
WITH ADDITIONAL TO ECONOMIC RENTS 117 
FIGURE 4. 4 EXAMPLE OF ANALYSIS AT EACH STAGE OF VALUE CHAIN 117 
 
FIGURE 5. 1 THE TRADEMARK OF THE THAI HOM MALI RICE ENDORSED BY THE THAILAND’S 
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN TRADE 121 
FIGURE 5. 2 TYPICAL OUTPUT COMPOSITION OF RICE MILLING OF NON-GLUTINOUS RICE PADDY. 123 
FIGURE 5. 3 MARKET VALUE ($) OF RICE COMPOSED OF 2.36 KG RICE PADDY OR 1 KG MILLED RICE 125 
FIGURE 5. 4 A WEATHER FORECAST MAP OF THAILAND’S PROVINCIAL AREA AT RISK OF HEAVY TO 
SEVERE RAINSTORM ON 15 OCTOBER 2020 (LEFT) AND ON 28 OCTOBER 2020 (RIGHT) 128 
 
FIGURE 6. 1 COST COMPARISON OF RICE FARMING BEFORE AND AFTER JOINING THE BSCM’S 
DIBBLING INITIATIVE ($ PER TON RICE PADDY) 148 
FIGURE 6. 2 COMMERCIAL ADVERT OF LIMITED EDITION JASMINE RICE FROM THE 2018 CROP 157 
FIGURE 6. 3 THE VALUE CHAIN OF RICE UNDER THE BSCM DIBBLING INITIATIVE 160 
FIGURE 6. 4 THE VALUE CHAIN PROCESS COORDINATION OF THE BSCM 161 
FIGURE 6. 5 COORDINATION MATRIX OF PRIMARY AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES IN JASMINE RICE 
FARMING 162 
FIGURE 6. 6 COMPARISON OF THE VALUE CHAIN FINANCE OF RICE FARMERS AS BSCM DIBBLING 
MEMBERS AND RICE FARMERS AS SOLE TRADERS 167 
 
FIGURE 7. 1 A SIMPLIFIED PICTURE OF CONNECTIONS BETWEEN LOCAL FARM SUPPLIERS AND 
FARMERS 180 
FIGURE 7. 2 A SIMPLIFIED PICTURE OF CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE UM SANG AND ITS MEMBERS; 
AND LOCAL FARM SUPPLIERS AND FARMERS 180 
FIGURE 7. 3 THE UM SANG’S SIMPLIFIED RICE VALUE CHAIN 191 
FIGURE 7. 4 THE UM SANG’S COORDINATION OF PRIMARY AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES 192 
 
FIGURE 8. 1 PADDY RICE PRODUCTION AND VALUE-ADDED PLANNING, MANAGED BY CO-OPERATIVE 
GROUP OF ROI-ET PROVINCE 213 
 
FIGURE 9. 1 LIVELIHOODS ASSETS HEXAGON FRAMEWORK FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 221 
FIGURE 9. 2 THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS OF BUILDING A CAPABLE FARMER ORGANISATION 230 
FIGURE 9. 3 MARKETPLACE AND MARKET OPPORTUNITY 242 
FIGURE 9. 4 A NEW MARKETPLACE LANDSCAPE AFTER REPOSITIONING FARMERS 244 





List of Photo  
 
PHOTO 4. 1 WOMEN SELL (LEFT) MILLED RICE AND (RIGHT) OPERATE A LOCAL COFFEE COUNTER AT A 
MORNING MARKET, MEUNG DISTRICT, SISAKET 103 
PHOTO 4. 2 SILK MAKING PROCESS (TOP LEFT AND RIGHT); AN ELDERLY WOMAN WEAVES ON A 
TRADITIONAL LOOM (DOWN LEFT AND RIGHT) 103 
 
PHOTO 5. 1 FLOODED RICE FIELD AFTER A RAINSTORMS IN SISAKET PROVINCE 128 
PHOTO 5. 2 COLLAPSED RICE FIELD DUE TO STRONG WINDS 130 
PHOTO 5. 3 THE DEPARTMENT OF DISASTER PREVENTION AND MITIGATION RELEASING WATER FROM 
FLOODED RICE FIELD AFTER HEAVY RAIN STORMS IN SISAKET PROVINCE 130 
 
PHOTO 6. 1 LEFT: RICE SEED DIBBLING MACHINE; RIGHT: RICE FIELD PLANTED USING THE DIBBLING 
MACHINE. 146 
 
PHOTO 7. 1 MR. BOONMEE SURAKOT PROUDLY PRESENTING THE UM SANG ENTERPRISE’S PRODUCTS
 177 
PHOTO 7. 2 CERTIFIED ORGANIC HOME MALI 105 SEED 179 
PHOTO 7. 3 FARM SKILL TRAINING ORGANISED BY SISAKET DOAE AT THE UM SANG’S FARMERS’ 
ORGANISATION IN JANUARY 2020 182 
PHOTO 7. 4 SUN-DRIED RICE PADDY: (A) RICE PADDY SPREAD ON THE AREA OF A MILLING FACILITY; 
(B) RICE PADDY ON THE SIDE OF A ROAD 187 
PHOTO 7. 5 PRIME MINISTER GEN PRAYUTH CHAN-OCHA VISITING THE UM SANG ENTERPRISE DUE 
TO ITS SUCCESS 193 
 
PHOTO 8. 1 5KG PACKED 100% JASMINE RICE OF A-RICE BRAND 206 

























This PhD training has been an invaluable journey. There are no words to express 
my deep gratitude and respect for many people involve in the process. 
 
I am deeply grateful to my esteemed supervisor Professor Nigel Poole, who saw 
the potential of an incipient research proposal and gave me a lifetime opportunity 
to be trained under his supervision. His support and tutelage have fostered 
academic growth and have lifted my spirit throughout the long road of the 
doctoral endeavour. My gratitude extends to my PhD examiners, Professor Tim 
Forsyth and Professor Bhavani Shankar for their guidance which was influential 
in shaping and critiquing my analysis. I would also like to express gratitude to 
Dr. Alessandra Mezzadri and Dr. Hannah Bargawi for their encouragement and 
mentorship.  
 
My gratitude extends to the people who dedicated their time to speak and help 
during fieldwork. This PhD study would not have been possible without the 
corporation and support extended by many people, especially the 128 persons 
who gave me the opportunities to interview. My deep appreciation goes out to 
the three farmers’ organisations in Sisaket province. Their patience during 
extensive interviews was very much appreciated. Special thanks to SOAS for 
providing the £800 grant towards the cost of PhD fieldwork in Thailand. I am 
indebted to my friends in Bangkok, who were always so supportive in numerous 
ways - special thanks to Mam, Neoung and Dr. Foyfa. 
 
Being a first-generation college student in my family, I would like to express my 
heartfelt gratitude to my parents, who planted the love of learning and 
determination since my childhood. My appreciation goes out to my older sibling 
Weir, my aunt Ta and my parents-in-law Pirjo and Kimmo, who helped in many 
ways during this challenging period. 
 
To the people that mean the most to me, I thank with love to Aleksi and Joachim, 
my husband and son. Aleksi has been my rock, my best friend, and highly 
supportive of me throughout this entire process. Joachim has been my brightest 
















This thesis has examined how a capable farmers’ organisation improves farmers’ 
livelihoods. Three cases of Thai rice farmers’ organisations were purposefully 
selected, representing different farmers’ organisation models that are producer-
driven, buyer-driven and facilitator-driven models. The rice value chain 
framework used in this thesis emphasised three key analytical aspects. These 
were i) value chain governance and organisational model; ii) upgrading; and iii) 
distributional outcomes. This enables the analysis to narrow down to which 
direction the farmers’ organisations would most likely achieve livelihood 
improvement.  
 
It is evident from the study of the three cases that a farmers’ organisation is a 
means to improve members’ livelihoods through leveraging power and resulting 
in value chain upgrading. By meaning improved livelihood, the focus was on how 
capacity building enhancement and post-harvest infrastructure resulted in 
improvements in income, farm productivity, access to capitals, and market 
participation. An organisational model arrangement directly impacts value chain 
governance, the ability to upgrade, and the efficiency of distributional outcomes. 
All these lead to rice value chain development. Findings have identified the 
pattern observed from the three farmers’ organisations as a process to increase 
capability. The pattern involves the precursor factors that lay the foundation for 
the determinants of organisational development.  These precursor factors are 
commitment and trust, organisational models and behaviours, shared value, and 
capacity development and resource mobilisation. Consequently, the process and 
outcomes of a capable farmers’ organisation influenced by such precursors are 
organisational routines, repositioning farmers in the value chain, the 
reconfiguration of value chain finance, and value chain upgrading. The 
significance of each factor may vary, but the firm foundation depends on the 
combination of precursors and processes. The results highlight policy 
recommendations that can offer a path towards sustainable livelihoods for 
farmers. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
This chapter introduces the study and the debate on farmers’ livelihoods in the 
context of Thailand’s rice industry. It sets the scene for the study by pinning down 
a problem statement that is based on extant knowledge. From there, the chapter 
then moves to the formulation of key research questions, follow by a summary of 
the findings. Overall, the chapter introduces the core tenets of the thesis and the 
logic of how the study unfolds from one chapter to another. 
 
1.1 Problem statement: policy interventions encourage dependency instead of 
freedom 
 
Rice farming is a major source of livelihood for millions of Thai smallholder 
farmers. In 2016, there were about 8 million registered rice farming households, 
of which about half were located in the northeast region of the country (DOAE, 
2016). The Northeast or Isan region is home to the world-renowned Thai jasmine 
rice, where farming is concentrated on the Thung Kula Ronghai plateau. The 
majority of rice farmers are poor smallholders with an average household farm 
size of just under 3 hectares (Thailand’s Office of Agricultural Economics, 2019). 
This suggests that positive changes, e.g., production efficiency and market 
participation, brought to farmers could improve livelihoods and reduce poverty 
in Thailand at a large scale. 
 
Although the average farm-size is small, the farmer population is large, resulting 
in a large volume of total rice paddy production. Rice traders and exporters enjoy 
the benefits of economies of scale, as Thailand is among the world’s biggest rice 
exporters. For example, in 2017 Thailand exported about 9.5 million tons of rice, 
which is valued around 4.3 billion USD (1.5 trillion baht) (Thai Rice Exporter 
Association, 2017). Such an industrial scale of production offers, however, few 
benefits to the farmers who mostly sell their produce at farm gate and mostly 
experience diseconomies of scale in production and marketing.  The rice farmers 
themselves are among the poorest and most heavily indebted occupational groups 
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in Thailand. A total debt of about 88 billion USD (2.8 trillion baht as of 2017) 
was carried by about 3 million rice farm households (Thailand’s National 
Statistical Office, 2017). This suggests that the farmers are ill-positioned in the 
rice value chain, creating a disconnect between the success of Thai rice exports 
and farmers livelihoods. If so, why do farmers still farm rice if it is not financially 
viable? Would not they be better off cropping other high value products? 
Although such an argument seems obvious, it is not as simple as it sounds. With 
limited resources and access to markets, farmers’ choices are restricted. 
 
To ease their financial hardship, Thai law classifies rice farmers in the tax waiver 
occupational category (Thailand’s Department of Revenue, 2001). A series of 
rice policies has been put in place to mitigate farmers’ deprivation and livelihood 
vulnerability. The primary economic tool has been price intervention that is used 
to boost growth and reduce poverty by most Thai governments. Arguably, the 
rice price policy has been also used as an electoral tactic to win the votes of 
millions of Thai farmers. Among other policies, a rice pledging scheme has also 
been a popular strategy implemented by many Thai governments. For example, 
the rice pledging scheme that guaranteed 15,000 Baht or about 500 USD per ton 
of rice paddy was believed to play a role for Ms Yingluck Shinawatra to win the 
2011 election. After becoming the first Thai female Prime Minister, Shinawatra’s 
government immediately implemented the scheme to fulfil its promise to the 
voters. However, the controversial policy was criticised by economists, law 
makers and rice communities. In 2017, the Supreme Court's Criminal Division 
for Holders of Political Positions found Shinawatra guilty of corruption, asserting 
that the policy was tantamount to a "dishonest dereliction of duty" in violation of 
the Criminal Code and the anti-corruption law (BangkokPost, 2018). In the end, 
such policy interventions have done little to alleviate the root causes of poverty 
among Thai rice farmers. 
 
Interventions targeting the farmgate rice price and subsidies may not enhance 
farmers’ economic opportunities and livelihoods because they often do not deal 
with factors encouraging dependency and the unfavourable position of farmers in 
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the overall value chain. There is often a gap between policy intervention and 
developing factors that would encourage independence among farmers through 
increased human capital and new capabilities (Noorbakhsh et al., 2001; Unger et 
al., 2011; Ali et al., 2018). In this context, capability means the skills and 
knowledge enabling farmers to stay innovative, resilient and competitive in the 
market. What is often missing from interventions is that they do not empower 
farmers to become less dependent on the government and financial institutions as 
well as rice traders. Improvements in the terms of trade could result from, for 
instance, reducing high transaction costs, improving agricultural infrastructure, 
or supporting farmers’ organisations. 
 
Some of the problems concern farming size and time. The farm size is often too 
small to farm rice profitably on an individual basis, yet farming would mean the 
risk of the change of environmental factors such as too much or too little rain. 
The time means that a six-months period yields famers’ major annual income, 
while the rest of year may not be utilised effectively, for instance, to diversify the 
sources of income. Without fixing such fundamental problems, the smallholder 
rice farmers are easily locked in as cheap labour carrying considerable risks for 
low returns on rice paddy. The farmers are offered an access to microfinance 
through an agricultural bank and agricultural co-operatives, and the smallholder 
status also entitles them to receive agricultural subsidies. However, the often-
deprived condition of farmers suggests that the use of such interventions has not 
been fully effective in solving the problems. This thesis argues that farmers’ 
livelihood improvements can be developed in a more sustainable manner where 
farmers become more independent. Being independent, which Amartya Sen 
escribed as freedom, means the freedom to choose their business activities while 
possessing the ability to achieve their aims (e.g., profits) (Sen, 1997). This 
implies that there is a need for resources and capabilities that could enhance farm 
management and marketing skills, based on a new way of examining the rice 
value chain from a value system perspective (Porter, 1997; FAO, 2010; Miller 
and Jones, 2010).  In short, farmers should have the capacity to make informed 
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decisions on how to improve their livelihoods, and a capacity to carry out those 
decisions. 
 
The government is seen as an institution that leverages resources to facilitate 
development processes. This implies that the development process is shaped by 
the breadth and wealth of government administrative competence in leveraging 
and facilitating the process through its resource allocation plans and programmes. 
That is, the progress of development relies largely on the government’s priorities, 
competencies and resources. Many countries in the world are agrarian-based 
societies with mixed economic systems (i.e. with elements of both being centrally 
planned and capitalist economies). In these systems the governments have a 
significant role in minimising societal risks and facilitating the creation of 
national wealth, while also facilitating the governance of economic relationships 
to ensure market efficiency where markets exist within productive institutional 
frameworks. These can include coercive measures, subsidies and interventions 
by the government. At the microeconomic level, approaches to economic 
development policy can be effectively implemented through collective actors 
such as farmers’ organisations (Key and Runsten, 1999; McManus et al., 2012; 
Poole, 2017). Therefore, while the issues studied in this thesis may seem unique 
to Thailand’s agricultural policy, the problem is essentially about the 
characteristics and type of policy development in a global context. As such, the 
findings concerning human development may be applied to other geographies 
and types of policies. 
  
1.2 The quest for improved livelihoods through a capable farmers’ organisation 
 
The discussion around improved livelihoods often involves a range of 
perspectives, such as income (e.g., Barrett et al., 2001; Achterbosch et al., 2014), 
capitals (e.g., Sen, 1997; Bebbington, 1999), resources (e.g., Leach et al., 1998) 
and capabilities (e.g., Chambers and Conway,1991; Scoones, 1998). In particular, 
Chambers and Conway’s synthesis (1991) lays a foundation for sustainable rural 
livelihoods and development pathways by bringing together the concepts of 
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capability, equality and sustainability, and by implying that improved capabilities 
can function to achieve sustainable livelihoods. Smallholder farmers face all sorts 
of problems that impede their livelihoods. Livelihood conditions concern how 
well farmers can manage or access assets or capital endowments in way that these 
facilitate positive livelihood outcomes (DFID, 2001). Problems in livelihood 
conditions affect farm production (e.g., land issues, natural disasters, lack of 
finance) and ability to trade (e.g., market access and business opportunities, 
meeting quality standards). With respect to these, smallholder farmers could 
often be better off through collective actions empowering them to, for instance, 
achieve economies of scale and to increase access to markets. 
 
Better access to the market can enable farmers to be better off by managing the 
supply for farm production and trade facilitation for their farm produce, which 
tends to result in positive impacts on agrarian household income and incentivize 
more efficient farming. To this end, farmers’ organisations are widely recognised 
as a form collective action of farmers (Pierre and Marie-Hélène, 2001; Hazell et 
al., 2007; Haggblade et al., 2010; Poole, 2017). Their advantages can include 
achieving the economies of scale, leveraging resources more effectively, 
expanding agricultural infrastructure and farming capability (ibid.). For instance, 
trade standards often involve a range of quality requirements and specifications 
that demanded by institutions and urban consumers. These can become barrier 
for farmers to enter the market for their products, for which the farmers’ 
organisations can offer a solution in the pursuit of better livelihood.  
 
Yet, farmers’ organisations exist in most agrarian economies suggesting that 
organising alone does necessarily help enhance smallholder famers’ condition 
and that the challenge lies in the process of building capable farmers’ 
organisations. Throughout agricultural development history, many attempts to 




Farmers’ working conditions change dynamically though evolving seasons, 
markets, and political interventions, whereas the availability of appropriate 
assets, capital and resources would enable farmers to deal as well as mitigate 
risks. Although the farmland is immobile, human capital and resources are not; 
by making capital and resources more readily available can generate more value 
from the farmland. The farmers organisation can play an important role in 
accumulating capitals and in helping to make heterogeneous resources available 
to smallholder farmers. As a collective, farmers’ organisations have an aim to 
create value in the way that helps farmers to be better off as compared to trading 
individually. 
 
Value creation involves the exchange of goods which almost always involves 
transaction costs. Williamson (1981) contended that transaction costs have an 
intrinsic link to the organisational structure, while North (1992) argues that 
institutions are key in the determination of transaction costs. This suggests that 
economic growth and development are often shaped by institutions and 
organisatons. Farmers’ organisations in the current context are capable of 
facilitating lower transaction costs. For instance, farmers are likely to achieve the 
economies of scale and reduce transaction costs where they collectively trade 
through a capable farmers’ organisation. Therefore, understanding the 
relationship between agricultural value chains, farmers’ organisations, and 
transaction costs could help in mapping a pathway to more a sustainable 
livelihood. 
 
A value chain, as the name suggests, is made of a series of activities that are 
connected by transactions. Each step involves value creation in different ways 
such as processing raw materials, labelling and branding, transportation, 
marketing and retailing (Porter, 1985). In general, transaction costs are 
understood as those costs associated with the act of exchanging ownership rights 
of economic assets (Coase, 1937; Demsetz, 1968; Williamson, 1981; North, 
1987; North, 1994; Ellram, 1995; Whinston, 2001; Demirbag et al., 2007). 
According to Coase, factors associated with transaction costs include 
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information, negotiation, monitoring, coordination, and enforcement of contracts. 
All these factors can be obstacles to development as smallholder farmers tend to 
have individually limited access and capabilities related to them. This can 
exacerbate their transaction costs in farm production and makes understanding 
them crucial to policy formulation. 
 
It is important to highlight that reducing transaction costs and lowering 
production costs are two different things. As Williamson (1979, 1986) argued, 
transaction costs are to be distinguished from production costs. A decision-maker 
can make a choice to use a firm structure or source from the market by comparing 
transaction costs with internal production costs. Thus, cost is the primary 
determinant of such a decision. In an agrarian context, internal production can 
cover economic activities organised by farmers’ organisations. For example, the 
Thai government has been promoting low cost production, which means to many 
farmers switching input supply such as chemical fertilizer to organic fertilizer 
(e.g., manure). At the same time, some farmland requires nutrient regeneration 
that can be only achieved by the application of supplementary chemical fertilizer 
during a cropping season, whereas only using compost with insufficient nutrients 
results in low yields.  Under such circumstances, the advocated low-cost 
production offers no cost advantage to farmers. 
 
To mitigate the high cost of transacting by individual firms, Coase asserted the 
principal role of intermediary firms to reduce transaction costs. In the 
agribusiness context, intermediary firms can trade in the form of individual 
traders (i.e. arbitrageurs or middlemen), agricultural cooperatives, contract farm 
companies, and farmers enterprises. These suggest that the structure and the 
business model of a farmers’ organisation has a direct impact on their value 
creation including the capacity to reduce transaction costs for the individual 
member farmers. However, Stockbridge et al. (2003) note that farmers’ 
organisations may also result in transaction costs that are too high to be 
successful. Market imperfections and transaction costs may then influence 
farmers’ decisions to settle into a new type of venture in order to access the 
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markets. To this end, Poole & Donovan (2014) discuss organization-building 
with the aim of facilitating the participation of smallholders in the value chain. 
Looking from the perspective of product development and organisation building, 
they identify the advantages of niche markets and building cooperative capacity 
as potential benefits of farmers’ organisation (Poole & Donovan, 2014), which 
can help to find a way for farmer-based organisations to become more resilient 
and entrepreneurial. 
 
1.3 Research question and contribution 
 
This thesis studies farmers’ organisations as a mean for capability building, 
mobilising resources and creating economic opportunities for smallholder 
farmers in Thailand. A farmers’ organisation is considered as a common ground 
where farmers can collectively learn, share and trade, that is, perform activities 
which are important building blocks for the development process. Indeed, Sen 
(1999) suggests that when an individual has achieved what can be termed a ‘good 
livelihood’ he or she usually has the ability to choose. To achieve better 
livelihoods, a typical farmers’ organisation may need to upgrade itself by 
becoming a capable farmers’ organisation. The meaning of ‘capable’ is that the 
organisation is in a position to access and mobilise resources and build 
capabilities in the way that empower farmers to deal with shocks and adapt to 
change. Such an organisation is a conduit bringing together a range of actors and 
coordinating economic activities collectively to achieve shared prosperity. The 
perspective seeks to explain how individual farmers can enhance their livelihood 
conditions by working together. As an organisation, farmers can gain access to 
resources and improve capability development in a way that is often practically 
impossible for individual farmers; the organisation can then serve as a skills 
development centre and a pool of heterogeneous resources, In the Thai context, 
this means that a farmer organisation can become the functional basis for rice 
value chain development. Understanding the development process of such 
organisations can advance the knowledge of the “what” and the “how” that 
encompass the road towards improved farmers’ livelihoods. 
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The aim of the thesis is to identify, explore and describe the patterns, mechanisms 
and factors through which farmers’ organisations aim to improve farmers’ 
livelihoods. In agricultural development literature, there is limited attention on 
the link between the capability of farmers’ organisations and value chain 
development. This thesis adds to the existing literature and knowledge base. The 
three empirical cases are purposefully selected to offer a better understanding of 
how and in what way farmers’ organisations develop resources and capabilities 
to improve livelihoods. To understand this, the thesis asks the key research 
question: “How does farmers’ organisation development improve livelihoods?” 
Empirically, the question emerges from the current state of the Thai farmers’ 
deprivation – despite many government interventions and subsidies. The 
argument then builds on the existing body of literature on farmers’ organisations, 
livelihoods and agricultural value chain as further discussed in Chapter 2: 
Literature Review. 
 
This analysis is essential, as success of a farmers’ organisation in Thailand is a 
rare achievement. The argument and the multidisciplinary discussion of the 
findings make a significant contribution to the current body of research 
concerning farmers’ organisations, livelihoods and agricultural value chains. As 
indicated earlier, a farmers’ organisation is a living body with a certain dynamic. 
The empirical cases have been purposefully selected so that they can offer an 
opportunity to explore and develop new knowledge through the examination of 
the dynamics of existing farmers’ organisations. To this end, the main analytical 
interest lies in a farmers’ organisation, its models, behaviour, and culture, that is, 
factors that form an organisation.  Furthermore, as the argument focuses on the 
development of novel organisational forms among farmers, we look at the 
direction, attributes, and characteristics of organisations that have provided the 
foundation for changes that could improve farmers’ livelihoods. The way 
organisations are formed influences their capabilities, efficiency and resilience. 
That is to say, the way farmers design their organisations influences the 
capabilities and effectiveness of their collective actions. In the context of 
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agricultural development, the setting for organising is somewhat different from 
typical business enterprises but nevertheless draws upon similar conceptual 
foundations. 
 
I find that a capable farmers’ organisation can develop in order to achieve the 
following: i) rice value chain upgrading as a process that reduces transaction 
costs; and ii) leveraging resources and capabilities building to improve farmers’ 
livelihood, reflecting their freedom and security. The following are fundamental 
outcomes of the study: 
• Farmers’ organisations can be instrumental as a means to improve 
farmers’ livelihoods. This can occur, for instance, when an 
organisational structure and behaviour helps farmers to develop their 
farm capabilities and to gain access to resources and different types of 
capital. 
• Improving coordination and linkages between immediate actors such as 
farmers (rice paddy producers) and millers (rice paddy processors) can 
offer a way to improve farm performance.  It is through improving value 
chain coordination and linkages that transaction costs can be managed 
and reduced and hence improve farm performance. 
• Farmers' organisations as a means to improved livelihoods requires that 
a farmers' organisation becomes a capable organisation so that it can 
facilitate resourcing, building capabilities and allocating capitals. 
• Farmers organisations, when functioning effectively, can improve rice 
value chains by i) achieving economies of scale; ii) 
attracting/accumulating heterogeneous resources; iii) leveraging power 
such as securing business loans and the associated business advice; and 
iv) enhancing human capital development.  
• Farmers' organisations can become a common arena where resources and 
capitals become available more readily. Consequently, assets and capital 
accumulation and capability development can emerge to offer multiple 
benefits from one farmer to another.   
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The development literature (further discussed in chapter 2) points to a link 
between human capital, capabilities, and economic prosperity (Chambers and 
Conway,1991; Scoones, 1998; DFID, 2001; Stockbridge et al., 2003; Poole et al., 
2016). From this perspective, the current study seeks to show that a farmers’ 
organisation can actively enable shared capabilities to be transformed into value 
(utility). The development process of a farmers’ organisation then concerns the 
interactions between farmers and other value chain actors toward more effective 
positioning in the business environment. The outcomes of such a process will 
determine the shared prosperity of actors in the rice value chain. In the Thai rice 
context, better understanding of this process could promote inclusive 
agribusiness leading to sustainable rice production, particularly among 
smallholder farmers. From the resource-based perspective, key actors, i.e. 
farmers and millers, can benefit by leveraging resources and capabilities. This 
could yield more a competitive advantage to farmers and thus make them more 
equitable partners in the value chain. To this end, collective organisation could 
strengthen the vulnerable actors while minimising business risks for the 
resourceful actors, which would benefit the public sector by reducing farmers’ 
indebtedness and thus the need for publicly financed subsidies to agriculture 
sector.  
 
This study employs qualitative research methods and discusses improved 
farmers’ livelihoods as a result of a capable farmers’ organisation and value chain 
development. Aa agricultural value chain framework is used as a theoretical 
basis. The findings and research outcomes can serve as building blocks toward, 
for instance, rice policy formation and implementation in Thailand and similar 
agricultural economies. Overall, the study contributes towards improving 






1.4 Originality and contribution to the literature  
 
This study's rice value chain framework builds on key concepts of agricultural 
value chain analysis focusing on improving farmers’ livelihoods. Based on the 
assumption that this can be achieved by upgrading the rice value chain and 
building a capable farmers’ organisation. 
 
Finding reveals that value chain governance's dynamic communicates how value 
chain coordination and interaction affect or improve information symmetry. For 
example, a farmers’ organisation with trade and milling facilities is likely to offer 
more transparent market information to farmer members. By contrast, millers are 
less likely to be more open about market information to farmers, who are not part 
of their business entity. Kaplinsky and Morris (2000) point out that power 
asymmetry is central to value chain governance. This is because the uneven 
distribution of information, capacities, and resources affect upgrading value chain 
activities. This research found that an organisational model arrangement directly 
impacts value chain governance, the ability to upgrade, and the efficiency of 
distributional outcomes. All these lead to rice value chain development. 
 
On building a capable farmers’ organisation, the discussion puts forward the 
pattern observed from the three farmers’ organisations as a process to increase 
capability. It can also serve the purpose of replication. The pattern involves the 
precursor factors that lay the foundation for the determinants of organisational 
development.  These precursor factors are commitment and trust, organisational 
models and behaviours, shared value, and capacity development and resource 
mobilisation. Consequently, the process and outcomes of a capable farmers’ 
organisation influenced by such precursors are organisational routines, 
repositioning farmers in the value chain, the reconfiguration of value chain 
finance, and value chain upgrading. The significance of each factor may vary, but 
the firm foundation depends on the combination of precursors and processes. 
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The study has shown that a buyer-driven farmers’ organisation model (i.e., the 
BSCM) can offer an excellent alternative model of interdependency for 
smallholder farmers instead of setting up farmers-led organisations without 
business experience and investment. To achieve these, farmers’ organisations 
would need to extend their network of resources and collaboration. This again 
emphasises the role of resource leveraging and organisational partnership in 
building a capable farmers’ organisation. It emphasises that relationships and 
chain coordination are crucial to integrating rice production and processing and 
organisation capability-building. This understanding is essential because, 
traditionally, farmers’ organisations are mostly formed by independent farmer-
led groups. Partnering with the business entity can enable farmers to gain market 
participation and narrow information asymmetry, which generally favours 
traders. 
 
This research has identified that value-added was not only derived from price 
build-up from stage to stage but involve how well value chain governance 
coordinate between value activities and relationship between value actors. This 
emphasise the importance of both vertical (i.e., explaining how a product comes 
into existence and then gets traded or transferred downstream the value chain) 
and horizontal linkages (i.e., the relationships between actors at the same level of 
the chain). This implies that social capital development has impacts on value 
chain governance, the wider networking, yet effective coordination is likely to 














Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
This thesis aims at contributing to a knowledge gap in agricultural development 
with a particular focus on farmers’ livelihood improvement. It builds on key 
literature in the theme of i) farmers’ livelihood, capability and resources; ii) 
farmers’ organisations; and iii) agricultural value chains. The research question 
and, more generally, the argument introduced in the previous chapter points to 
relevant streams of research within organisational theory that will be discussed 
in this chapter. It lays the foundation of this thesis’s conceptual framework.  
 
2.1 Farmers’ livelihood, capability and resources 
 
If poverty were seen as a disease, farmers would need a capable immune system 
to enable them fight against factors leading to poverty. Chambers and Conway 
(1991), Ellis (1998), Scoone (1998), Bebbington (1999), Carney (1999), 
Farrington et al. (1999), Sen (1999), DFID (2001), Poole and Donovan (2014) 
asserted that specific assets, capital and capabilities are instrumental for 
smallholder farmers to deal with various shocks, trends and seasonality that 
threaten their livelihoods.  From this viewpoint, there are certain capabilities and 
resources that can serve as conduits to achieve sustainable rural livelihood with 
the ability to adapt to change. The state of livelihood should depend more on 
individual farmers and their respective farmers organisations, and be less at the 
mercy of external factors. To this end, certain capabilities and resources are key 
to enable farmers to achieve sustainable and independent livelihood. Chambers 
and Conway (1991) laid a foundation for sustainable rural livelihood in terms of 
capabilities, equality and sustainability. These elements could function as a mean 






“A livelihood comprises people, their capabilities and their means of 
living, including food, income and assets. Tangible assets are resources 
and stores, and intangible assets are claims and access. A livelihood is 
environmentally sustainable when it maintains or enhances the local and 
global assets on which livelihoods depends, and has net beneficial effects 
on other livelihoods. A livelihood is socially sustainable which can cope 
with and recover from stress and shocks, and provide for future 
generations”  
 
Chambers and Conway,1991: p.5 
 
In general, individual smallholder farmers often possess limited tangible and 
intangible assets that enable them to trade profitably. For instance, Saqib et al. 
(2018) studied a group of subsistence farmers in flood-prone area of Pakistan and 
found that socio-economic factors, such as level of education and landholding 
farm size, determined the ability for subsistence farmers’ access to credit. 
Stockbridge et al. (2003) pointed out that services provided by farmers’ 
organisations such as access to services and resources enable better livelihoods 
for rural producers, otherwise limited at individual level. This suggests that 
sustainable livelihoods could be achieved where a farmers’ organisation is 
employed as a mean to develop collective assets and capabilities, resulting in a 
process that grants farmers the ability to manage vulnerability.  
2.1.1 Improving basic capacity  
 
Against this background, it is sometimes paradoxical that poverty alleviation 
strategies that intend to lift the vulnerable people out of poverty might be also a 
trap them into deepening deprivation. For example, the Thailand’s rice pledge 
scheme that promised to double the market price for typical rice paddy has led 
farmers to invest more on farm hoping to benefit from the surge of market prices. 
The controversial strategy ended up, however, causing damage to the industry for 
years as a result of making the price of Thai rice uncompetitive in the 
international markets, which has consequently caused deterioration to the 
financial situation of many Thai farmers. Such outcome had highlighted that 
market intervention policy may not be fully effective without farmers’ capacity.  
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This also suggests that using a narrow perspective such as pricing alone to 
analyse agricultural value chains can be misleading. Also, agricultural production 
is not controllable in a manner similar to manufacturing, as there are many 
uncontrollable factors such as weather and diseases, in addition to changing 
markets and regulation, and government interventions. These factors have one 
thing in common – uncontrollability from the perspective of a smallholder farmer 
that leads to dependency. This suggests that improving farmer’s livelihood’ 
should involve minimising the impact from, and coping with, such uncontrollable 
factors and thus enable farmers to become more independent. As the UN 
Economic and Social Council (1998) has declared in the Statement of 
commitment for action to eradicate poverty, the consequences of constrained 
choice and opportunity are central to development: 
“[F]undamentally, poverty is a denial of choices and opportunities, it is a 
violation of human dignity. It means lack of basic capacity to participate 
effectively in society. It means not having enough to feed and clothe a 
family, not having a school or a clinic to go to, not having the land on 
which to grow one's food or a job to earn one's living, nor having access 
to credit. It means insecurity, powerlessness and exclusion of individuals, 
households and communities. It means susceptibility to violence and it 
often implies living on marginal and fragile environments, not having 
access to clean water and sanitation.” 
 
United Nations, 1998 
 
The statement above concerns human development and infrastructure 
development as processes to build basic capacity. Amartya Sen’s concept of 
development as freedom (1999), which is central in his works on human 
development, and helps to elaborate the above ideas further. According to Sen, 
human development involves “the accumulation of human capital and the 
expansion of human capability” (Sen, 1997:1959). These two perspectives refer 
to actual abilities that people can achieve and acquire, which implies that a 
development process that offers access and opportunity to build capabilities in 
human development can lead to – or at least are a prerequisite for - poverty 
reduction and improved livelihood. Without these developmental pathways, other 
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market interventions, such as credit and taxation, are less likely to be effective in 
lifting poverty in long-term.  
2.1.2 Livelihood assets 
 
Scoones (1998) offers a useful framework for evaluating sustainable rural 
livelihoods published as a working paper on “Sustainable Rural Livelihood – A 
Framework for Analysis”. The paper formed a foundation for the DFID’s 
sustainable livelihoods guidance sheets (DFID, 1999). The DFID’s guidance 
sheets, as the name suggests, offer a practical direction on how rural livelihood 
can be evaluated. These are i) the vulnerability context, ii) different capitals, and 
iii) a livelihood strategies checklist. The framework highlights key elements of 
sustainable livelihoods, the vulnerability context and livelihood assets in 
particular. These two are crucial because understanding the vulnerability context 
helps to analyse vulnerability factors that come with market trends, shocks and 
inevitable seasonality in agricultural production. At the same time, livelihood 
assets help people to cope with the consequences that occur due to different 
vulnerability factors. Figure 2.1 shows the asset pentagon at the centre of the 
DFID’s livelihoods framework. It highlights how various assets, or human, 
natural, financial, physical and social capitals improve livelihoods together when 




Figure 2. 1 The asset pentagon   
Source: DFID, 2001 
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The livelihoods framework, the asset and capabilities concepts have been widely 
used in research, particularly in agrarian studies. Many scholars, for example, 
Shaffer (2001), Poole (2017) and Manlosa et al. (2019) have highlighted the 
importance of social and cultural assets for agricultural development. Shaffer 
(2001) defines vulnerability as a risk, but not necessarily poverty as such – it is 
“the likelihood of falling into poverty” (p. 7). Vulnerability is a risk factor that 
can cause physiological (i.e. income and basic human needs), social and basic 
human rights deprivation (ibid.). He then characterises seven forms of capital as 
causal variables that, if changed positively, can help improve livelihoods. These 
are economic, human, social, political, cultural, coercive and natural capitals. For 
example, Poole (2017) put forward the livelihood assets hexagon framework for 
agricultural development, as shown in figure 2.2. Some of the features of social 
assets include collective organisation, participation in information society, and 
access to public services. It also considers community gender, intergeneration as 
equity which could form the basis of value generation. The most striking feature 
is that of such livelihood assets components can build on existing possessions, 
leading to further development.  Also, Manlosa et al. (2019) contend that there 
are associations between capitals and livelihoods. The latter suggest that farm 
diversification, i.e., a combination of food crops and cash crops, is crucial for 
improving livelihoods. All in all, many scholars see capitals in the same way as 




Figure 2. 2 Livelihoods assets hexagon framework for agricultural development 
Source: Poole, 2017 
 
Capitals in some way serve as a driving force of social change and in this sense 
the development literature refers to capitals broadly as resources or assets (terms 
used interchangeably) which may be utilised in the pursuit of social betterment 
and objectives such as rural development and farmers’ livelihood (Chambers and 
Conway,1991; Scoones, 1998; DFID, 2001; Stockbridge et al., 2003; Poole et al., 
2016). 
2.1.3 Above poverty line, but below good livelihood  
 
However, the concept of livelihood is hard to measure and the conditions can be 
often more complex than those simply captured by a poverty line. For example, 
Thailand’s national poverty line is THB 1,586 (USD 48) per person per month, 
which is higher than the international standard of USD 1 per person per day 
(NESDB, 2017). At the same time, rice farmers in Thailand suffer from 
significant financial problems that go unnoticed if perceived narrowly from the 
perspective of economic poverty. Particularly, they have more access to various 
assets such as financial, natural and physical capitals. To this end, Alkire (2007) 
argue that using income as an indicator of poverty is an inadequate measure of 
human well-being. She also discusses the contradiction between earning more 
income but still having little access to health and education facilities. The author 
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argues that people who have access to health and education facilities can 
sometimes be better off than those who earn higher incomes, at least in the long 
run. 
 
Farmers’ livelihoods are particularly at risk when living conditions deteriorate 
rapidly. For example, an unmanageable debt (or poverty in this context) 
compromises the ability to interact with various parties not only for financial 
reasons but also due to the sense of shame or guilt for one’s situation (Alkine, 
2007; Reyles, 2007). Such a psychological obstacle can thus hinder farmers’ 
participation and learning new skills, thus limiting farmers’ opportunities to build 
human and social capitals over time that would help to improve livelihood. 
According to Coleman (1988, p. S96) social capital is a resource for a person’s 
action: “a person’s actions are shaped, redirected, constrained by the social 
context; norms, interpersonal trust, social networks, and social organization are 
important in the functioning not only of the society but also of the economy”. By 
contrast, human capital can be considered a resource for a person’s capabilities 
and “is created by changes in persons that bring about skills and capabilities that 
make them able to act in new ways” (Coleman, 1988, p, S100). This suggests that 
creating an organisation can serve as an engine of change enabling the creation 
of human capital and social capital, since an organisation can achieve much 
higher resource heterogeneity than individuals on average. Organisations (e.g., 
companies, farmers’ organisations) with heterogeneous resources and 
capabilities can better compete in the marketplace – the more and better 
resources, the more likely they are to earn economic rents and be able to compete 
(Peteraf, 1993). By contrast, as a result of the lack of learning, new practices and 
ideas are often inaccessible to individual farmers, resulting in a limited chance to 





2.1.4 Means to improved livelihoods of Thai rice farmers: Organisations, resources 
and capabilities 
 
Achieving and sustaining competitive advantage is the enigma of strategic 
management discipline (Porter, 1985; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Teece et al., 
1997; Grant, 2001) as successful businesses are driven by effective strategies. 
Considering the intrinsic link between value chain approach and competitive 
advantage demonstrated by strategy scholars, this literature review has attempted 
to understand how such connections can be applied to advancing poverty 
reduction strategy in the development studies. The depth and wealth of 
knowledge in strategic management can lend itself to analysing livelihood 
improvement in the context of Thai rice’s value chains. Despite the focus of this 
study being on farmers’ livelihoods, the organisation of the rice value chain 
obviously involves a variety of stakeholders including suppliers, processors, and 
traders. In particular, the Thai government is a significant stakeholder (an 
external but significant actor to rice value chains) in the Thai jasmine rice value 
chains. Actors act to their own business interests. This implies that with more 
stakeholders involved in the value chains, the more risks could be brought into 
the business environment. Therefore, the more vulnerable and resilient actors are 
well equipped, the more likely they thrive and survive in the business. As Grant 
(2001, p. 114) pointed out “the match an organization makes between its internal 
resources and skills […] and the opportunities and risks created by its external 
environment” is critical to its survival. Resources and capabilities are 
instrumental enabling actors to thrive and the businesses to stay competitive in 
the markets. 
 
The availability of resources and capabilities can involve possession, 
accessibility and mobilisation linking to organisation performance (Hall, 1993; 
Bebbington, 1999; Grant, 2001; Ravichandran & Lertwongsatien, 2005). This is 
particularly relevant when considering rice market organisations from a value 
chain perspective. Taking advantage of how a firm’s value chain interacts and is 
embedded in the overall value system, the perspective can offer opportunities for 
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actors and organisations to extend their resources and capabilities by partnering 
with new parties.  Resources and capabilities can be used as a perspective to 
understand the process of institutional change. For example, Battilana et al. 
(2009) defined institutional entrepreneurs as actors who leverage resources to 
create new or transform existing institutions (DiMaggio,1988; Garud, Hardy, & 
Maquire, 2007; Maquire, Hardy & Lawrence, 2004). DiMaggio (1988) termed 
such actors as institutional entrepreneurs whose actions contribute to 
transforming existing institutions or creating new ones. They can be 
organizations or groups of organizations (Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002; 
Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002), or individuals or groups of individuals 
(Fligstein, 1997; Maquire et al., 2004) (p.68). The agricultural value chain 
approach can be a meaningful tool when it offers more insight into how resources 
can be managed and mobilised to strengthen actors’ capabilities such as 
smallholder farmers and their respective associations. Linking farmers’ 
livelihood, resources and capabilities together will help frame a conceptual 


















2.2 Literature on Farmers’ Organisations 
 
The term ‘organisation’ has been defined by scholars from various disciplines 
and practices approaching organisations from many different perspectives. These 
represent different perspectives into how organisations are formed and 
developed, and in what ways they can improve and change their capabilities to 
become resilient and adapt to change and competition. It is worth noting that the 
term organisation may sometimes subconsciously result in narrowly thinking 
about the phenomenon in a business studies context. Thus, while the aim of this 
study is to contribute to knowledge related to organising, it is important to note 
that development studies is the key relevant literature and the target for the 
production of knowledge and contribution of this study. 
 
Researchers have considered for decades how the development process can 
influence organisations to evolve and transform in their design, arrangement and 
innovation. For instance, Hayek (1945) highlights an important role of 
organisations in achieving efficient economic outcomes by coordinating and 
integrating dispersed knowledge. Gartner (1989) asserts that the creation of 
organisations is a factor that separates entrepreneurship from other disciplines. 
Kachule and Poole (2005) analysed organisational and management issues of 12 
farmers’ organizations in Malawi. It critically assessed management issues in 
relation to market participation and human and social capital empowerment.  
Some critical features enabling coordination and empowering farmers included 
careful design of governance systems, capacity building and relationship with 
commercial partners. Jones (2013) describes organisations beyond economic 
value creation by looking at them from a service perspective. He described an 
organisation as “…a tool people use to coordinate their actions to obtain 
something they desire or value – that is, to achieve their goals (p.30).” According 
to Jones (2013), an organisation can be understood as a value-based engagement 
of satisfying an interest of an organisation, highlighting that new organisations 
are created and old are transformed when existing organisations cannot satisfy 
the needs or organisational members and owners. 
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The above-mentioned development process will be referred to as organisational 
development throughout this study. The term ‘organisational development’ in 
this study refers to the change process of a farmers’ organisation or a partnership 
between groups with the aim to conduct collective actions, which concern 
characteristics, resources, capabilities and attributes of organisations being 
subject to the study. As this thesis attempts to look into the characteristics and 
mechanisms that initiate and facilitate value creation through organisational 
development, it is important to understand what defines organisational 
development and how it is used in this study. Beckhard (1969) define 
organisational development as, “[..] an effort planned, organization-wide, and 
managed from the top, to increase organization effectiveness and health through 
planned interventions in the organization's 'processes,' using behavioural-science 
knowledge” (p.9). The description offers overall answers to how and what to 
expect if such a developmental process goes as planned, in relation to 
organisational goals. Essentially, the definition suggests a pattern of 
organisational development that can proceed as follow: 
 
effective plan ⇒ management from top-down ⇒ interventions ⇒ expected outcome 
 
Tailor-made development programmes are often required to meet the specific 
nature of an organisation. This highlights that human and capital resources are 
significant elements that each stage of the process requires. It is noticeable that 
organisational development is an objective-based approach aiming at introducing 
change processes within an organisation. It can be instrumental and complement 
the use of results-based approaches widely used by development agencies such 
the UN agencies, OECD and the World Bank. 
 
This study approaches farmers’ livelihoods from the perspective of resources, 
capabilities and competitiveness granted by the ways in which farmers organise 
their production and marketing. It assumes that the interventions through the 
development process of farmers’ organisations can enable farmers to mobilise 
resources and build relevant capabilities. An organisational perspective thus can 
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offer a significant contribution to knowledge towards improving farmers’ 
livelihoods by drawing upon rich literature and multidisciplinary knowledge. 
Relevant literature to understanding the development process of farmers’ 
organisations have been published by various disciplines including development 
studies (e.g., Miller & Jones, 2011; Poole & Donovan, 2014), economics (e.g., 
Coase, 1937; North, 1992), strategic management (e.g., Peteraf, 1993; Porter, 
1998), organisational studies (e.g., Mosakowski, 1998; Handy, 1999), to name 
but a few. A particular focus on farmers’ organisations can be found in 
development studies, rural development and sociology of development. 
However, to get a wider perspective of how organisations can be developed, the 
literature review is not limited to the context of farmers’ organisations. 
2.2.1 Farmers’ organisations 
 
To gain access to financial capital, taking a loan is a common resource among 
smallholder farmers for which land is often used as a collateral. If farmers cannot 
pay back their loans, this may result to land dispossession, making farmers 
become landless farm workers. Having to farm on a rental farmland makes it 
often uneconomic, for instance, to switch from chemical-based to organic 
farming, as this involves long-term investment of time and money. This suggests 
that there are flaws in current production systems and how markets work for the 
farmers. Consequently, a change in current production and market systems can 
lead to a way to improve farmers’ livelihoods, which highlights the importance 
of farmers’ entrepreneurial skills and capabilities as well as some financial 
literacy. Working collectively as a farmers’ organisation can offer an opportunity 
to achieve economies of scale and farm skills development, suggesting that 
farmers could be better off at improving livelihoods when working collectively 
as groups or as an organisation. In Thailand, for example, agricultural 
development policies put emphasis on financing farmers’ organisations, as shown 
in table 2.1. Despite government financial support and intervention, successful 
farmers’ organisations are considered a rare achievement in Thailand. This means 
that learning from the few successful organisations that have survived and thrive 
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could offer hints on what are the determinants of successful organisational 
arrangement for farmers.  
 















2014     
Number of projects 3 4 3 N/A 
Loan from BAAC (Million 
baht) 
0 196,370 0 N/A 
Fiscal budget (Million baht) 42,376 3,710 7,124 N/A 
2015     
Number of projects 4 6 7 N/A 
Loan from BAAC (Million 
baht) 
0 38,063 0 N/A 
Fiscal budget (Million baht) 48,996 11,286 37,539 N/A 
2016     
Number of projects 4 5 11 1 
Loan from BAAC (Million 
baht) 
0 58,200 0 0 
Fiscal budget (Million baht) 50,611 43,475 147,623 5,326 
2017     
Number of projects 3 3 10 1 
Loan from BAAC (Million 
baht) 
19,400 80,025 0 2,047 
Fiscal budget (Million baht) 4,441 2,475 22,743 83 
2018     
Number of projects 3 3 14 2 
Loan from BAAC (Million 
baht) 
55,991 56,680 0 1,420 
Fiscal budget (Million baht) 5,573 1,753 9,493 1,029 
Source: Paopongsakorn (2019) 
 
More generally, Miller and Jones (2011) discuss four types of organisational 
models of smallholder production. These are: producer-driven (association); 
buyer-driven; facilitator-driven; and integrated model, as shown in the table 
below. Understanding the role of farmers’ organisations can enable more 
effective implementation. For example, in a business environment where traders 
are predominant, encouraging trade partnership may offer a channel for farmers 
participating into markets. However, producer-driven farmers’ organisation 
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model is likely to benefit small farmers where their produces are on high demand 
and able to benefit from economy of scale. This is conceptual, yet practical as 
discussed by Gereffi (1999), a comparison between producer and buyer driven 
chains exhibit in table 2.3.  
 
Table 2. 2 Typical organisational models of smallholder production 
 
Model Driver of organisation  Rationale  
Producer-driven  
(association) 
• Small-scale producers, 
especially when formed into 
groups such as associations or 
cooperatives 
• Large scale farmers 
• Access to new 
markets 
• Obtain higher market 
price 
• Stabilize and secure 
market position 
 
Buyer-driven • Processors 
• Exporters 
• Retailers  
• Traders, wholesalers and other 
traditional market actors 
• Assure supply  
• Increase supply 
volumes 
• Supply more 
discerning customers, 
and market niches and 
interests 
 
Facilitator-driven • NGOs and other support 
agencies 
• National and local 
governments 
• ‘Make markets work 
for the poor’ 
• Regional and local 
development  
Integrated  • Lead firms 
• Supermarkets 
• Multi-national corporations 
• New and higher value 
markets 
• Lower prices for good 
quality 
• Market monopolies 
 Source: Miller & Jones, 2011 (p.28) 
 
The recognition that there are different types of value chains is particularly 
relevant to this research that aims to improving farmers’ organisations and 
farmers’ livelihoods. Gereffi (1999) and Kaplinsky and Morris (2000) highlight 
two different types of value chains as producer-driven and buyer-driven value 





“Producer-driven commodity chains are those in which large, usually 
transnational, manufacturers play the central roles in coordinating 
production networks (including their backward and forward linkages). 
This is characteristic of capital and technology intensive industries such 
as automobiles, aircraft, computers, semiconductors, and heavy 
machinery.”  
“Buyer-driven commodity chains refer to those industries in which large 
retailers, marketers, and branded manufacturers play the pivotal roles in 
setting up decentralized production networks in a variety of exporting 
countries, typically located in the third world. This pattern of trade-led 
industrialization has become common in labor-intensive, consumer goods 
industries such as garments, footwear, toys, housewares, consumer 
electronics, and a variety of handicrafts. Production is generally carried 
out by tiered networks of third world contractors that make finished goods 
for foreign buyers. The specifications are supplied by the large retailers 
or marketers that order that goods.” 
Gereffi, 1999: p.1 
 
 






Drivers of global 
commodity chains 
Industrial capital Commercial capital 
Core competencies Research and 
development, production 
Design, marketing 
Barrier to entry Economies of scale Economies of scope 




Typical industries Automobiles, computers, 
aircraft 
Apparel, footwear, toys 
Ownership of 
manufacturing firms 
Transnational firms Local firms, predominantly in 
developing countries 




  Source: Gereffi, 1999  
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2.2.1 How does an organisation create value?  
 
The creation of value is the ultimate aim of an organisation, but how an 
organisation creates value is a complex question and relates to setting and the 
boundaries of the organisation. Value creation involves the exchange of goods 
which virtually always involves transaction costs. In general, transaction costs 
are understood as those costs associated with the act of exchanging ownership 
rights of economic assets (Coase, 1937; Demsetz, 1968; Williamson, 1981; 
North, 1987; North, 1994; Ellram, 1995; Whinston, 2001; Demirbag et al., 2007). 
Coase (1937) introduced the concept of transaction costs in The Nature of the 
Firm, although he used the term ‘marketing costs’. According to Coase, factors 
associated with transaction costs include information, negotiation, monitoring, 
coordination, and enforcement of contracts. To mitigate the high cost of 
transacting by individual firms, Coase asserted the principal role of intermediary 
firms is to reduce these costs. Williamson (1981) contend that transaction cost 
economics has an intrinsic link to the study of organisations and regards “the 
transaction cost as the basic unit of analysis” (p. 548). In the agribusiness context, 
intermediary firms can trade in the form of individual traders (i.e., arbitrageurs 
or middlemen), agricultural cooperatives, contract farm companies, and farmers’ 
enterprises. This suggests that the nature of a farmers’ organisation (or a firm) 
has a direct impact on their value creation. 
 
Value creation concerns economic organisation. In the marketplace, price is a 
means to coordinate value create by organising economic activities. Generally, 
information about market is imperfect. Consumers, or buyers, make unjustified 
choice due to the lack of information (Nelson, 1970). Hayek (1945) asserted that 
the price system can be instrumental to communicate market information, for 
example, signalling changes in demand and supply. Wolinsky (1983) discussed 
that prices served as a quality signal, the higher price signal higher quality to 
group of consumers of whom willing to pay. In the context of agriculture, the low 
supply of agricultural produce can cause a seasonal rise of the market price, 
which consumers may, at least partially, perceive to be related to the change of 
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supply. At the same time, the change in the relationship of price and supply can 
be caused by natural disasters, management of stocks of goods, changes in 
product quality and, for instance, newly available information. Such factors are 
typically beyond the control of small producers on the market. This is where 
value chain development can support more successful market participation by 
enabling smallholder farmers to enter markets as organisations. Creating a new 
model or structure of farmers’ organisations can potentially offer an alternative 
way to reach out to the markets instead of serving intermediary middlemen. The 
re-allocation of capital and resources could help create a business ecosystem that 
benefits a farmers’ organisation itself. Gathering as organisations can allow 
individuals to seize market opportunities from actual demand in their business 
environment. In addition, collective actions such as agricultural cooperatives can 
employ savings and investment as a means for wealth creation. Farmers’ 
organisations can be instrumental to help individuals to benefit from savings and 
investments (Stockbridge et al., 2003; Adeyemo and Bamire,2005).   
 
In rural agriculture markets in Thailand, arbitrageurs or middlemen facilitate the 
rice value chain to become more efficient by linking smallholder farmers and 
millers. Middlemen offer services to help individual farmers to trade with millers 
more easily and thus, in principle, reducing the cost of transacting. Services can 
involve, for instance, transportation and negotiating farm-gate price guarantees. 
However, in the situation where farmers have limited alternative choices to trade, 
this can also result in high transaction costs being imposed on farmers as a 
premium to facilitate trade. To counter such a situation, some farmers have self-
organised as a farmers’ organisation, where possible, to reduce transaction costs 
by trading through their own enterprise. However, founding a farmers’ 
organisation is similar to setting up a company – it is a challenging task for those 
with limited business experience. As a result, many farmers’ organisations have 
not been able to resolve issues of transaction costs and trade facilitation (Poole 
and de Frece, 2010; Poole, 2017). 
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Transaction costs can have a sort of domino effect on farmers’ livelihoods. High 
transaction costs incurred by farmers result in low profit margins as small farm-
sizes do not easily support economies of scale. Therefore, this can affect small 
producers in a way that causes production costs to be too high to farm profitably, 
whereas the trade environment can influence the way farmers respond to such a 
situation. For example, farmers may end up borrowing from multiple lenders, 
delay debt payback and be reluctant to invest in improving farm activities 
(Paopongsakorn, 2019). All these can contribute to debt accumulation that 
eventually becomes difficult to cope with. Basically, farmers often end up using 
loans as a source of cashflow. Such a situation is not new among smallholder 
farmers with inadequate resources to create superior products and limited market 
negotiation power. This suggests that improving farmers’ livelihood can be 
realised through the association with farmers’ organisations that help to reduce 
transaction costs, and that enhancing farm production performance would require 
effective use of finance together with capability development. 
 
A trend towards high transaction costs can also attract new actors who see 
economic opportunities through increasing the efficiencies in the way the market 
is currently organised. In some cases, such new players may bring in required 
facilities that are scarce among farmers due to the lack of capital. For example, 
the Thailand’s Kubota company as a new entrant used farmers’ organisations as 
a launchpad to reach out to smallholder farmers. The lack of credit makes it 
difficult to lease farm machines on an individual basis, whereas leasing through 
farmers’ organisations, the Kubota’s farm machines boost farm productivity by 
providing more effective farming technology (SKL, 2019). This highlights a 
trade alliance between farmers’ organisations and agricultural supply firms in a 
way that could benefit farmers, who otherwise may not have similar access to an 
important resource on an individual basis. Such an organisation may create value 
not only by maximising (or at least improving) profit margins but also by 




2.2.3 Entrepreneurship and resources 
 
Several scholars have emphasised the connection between organisation, 
entrepreneurship and resources. For example, Gartner (1989) simply defines 
entrepreneurship as “the creation of organizations” (p. 47) and further describes 
that “…entrepreneurs create organizations, while non-entrepreneurs do not” (p. 
47). Creating organizations or new ventures requires individuals to perform the 
role of an entrepreneur involving the management of financial, legal, marketing 
and technical aspects of a new firm or other type of productive arrangement 
(Casson, 1982; Gartner, 1989; Mosakowski,1998; Jones, 2013; Battilana et al., 
2009). Jarillo (1989, p. 135) points out that the essence of entrepreneurship “is in 
the ability and willingness to use external resources”. This is particularly 
important in circumstances where mobilising the use of external resources can 
reduce transaction costs and increase an organisation’s production capacity. 
Jones (2013, p. 3) describes: “entrepreneurship is the term used to describe the 
process by which people recognize opportunities to satisfy needs and then gather 
and use resources to meet those needs”. It is notable that scholars distinguish 
between entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial resources. For example, Casson 
(1982, p. 23) defines an entrepreneur as “someone who specializes in taking 
judgemental decisions about the coordination of scarce resources”. The author 
(p. 23) further explains that the someone “is a person, not a team, or a committee, 
or an organization”. Mosakowski (1998) asserts that entrepreneurial resources 
can affect a firm’s efficient organisation. These entrepreneurial resources can be 
found at an individual level acquired by one or a few individuals as well as at a 
team level acquired by a team of individuals. Despite the different views between 
organisation and entrepreneurship in terms of individual and collective levels, a 
common theme across the entrepreneurial perspective is the ability to mobilise 
resources to achieve the interests of an organisation (or a firm). This means a 
successful organisation is likely to be formed by an entrepreneur who acquires 




2.2.4 Learning organisation  
 
A learning organisation has become a characteristic of organisations trying to 
evolve in order to maintain performance and compete with business rivals 
(Korten, 1980; Kachule and Poole, 2005; Gavin et.al, 2008). As this thesis 
concerns farmers and rural development, an organisation meaning leans towards 
such themes. Korten (1980) pinpointed contradictions in foreign assistance 
programming, driven by political and bureaucratic imperatives. Such 
circumstances were still relevant, despite old publication, government may face 
similar traps on policy implementation. Some of Korten’s critics included the 
nature of poverty-focus rural development projects were small, slow to 
implement, difficult to monitor and simple. While donors preferred projects that 
were large, easy to monitor, quick to implement and somewhat technical.  
 
Kachule and Poole (2005) analysed organisational and management issues of 12 
farmers’ organizations in Malawi. It critically assessed management issues in 
relation to market participation and human and social capital empowerment.  
Some critical features enabling coordination and empowering farmers included 
careful design of governance systems, capacity building and relationship with 
commercial partners. Gavin et al. (ibid.) proposed three building blocks of a 
learning organisation, which are i) a supportive learning environment; ii) concrete 
learning processes and practices; iii) leadership that reinforces learning. This kind 
of organisational learning ideology is particularly relevant in the context of Thai 
rice farmers’ organisations. As Gavin el al. (2008) further explain, four 
characteristics of a supportive learning environment include psychological safety, 
appreciation of differences, openness to new ideas, and time for reflection. This 
insight from (individual and organisational) psychology suggests that in the cases 
of people with emotional insecurity as a result of insecure living conditions (e.g., 
high debt and job loss), their emotional condition may oppose participation in 
such a learning environment. In other words, insecure livelihood conditions can 
create a psychological obstacle for an individual to become a part of a learning 
organisation. As organisations are established as a formation of individuals, this 
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suggests a domino effect: the more unmanageable debt individuals have, the less 
likely they are to become a part of a learning organisation that could help improve 
their condition and find themselves excluded from more efficient and effective 
enterprises. 
 
To succeed in improving farmers’ livelihood, farmers’ organisations may 
facilitate more than the direct creation of financial value through revenues. Value 
creation can offer not merely financial profits but also human and social capitals. 
Garwin (1993) asserts that a learning organization is one important attribute 
contributing to the development of an organisation. The idea of a learning 
organisation is not new, as Garwin (p. 55) cites Charles Darwin: “It is not the 
strongest of the species who survive, nor the most intelligent; rather it is those 
most responsive to change.” From this perspective, organisational effectiveness 
is a result of being a learning organization, which involves a learning vision and 
leadership committed to learning. The level and type of learning mechanisms can 
be complex and vary in relation to the nature of firm business and the size of an 
organisation. Garwin proposes that the learning organization is built on four 
pillars (or subsystems): organisation, people, knowledge, and technology (ibid.). 
Each subsystem supports the other in magnifying the learning as it permeates 
across the system. 
 
In the context of agricultural development, farmers’ organisations have been 
found to be instrumental to enable farmers to access and extend their resources. 
Development agencies and scholars such as IFAP (1992), Stockbridge et al 
(2003), Poole and de Freece (2010), Poole and Donovan (2014) look into 
farmers’ organisations as instruments for agrarian development. For example, 
Stockbridge et al (2003) offers a theoretical discussion of farmers’ organisations 
for market access. The International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP, 
1992, p.4) defines four types of farmers’ organisations including: i) farmers 
groups and pre-cooperatives, ii) farmers’ associations, federations and unions, iii) 
agricultural cooperatives owned and controlled by their members, and iv) 
chambers of agriculture having a general assembly elected by farmers. The aim 
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of smallholder farmers collectively to work together as a farmers’ organisation is 
typically to generate more profits than through the traditional market-access 
system. The traditional market-access system is typically organised by local 
traders and middlemen. Collective trading through farmers’ organisations is 
believed to empower farmers to earn more profits as compared to sole trading. 
However, capacity building remains challenging. 
 
Creating profit generally results from business activities which require specific 
skill sets, for example, in supply chain management, product development, 
accounting, advertising and marketing. This may explain why many farmers’ 
organisations often find themselves unsuccessful due to the lack of essential 
business management skills to trade profitably. Establishing a farmers’ 
organisation involves various costs to set-up and to run, let alone the lack of credit 
history to apply for loans. In many cases, these costs can turn out to be higher 
than the value an organisation can create for smallholder farmers in the short 
term. Stockbridge et al (2003) note that farmers’ organisations may also result in 
transaction costs that are too high to be successful. Yet, market imperfections and 
transaction costs may also influence farmers’ decisions to settle into a new type 
of venture to access the markets. To this end, Poole & Donovan (2014) discuss 
organization-building with the aim of facilitating the participation of 
smallholders in the value chain. Looking from the perspective of product 
development and organisation building, the authors identify the advantages of 
niche markets and building cooperative capacity as potential benefits for farmers’ 
organisation (Poole & Donovan, 2014). This can help to narrow down a way for 
farmer-based organisations to become more resilient and entrepreneurial. 
 
The discussion in this section highlights learning through organising as a 
mechanism for improving smallholder farmers’ livelihoods. Obviously, the 
specific way in which such an organisation is arranged can also affect 
organisational effectiveness and the ability to catalyse knowledge development 
by farmers as so-called reflective practitioners (Garwin 1993, p. 60). This implies 
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that the influencing the nature of the organisational setting can be the initial stage 
towards the development of organisation. 
2.2.5 Organisation as the basis for growing heterogeneous resources and 
capabilities 
 
A variety of factors have been shown to have an impact on the ability of 
organisations to acquire sustained competitive advantage including the attributes 
of the organisation (Barney 1986, 1991), capability development (Sen, 1997; 
Johannessen & Olsen, 2003; Robyns, 2005; Alkire, 2005; Ansari et al., 2012), 
product differentiation (Porter, 1989, Teece et al., 1997), and resources (Peteraf, 
1993; Grant, 2001). For example, the attributes of organisational culture can be 
sources of sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1986). Barney (1991) 
further elaborates four attributes of organisational resources that could potentially 
generate sustained competitive advantage, which are value, rareness, imitability 
and non-substitutability. Peteraf (1993) develops a general model of resources 
and firm performance with the aim to build consensus around a ‘parsimonious 
model’ (p. 180). In the article The Cornerstones of Competitive Advantage: A 
Resource-Based View, Peteraf (1993) describes a resource-based model that 
underpins competitive advantage. The study offers four conditions all of which 
must be met to create sustained competitive advantage. These are: i) resource 
heterogeneity, ii) ex post limit to competition, iii) imperfect resource mobility, 
and iv) ex ante limits to competition. The level of resource heterogeneity and 
superior productive factors have an impact on the return on investment. Peteraf 
(1993) indicates that breakeven can be expected by firms with marginal 
resources, while ones with superior resources can expect to earn rents. Rent-
seeking behaviour can generate economic rents through competition and 
cooperation (Lado et al., 1997). This suggests that an organisation with limited 
internal resources, such as a farmers’ organisation, can earn rents by building a 




Jones (2013) asserts that sustained competitive advantage can be created through 
organisational design and organisational development. This suggests that the 
organisational development would need to result in the aforementioned resources 
in order to produce sustained competitive advantage. By contrast, Porter (1998) 
considers the source of sustained competitive advantage from a product 
development perspective and identifies the source of competitive advantage as 
product differentiation and cost competitiveness in the market. For Barney (1986, 
1991) the question is viewed from an internal organisational perspective. In fact, 
these different views complement each other and could offer a framework to 
build a cooperative network. Both Porter and Barney saw that competitive 
advantage is at the heart of a firm’s performance and that performance can 
become superior as a result of the quality of a firm’s resources and capabilities. 
Against this background, by becoming a cooperative/collaborative network an 
organisation can mobilise more heterogeneous resources and capabilities (i.e. 
internal and external). In response to the need for building a cooperative network, 
creating shared value can offer collaboration in a more sustainable manner 
(Porter and Kramer, 2011). 
 
So, how can a farmers’ organisation create a basis of heterogeneous resources 
and capabilities? The differences between organisations and individuals include 
dispersed knowledge and heterogeneity of resources. When functioning well, an 
organisation offers a pool of diversified skills beyond what any individual can 
possess. This is particularly significant to smallholder farmers who normally 
have limited resources, knowledge and power, especially when acting as 
individuals. A well-functioning organisation is, in this sense, not only a physical 
collection of individuals and material resources but the collective of dispersed 
knowledge and skills that enable them to improve over their individual 
limitations (e.g.,, market participation, skills and access to resources). Andrews 
(1971) asserts that an appraisal of organisational competencies and resources are 
the foundation of strategy formulation. Those which are distinctive or superior 
relative to those of rivals, may become the basis for competitive advantage if they 
are matched appropriately to environmental opportunities (Andrews, 1971; 
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Thompson and Strickland, 1990). From this viewpoint, understanding of a firm’s 
competitiveness and attractiveness is deemed necessary. From farmers’ 
organisations’ standpoint, an optimal perspective should involve managing 
vulnerability, farmers’ capacity development and achieving value chain 
upgrading. Improving farmers livelihood would yield competitiveness, and vice 
versa.  
2.2.6 Building organisations for value creation 
 
I have discussed above the importance of organisational competencies, resources 
and networking in building organisational capability through collaboration. As 
explained in section 2.2.3 above, the connection between entrepreneurship, 
entrepreneur and organisation is a crucial linkage to consider when it comes to 
organisational development and change. This suggests that the connection 
between entrepreneurship, entrepreneur and organisation is a crucial linkage to 
consider when it comes to organisational development and change. This is 
because existing literature suggests that without the expression of 
entrepreneurship and the work of entrepreneurial individuals – an organisation 
might well be considered merely a business model. This is important to keep in 
mind when considering the use of knowledge for replication or scaling up local 
organisations such as farmers’ organisations and agricultural cooperatives. This 
section focuses on the nature of the organisational setting, particularly among 
vulnerable actors such as smallholder farmers. 
 
Handy (1999) describe factors that could influence organisational behaviour – 
the environment, ecology of collective interests, and behaviour. Although the 
factors are generally independent from one another, they also have some 
influence on each other. Handy (1999, p. 11) explains: 
“All behaviour takes place in an environment. To ignore the influence of 
the environment is implicitly to accept constraints and conditions, to take 
a negative decision about influence. To adjust the environment in order to 
remove constraints or facilitate some aspect of behaviour is indirect 
influence. The understanding of ecology is necessary to an understanding 
of behaviour. The use of ecology is a powerful means of influencing 
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behaviour, or at the very least, of allowing other methods of influence to 
work.”  
Handy, 1999: p. 11 
 
Handy (1999) offers an interesting direction to make the most out of establishing 
an organisation as an instrument for value chain development. First, 
‘environment’ can mean business environment or institutional environment that 
influences organisational behaviour (North, 1992). Second, ‘ecology’ suggests 
the coordinated utilisation of resource-based view on accessibility of individuals 
in the given business environment. Obviously, that the term ecology is not used 
here in the general meaning of environmental ecology, but rather as a part of 
figurative terminology such as political ecology and entrepreneurial ecology. 
Third, ‘behaviour’ would not exist without two factors: actors (e.g., individual, 
groups) and the environment. This highlights that the interaction between actors 
and the environment shapes behaviour. In the context of agricultural 
development, farmers’ organisations have been used as a platform for actors to 
engage more thoroughly with their business environment. This suggests that 
quality of organisational behaviour can be built from a process whereby 
individual traits become embedded in an organisational culture. The success of 
an organisation is then intrinsically linked to the quality of its behaviour, 
attributes and competencies. 
 
Overall, the extant literature highlights the need for new or developed 
organisational forms as the existing forms of trading and operating do not seem 
to serve farmers satisfactorily. Such a satisfactory performance can require 
organisations that can remedy information asymmetries and reduce transaction 
costs, and thus enable economic rent generation. Achieving these aims can mean 
improving resources accessibility which is a way to improve farmers’ livelihoods. 
This suggests that a new form of organisational setting is required to access 
resources that can help individual farmers to manage production, and to govern 




2.3 Value chain approach and improved livelihood 
 
The value chain approach is considered a powerful analytical tool for strategic 
planning in sustainable development and poverty reduction. It has gained 
popularity for its promise to help stimulate economic growth and enhance 
competitiveness of the agricultural sector (Kaplinksy & Morris, 2000; Miller & 
Silva, 2010; Jones, 2011; Stoian et al., 2012; Poole & Donovan, 2014; Donovan 
et al., 2015; Poole, 2017). Particularly, value added and value chain upgrading 
perspectives have been used to suggest improvements to the production and 
capture of value by actors in the agricultural sector (Gereffi, 1999; Kaplinsky & 
Morris, 2000; Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002; Trienekens, 2011; Poole & Donovan, 
2014; Donovan et al., 2015). Over the last few decades, it has become popular 
among development agencies such as governments and development aid 
agencies. Various development agencies have produced value chain guidelines, 
for example, FAO, 2007; IIED, 2008; ILO, 2009; World Bank, 2010. Donovan 
et al (2015) looked into 11 methodological guidelines (namely: FAO, 2007; IIED, 
2008; ILO, 2009; World Bank, 2010) and found gaps between the stated 
recommendations and how to perform a full implementation of value chain 
analysis. For example, the guides by FAO (2007) and IIED (2008) consider 
investment aspects by smallholders and other value chain actors as a potential 
element for making improvements through value chain development. However, 
according to Donovan et al. (2015), the guides fail to describe the actor-specific 
conditions in relation to investment (e.g.,, potential cost and benefits, investment 
risks). In general, value chain analysis is a strategic tool used to analyse internal 
firm activities aiming at increasing profit margins or simply value produced by 
the firm. In this section, the focus is on the benefit of value chain application on 





2.3.1 An evolving and expanding field of value chain approach from business to 
development studies 
 
The value chain concept as an analytical tool for understanding competitive 
advantage was created and popularised out of the strategic management 
discipline as early as in late 1970s by Porter (1979). Since then, the value chain 
approach has evolved into various versions with slightly different definitions with 
respect to the perspective and aims of different academic disciplines as well as in 
practical applications deriving from it. Trienekens (2011) asserts that four key 
disciplines have contributed to the building of value chain theory: Global Value 
Chain (GVC) analysis, supply chain management, new institutional economics, 
and network approaches. Although there is no universal definition for a value 
chain, most understandings revolve on two elements: bringing product from 
production to markets and, along with this, the creation of added value at each 
step. 
 
Considering Google citations among value chains scholars, Michael Porter’s 
“Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Performance” (1985) is one of 
the most prominent value chain reference in the field of business studies. While 
“A Handbook for Value Chain Research” authored by Kaplinksy and Morris 
(2000) is among the most influential in the field of development studies. Their 
works have greatly contributed to foundation and guideline of value chain 
methodology. 
 
Porter (1998) defines a value chain as an instrument that represents firm’s source 
of performance and indicates opportunities for competitive advantage. 
Describing a firm’s business functioning, Porter (1998, p. 36) argues that “every 
firm is a collection of activities that are performed to design, produce, market, 
deliver, and support its product”. Porter (1998) then introduced the value chain 
(p. 33) as a tool to systematically examine and analyse the sources of competitive 
advantage in terms of a firm’s activities and performance, and how the activities 
are linked to each other and external parties. According to Porter (1985), value 
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can be harvested by i) cost advantage and ii) differentiation advantage strategies. 
He offers a generic value chain approach (figure 2.3) that can be amended and 
adapted for the specific needs of a specific business. The value chain approach 
highlights the importance of tangible and intangible resources enabling the firm 
to function effectively and competitively in the value chain in which it 
participates. This idea has been tested and developed extensively over time 
mostly by scholars and practitioners in business and economic disciplines. Porter 
himself has developed the value chain concept in relation to corporate social 
responsibility and the interests of the wider society (Porter and Kramer, 2006). 
Recently, the development of agricultural value chains approach has been 
conceptualised and used as a tool for livelihood improvement and poverty 
reduction. (Stoian et al., 2012; Devaux et al., 2016). 
 
 
Figure 2. 3 Porter’s generic value chain 
Source: Porter, 1998: p.37 
 
A value chain, as the name suggests, is made of a series of activities that are 
connected by transactions. Each step involves value creation in different ways 
such as processing raw materials, labelling and branding, transportation, 
marketing and retailing. Value can be created, for instance, by 1) processing 
material to a state in which consumers are willing to pay for the product, 2) 
minimising production costs while maintaining the quality of product, and 3) by 
differentiating the product so that it serves a specific market niche. This means 
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value can be created in the form of increased profits, reduced costs, and economic 
rents. By considering discrete activities and their configuration along a particular 
value chain, firms can position themselves so that they are able capture value 
generated in the chain. This perspective on value creation can serve as a 
springboard for creating new business models, or a way to improve a firm’s 
position in a value chain. 
 
According to Kaplinksy and Morris (2000, p. 4) “Value Chains describe the full 
range of activities which are required to bring a product or service from 
conception, through the different phases of production (involving a combination 
of physical transformation and the input of various producer services), delivery 
to final consumers, and final disposal after use”. Kaplinksy and Morris emphasise 
the role of economic rents as a way to value creation and consider a variety of 
forms of economic rents including technology and human resources; 
organisational, marketing, relational, resources, policy, infrastructural and 
financial rents. It is noticeable that Kaplinsky and Morris’s (2000) idea of 
economic rents is similar to the resource-based approach (for example, Grant, 
2001) suggesting that there is a close affinity between competitive advantage, 
economic rents, and resources in value creation. They also suggest that a value 
chain could be defined from two perspective: heuristic and analytical. This has 
led to not only the issue around the variation of definitions but also different 
denomination. For example, Gereffi (1994) has coined the phrase ‘global 
commodity chain (GCC)’ and argued that the GCC is distinct in that it 
incorporates an international dimension, that it focuses on the power of lead firms 
and the coordination of global activities, and that it explicitly recognises the 
importance of organisational learning (Gereffi, 1999). 
 
Several prominent studies such as Horvath (2001), Taylor (2005) and Stevenson 
and Spring (2007have used value chain and supply chain interchangeably, yet 
value chain and supply chain have different definitions from one another. Value 
chain emphasises value creation for competitive advantage from internal firm and 
coordination within its business unit, whereas a supply chain perspective looks 
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into the whole range of supply-side movements physically (Stevenson and 
Spring, 2007). It is the common feature of both value chain and supply chain that 
they involve exchanging intermediary products resulting in value build-up. The 
World Bank (2006, p. 5) characterises the value chain as “price build-up from 
stage to stage”, by which market price is used to determine a quantitative value 
chain analysis. From this viewpoint, it may seem obvious enough to perceive 
value build-up along the value chain as value-added. Other scholars offer 
different views, for example, Bolwig et al. (2010) and Talamini and Ferreira 
(2010) emphasise the vertical linkages in connection to the horizontal dimension. 
The relations of vertical and horizontal linkages illustrate how actors and 
activities are connected vertically, while managing relationships between actors 
at the same level of the chain (Bolwig et al. 2010). However, value chains are not 
just a linear sequence of activities and associated actors (Bolwig et al. 2010; 
Talamini and Ferreira 2010). The notion of a chain seems to suggest a linear and 
sequential order that is unlikely to be found in the real world. Value chain analysis 
has commonly focused on the vertical linkages, i.e. explaining how a product 
comes into existence and then gets traded or transferred downstream the value 
chain. While it is important to know how actors and activities are linked 
vertically, it also important to understand the horizontal dimension, i.e. the 
relationships between actors at the same level of the chain (Bolwig et al. 2010). 
It is noteworthy that horizontal linkages are often not included in the value chain 
analysis. Such linkages can offer a view on how primary and secondary actors 
are embedded in a value chain. This implies that healthy relationship 
management can contribute to value creation activities in the value chain. 
 
To this end, it is noticeable that value chain research published during the late 
2000s and early 2010s may use the term value chain and commodity chain 
interchangeably, which is probably due to the influence of Gereffi’s research on 
global commodity chains. Interestingly, Gereffi (1999) further discussed four 
dimensions that differentiate the global commodity chains from value chain 
approaches (Porter, 1990). 
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“The global commodity chain framework: 
1) incorporates an explicit international dimension into the analysis; 
2) focuses on the power exercised by the lead firms in different segments 
of the 
commodity chain, and it illustrates how power shifts over time; 
3) views the coordination of the entire chain as a key source of 
competitive advantage that requires using networks as a strategic asset; 
and 
4) looks at organizational learning as one of the critical mechanisms by 
which firms try to improve or consolidate their positions within the 
chain.” 
Gereffi, 1999: p.3 
 
Taking cue from these dimensions can help to understand how to improve value 
chain performance. The components 3 and 4 seem particularly helpful for value 
chain upgrading. Considering Gereffi’s viewpoint, value chain development can 
benefit from leveraging assets and resources through coordination and 
organisational learning above the level of individual farmers. At the same time, 
Kaplinsky and Morris (2000) elaborate value chain governance and provide 
examples that help understand it in practice. The authors described three types of 
governance that are legislative, juridical and executive governance, as shown in 
Table 2.4. 
 
Table 2. 4 Examples of legislative, judicial and executive value chain governance 
 
Type of governance Exercised by parties internal 
to a value chain 
Exercised by parties 
external to a value chain 
Legislative governance  Setting standards for 
suppliers in relation to on-
time deliveries, frequency of 
deliveries and quality 
Environmental standards 
Child labour standards 
judicial governance Monitoring the performance 
of suppliers in meeting these 
standards 
Monitoring of labour 
standards by NGOs 
Specialised firms 
monitoring conformance to 
ISO standards 
Executive governance Supply chain management 
assisting suppliers to meet 
these standards 
Producer associations 






Source: Kaplinsky and Morris, 2000, p.31 
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Legislative governance involves defining the basis of participation in value chain, 
which is setting the parameters governing the value chains. The example of such 
rules of participation can include conformance to international standards such as 
ISO9000 (on quality), ISO14000 (on environment), and HACCP (hazard analysis 
and critical control point) in food processing industry. Juridical governance 
concerns audit performance and compliance with rules that coordinate the 
conformance with the set parameters. Executive governance concerns 
intermediaries that provide assistance to value chain participants in meeting these 
rules. From smallholder farmers standpoint, these are clearly proactive forms of 
governance and costly to implement. To achieve these, farmers’ organisations 
would need to extend their network of resources and collaboration. This again 
emphasises the role of resource leveraging and organisational partnership in 
building a capable farmers’ organisation.    
 
Bellu (2013) discusses the value chain approach as a functional analysis to 
provide a detailed profile of industry structure. These involve the sequence of 
manufacturing operations from production to consumption. This type of value 
chain analysis largely concerns the flow of physical components, namely 
products, services, information and finance.  In international food and agriculture 
development contexts, value chain has become a useful analytical tool for 
understanding the relationships among actors in a chain and considering the 
potential implications for development (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001; Humphrey & 
Schmitz, 2002; Stringer & Le Heron, 2008; Graef, 2014). Among recent research 
efforts, the value chain concept has been linked to the prevailing global 
challenges of malnutrition, and how agricultural and food value chains can be 
enhanced to improve the health of poor communities (Gelli et al., 2015; Maestre, 
et al., 2017; Maestre and Poole, 2018; Donovan and Gelli, 2019; Gelli, et al., 
2020). The overall aim of value chain analysis is to identify ways to improve the 
performance of a chain such that all actors are placed in a better position 
(Bammann, 2007; Riisgaard et al., 2010). The position of actors in a chain may 
be improved through increased rewards and/or minimised exposure to risk, both 
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economically and in term of outcomes such as poverty, gender, labour and the 
environment (Riisgaard et al., 2010). 
 
It is important to note that a firm’s value chain is normally a part of a value 
system. A value system refers to the conglomeration of different but related value 
chains performing their business activities in a given business sector environment 
(Porter, 1989; Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998; Möller & Rajala, 2007; Porter, 2009). 
Taking a systems or sectoral approach rather than focusing on an individual chain 
helps to give a broader focus, not least by adopting a dimension of broader inter-
firm or inter-organisation horizontal relationships. Typically, a value chain is 
considered from the perspective of a lead firm in the analysis, by having suppliers 
as their trade partners. These partners have their respective value chains. 
Interaction with trade partners can impact profit. This means that to achieve and 
sustained competitive advantage, a firm must understand its trade partners in the 
value system. 
 
Mitchell et al (2009) reflect the benefit of value chain analysis and development 
as “robust evidence-based research of the current market system”. They contend 
that the successful value chain development can improve the stage of poverty in 
a practical manner. They highlight that the quality of value chain research impacts 
its beneficiaries - “poor quality research can result in project failure, with 
disastrous consequences for target beneficiaries.” The role of the value chains has 
been considered from different perspectives by different scholars. For Porter 
(1998), identifying source of competitive advantage was viewed as the value 
chain’s fundamental role. While Miller & Silva (2007) see the advantage of the 
value chain as the business development framework of choice in the agri-food 
sector. Poole & Donovan (2014) assert the value chain as a mean to improve 
market participation and competitiveness among smallholder farmers. Stoian et 
al (2012) see the benefit of value chain development as an instrument 




2.3.2 The role of value chains in rural poverty reduction   
 
The agricultural value chain (AVC) approach can promote sustainable 
development and poverty reduction through its promise of enabling food security, 
market inclusion and resource accessibility for smallholder farmers (Miller & 
Silva, 2007; Coles and Mitchell, 2011; Poole, 2013; Deval, 2016; Poole, 2017). 
Poole (2017) asserts that the value chain concept is instrumental in achieving the 
UN Sustainable Development Goals because of its practicality in terms of, for 
instance, market participation. The perspective believed to help bringing about 
better productivity, agribusiness financing and eventually improve farmers’ 
income. However, using the value chain approach as an instrument to improving 
farmers’ livelihood is a new proposition that has been studied little to date. 
McMichael (2013) looks into value-chain agriculture and debt relations in the 
context of contract farming. He finds that downstream actors (e.g.,, traders) 
currently benefit from the value chain “via extraction of rents and resources from 
smallholders” (p. 687). The upside of this claim is that there are rents and 
resources that smallholders could potentially benefit from. The challenge is how 
the smallholders can re-position themselves so that it enables them to benefit 
from rents and resources. This is a key function of the agricultural value chain 
analysis which farmers can use for envisioning the path toward sustainable 
livelihood. 
 
Existing AVC literature agrees that processed products can bring more income to 
farmers as compared to selling produce as primary products (e.g.,, World Bank, 
2006; Miller & Silva, 2007; Bolwig et al., 2010; Poole, 2017). To be successful 
in this, farmers (individuals and organisations) need to possess skills in 
production processes, business administration, and marketing. For instance, at the 
moment there are often limited business and financial advisory services available 
to farmers, not to mention services on production processes. This is key 
difference when trading as individual smallholder farmers in comparison to 
trading as a collective. Financial institutions (i.e. banks and brokers) are one type 
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of AVC intermediary that usually offers professional investment services to 
farmers as customers. 
 
The AVC can offer economic opportunities in many ways to value chain actors 
because it can capture how many different businesses are embedded in a value 
system. The value system is a business ecosystem comprising of interdependent 
agricultural value chains. The actors have their operations linked to one or 
another in the value chains. The nature of value chain can, however, turn into a 
sort of trap to vulnerable actors such as smallholder farmers and small 
agribusiness owners. An example is of the Indian government’s current attempts 
to develop agricultural marketing through ‘modernisation’ of agribusiness, which 
is driven by concerns to increase the efficiency of agricultural value chains. The 
new policies are opposed by small farmers who see market liberalisation as a 
threat to their livelihoods (The Economist, 2021a; The Economist, 2021b). Such 
actors have limited resources (e.g.,, cash-flow, agricultural machinery, market 
channels) to yield a healthy business and can end up in a weak position vis-à-vis 
upstream and downstream actors. This highlights a potential role of farmers’ 
intermediary organisations in value chain analysis to enhance farmers’ 
competitiveness.   
 
Farmers’ vicious cycle of debt in Thailand (and commonly in other countries and 
regions of the world) is an obstacle to development and economic growth as it 
locks farmers into an unproductive way of harnessing their investments in 
farming. There can be many reasons for debt, including the lack of efficiency to 
exploit factors of production (i.e., land, labour and capital), market failure (e.g.,, 
asymmetric information and transaction costs) and dysfunctional institutions. To 
increase their income and capture more of the value (i.e., economic rent) in the 
value chains, farmers may need to upgrade their involvement in their respective 
value chains. There are many ways to do this. One potential way to do this is to 
become a crop specialist, an approach that value chain analysts would call 
upgrading (Gibbon, 2001; Humphrey, 2005; Coles and Mitchell, 2011).  
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A crop specialist is a farmer who has improved his or her farming practices and 
is producing goods for the market in an efficient and productive way. To this end, 
agricultural degrees are not usually required, but on-the-job training to improve 
specific crop skills are often important. For example, by using appropriate 
farming practices, the farmer can achieve higher rice yields and better-quality 
paddy rice. This may often come with other positive outcomes such as improved 
soil quality and, consequently, enhanced farmers’ health due to lower chemical 
fertilizer use needed. Such upgrading can bring benefits to farmers, the traders 
and the buyers. 
2.3.3 Value Chain Methodology  
 
The value chain methodology consists of various components that make up a 
methodological framework for analysis by value chain mapping and the 
identification of value chain actors. Value chain mapping and value chain actors 
are the basis of a value chain analysis. Value chain analysis is about 
understanding the interconnections between business activities and actors that are 
involved in conducting a complex and sequenced set of activities from production 
to consumption (Porter, 1989; Humphrey and Navas-Alemán 2010, Stein and 
Barron, 2017; Poole, 2017). Stein and Barron (2017) describe the idea of a chain 
as a metaphor for connectedness. It enables a complex system of markets to be 
systematically analysed by who acts in relation to what economic activities. Such 
understanding forms the basis for value chain governance. Value chain mapping 
is a process that identifies primary and support activities associated with a firm’s 
services and product line(s). It is a simple yet an effective tool for corporate 
strategy formulation in order to identify performance improvement opportunities 
(Springer-Heinze 2007; Stein and Barron, 2017). The most commonly known of 
value chain mapping is the generic value chain put forward by Porter (1985). 
 
In Porter’s value chain conception (see Figure 2.1), value activities are comprised 
of primary and support activities. The primary activities consist of five business 
activities, which are Inbound Logistics, Operations, Outbound Logistics, 
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Marketing and Sales, and Service. Support activities include Procurement, 
Human Resource Management, Technological Development and Infrastructure 
(Porter 1985, pp. 11-15). Porter (1979, 1985, 2001) argued that a firm’s 
competitive advantage can be identified by systematically examining these 
activities, and that a firm’s strategy, history and economic activities influence its 
current value chain and its business activities (Porter, 2001). Each of the primary 
activities can contribute to a firm’s cost competitiveness and product 
differentiation, which can be a source of competitive advantage. The fundamental 
point about value chain analysis is that primary and support activities can 
contribute as well as obstruct a firm’s margin generation. Also, Porter highlights 
that the business unit is the appropriate level to constructing a value chain, not by 
looking at a firm as a whole (Porter, 1985 & 2001). 
 
Porter (1998) defined the primary value activities as Inbound Logistics, 
Operations, Outbound Logistics, Marketing and Sales, and Service (Porter 1985, 
pp. 11-15), as shown in figure 2.3. Whereas in an agricultural context, these 
stages can be retitled by farm inputs, production or farming, processing and 
storage. They may not carry exactly the same meaning but provide similar 
functions of value creation through product processing and improvement down 
to marketing. A generic model of an agricultural value chain is shown in Figure 
2.4 as an example.  
 
 
Figure 2. 4 A typical agricultural value chain  
Source: ImpactInsurance, 2017  
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In the real business environment, a value chain is typically not a linear chain of 
activities leading to a product or a service. It is a complex configuration of value 
systems that link value chain actors, value activities, markets and interventions. 
At the same time, the actors retain their degree of interdependence from each 
other. In the context of agribusiness, value chain mapping refers to the process 
starting from farm production (e.g.,, farming, input supply), processing (e.g.,, 
milling) and storage, marketing (i.e., wholesale and retail), to selling final goods 
to consumers. The primary activities are farm production, processing, quality 
control and storage, wholesale and retailing. Transportation (logistics) takes place 
in between each stage. At each stage, there are value chain actors including 
farmers, input suppliers, creditors, farm labour (e.g.,, cultivators and harvesters); 
consolidators; processors and exporters (see Figure 2.4 depicting a generic 
agribusiness value chain). The nature of value chain framework usually calls for 
qualitative research techniques to compile data on the different aspects of a value 
chain and to analyse them holistically. Quantitative data such as price, profit and 
potential value added can be also used to support the analysis. 
The development of the agricultural value chain approach has been 
conceptualised and used as a tool for livelihood improvement and poverty 
reduction. For example, Donovan et al. (2015) found that improving coordination 
and collaboration among value chain actors are significant aspects included in 
most existing value chain development frameworks. There are various factors 
contributing towards achieving more efficient coordination and collaboration. 
These can include “product lead times, access to infrastructure, attitudes and 
capabilities among chain actors, the distance between businesses, and access to 
different types of services (such as technical and business advisory services and 
financial services)” (p. 18). This highlights the limitation of a narrow ‘price build-
up’ approach to value chain analysis. Improving factors such as coordination and 
collaboration among value chain actors are essential to meet sustainable 
development objectives but are not easy to quantify. Clearly, paying attention to 
such factors can enable a more powerful version of value chain development that 
would also strengthen farmers’ resilience.   
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From smallholder farmers standpoint, these are clearly proactive forms of 
governance and costly to implement. To achieve these, farmers’ organisations 
would need to extend their network of resources and collaboration. This again 
emphasises the role of resource leveraging and organisational partnership in 






































Chapter 3 Conceptual Framework  
 
This chapter presents a conceptual framework to be used in this thesis. The 
framework uses the idea of an agricultural value chain as a theoretical basis with 
a view to upgrading rice value chains and building capable farmers’ 
organisations. The main motivation is to understand how farmers’ livelihoods can 
be improved by strengthening their position in the rice value chain. This involves 
minimising vulnerability and enhancing resource mobilisation and capital 
allocation from the perspective of the farmers. 
 
3.1 Major concepts guiding agricultural value chain 
 
The key constructs guiding Agricultural Value Chain Analysis (AVCA) have 
been continuously discussed by development specialists although there is no 
exact agreement about the details of the approach. Value chain research deals 
with dynamic systems that comprise of social, economic and environmental 
dimension, and the analysis is often framed differently according to individual 
scholars’ perspectives and interests. Kaplinsky and Morris (2000) assert three key 
elements of value chain analysis that would need to be taken into consideration 
in order to transform until now a largely heuristic value chain approach into an 
analytical tool. These are i) barriers to entry and economic rents; ii) governance; 
and iii) different types of value chains. Gereffi (1999) provides important 
contribution concerning vertical coordination and the role of governance in value 
chain development. Anandajayasekeram and Gebremedhin (2009) discuss four 
key concepts that guide AVCA: verticality and vertical coordination, effective 
demand, value chain governance, and leverage and impact. Miller and Jones 
(2010) take the financing aspect of agricultural value chain as an avenue to rural 
economic development. Poole (2017) takes trade and market participation as 
means to fostering livelihood enhancement. Considering that the main motivation 
of this thesis on improving rice farmers’ livelihood, the following dimensions are 
to be discussed as guiding the rice value chain analysis: value chain governance 
and organisational models; upgrading and innovation; and finance. 
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3.1.1 Value chain governance and models 
 
Value chain governance is an important element of value chain analysis. It is 
noticeable that the emphasis on value chain governance and models (e.g., 
producer-driven and buyer-driven models) are common analytical elements 
agreed by many value chain scholars (Gibbon, 2003; Webber and Labaste, 2009; 
Trienekens, 2011; Lee et al., 2012; Gereffi, 2014; Donovan et al., 2014; Gereffi, 
2015; Poole, 2017; Devaux et al., 2018). Research that contributes to the 
development of governance and organisational models in the value chain 
methodology can include the work of Gereffi (1999, 2005), Kaplinsky and Morris 
(2000), Miller & Jones (2011), Donovan et al. (2014) and Poole (2017), to name 
a few. Gereffi (1999) pays particular attention to vertical coordination and the 
role of governance. Understanding the role of value chain governance is crucial 
as it affects how value chain actors coordinate and interact across the links in the 
chains, forming value activities in the chains as illustrated in Figure 3.1 as an 
example. Such interaction is a key factor in terms of understanding of 
opportunities for upgrading activities through process and product development. 
To this end, Kaplinsky and Morris (2000) point out that value chain coordination 
and governance are not necessarily the same thing. The authors also argue that 
power asymmetry is central to value chain governance. This is because the 
uneven distribution of information, capacities and resources affect the 




Figure 3. 1 Rice value chain process (map) 
Source: Trade Development Authority of Pakistan, 2016 (p.16) 
 
Some value chain scholars highlighted intrinsically link between organisational 
models and value chain models (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2000; Miller and Jones, 
2011). For example, Miller and Jones (2011) refer to organisational models of 
smallholders and value chain business models interchangeably.  They discussed 
four types of organisational models of smallholder production. These are 
producer-driven (association); buyer-driven; facilitator-driven; and an integrated 
model, as discussed in literature review. From smallholder farmers standpoint, 
these are clearly proactive forms of governance and costly to implement. To 
achieve these, farmers’ organisations would need to extend their network of 
resources and collaboration. This again emphasises the role of resource 
leveraging and organisational partnership in building a capable farmers’ 
organisation. 
 
Value chain mapping is the core activity of value chain analysis, which helps to 
represent value chain governance. Its simplicity supports planners and managers 
to make connections between what are the activities and how actors link to each 
other in value creation process. Value chain maps can be categorised into basic 
maps and detailed maps (USAID, 2018). USAID (2018) suggests that basic map 
is drawn by answering the following questions: i) What is being done in the value 
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chain? ii) Who are the key players that are doing it? iii) How is the 
product/service reaching end market? and iv) What market channels are available 
to reach those end markets? The detailed map is then an extension of the basic 
map by adding more information and statistical data gathered during the data 
collection phase. A detailed map can involve i) supporting markets, ii) value 
chain governance, and iii) data overlays. Supporting markets are individuals or 
firms that provide products or services to the main actors such as input supplies, 
capital and technical assistance. Value chain governance concerns power 
relations among value chain actors in the business environment. Data overlays 
are quantitative information acquired from data sources. For example, they can 
include input costs, number of farmers, farm size, unit price and profit margin. 
3.1.2 Agricultural value chain upgrading and innovation 
 
Value creation or, more specifically, increased value creation is the ultimate 
outcome of successful value chain upgrading. Agricultural value chain 
upgrading, as the name suggests, can involve the development of new products 
and processes that meet the increasing level of regulations of domestic and 
international quality standards and food safety measures (Bolwig et al, 2011; Lee 
et al, 2012). The upgrading process is intrinsically associated with innovation and 
the governance of the value chain. It also suggests that upgrading is a requirement 
for strengthening buyer-driven and facilitator-driven value chains. Such 
mechanisms emphasise the necessity of promoting partnerships among actors and 
heterogeneous resources enabling capacity building, human development and 
eventually improved livelihoods and rural economic development. In the context 
of this thesis, the upgrading is particularly meaningful in terms of policy 
guidelines and implementation. This is necessary because Thailand’s rice policy 
has repeatedly employed narrow price intervention strategies, which are both 
highly politicised and attract criticism for serving political interest, rather than 
promoting value chain development to improve farmers’ livelihoods.   
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According to Kaplinsky and Morris (2000), value chain upgrading concerns the 
acquisition of technological capabilities and market linkages enabling firms to 
improve their competitiveness and capture higher value. Four objectives of 
upgrading are discussed by Kaplinsky and Morris (2000: p. 38): 
 
“Process upgrading: increasing the efficiency of internal processes such 
that these are significantly better than those of rivals, both within 
individual links in the chain, and between the links in the chain. 
Product upgrading: introducing new products or improving old products 
faster than rivals. This involves changing new product development 
processes both within individual links in the value chain and in the 
relationship between different chain links.  
Functional upgrading: increasing value added by changing the mix of 
activities con- ducted within the firm or moving the locus of activities to 
different links in the value chain. 
Chain upgrading: moving to a new chain, for example, Taiwanese firms 
moved from the manufacture of transistors radios to calculators, to TVs, 
to computer monitors, to laptops and now to WAP phones.” 
 
Kaplinsky and Morris, 2000: p. 38 
 
Trienekens (2011) suggests three elements that are influential to upgrading of 
developing country value chains. These are i) addressing markets that offer 
opportunities for increased value added; ii) innovation in products, including 
marketing activities, and processes; and iii) vertical and horizontal organizational 
arrangements that enable chains to capture value from markets for various chain 
actors. The upgrading perspective of value chain development is thus not only 
introducing improvements, but also doing so in a more sustainable manner.  
3.1.3 Agricultural value chain finance 
 
Agricultural financing has long been facing challenges making it complex and 
difficult to implement successfully (Galarza et al., 2009). The levels of business 
risk and lower profitability of agriculture appear to be less attractive to most 
commercial financial institutions which are reluctant to invest in agricultural 
financing. To cope with financial credit scarcity among smallholder farmers, 
governments are the most common institution providing financing. Agricultural 
financial institutions such as agricultural banks and cooperatives are the most 
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highly regarded for agricultural financing. Products and services are often 
provided in the form of microfinance covering agricultural loans, small sized 
business loans, personal loans and savings. Many of the microfinance products 
do not require collateral but rather employ social instruments such as a group 
lending system of Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank and Thailand’s Bank for 
Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (Siamwala et al., 1990; Coleman, 
1999; Muhammad, 2006; Ahlin, 2019). 
 
In a rural context, the most common form of value chain finance is often trade-
related financing (Miller and Jones, 2020), which can take place, for instance, in 
the form of advance payments and advance credit. Advance payments are given 
by buyers who purchase farm outputs, whereas advance credit refers to producers 
taking input supplies (e.g., seeds and fertilizer) but paying later based on agreed 
conditions. Overall, insufficient financial investment is an obstacle to improving 
the quality of, and expanding, cultivable land, resulting in low yields that make 
it hard to break even and make profit. Therefore, agricultural value chain finance 
plays a vital role in improving agribusiness and enhancing farmers’ livelihood. 
 
The value chain financing can be considered from internal and external 
perspectives (Miller and Jones, 2010). Internal finance occurs within the value 
chain, while external finance involves relationships and mechanisms without the 
value chain. For example, farmers invest their own resources by using profit 
earned from the previous cropping season (internal), while advance credit can be 
arranged with a miller based on farmers’ promise to delivery rice paddy 
(external). This points out that value chain relationships and mechanisms can 
have a direct influence on financing. The question is how such a relationship can 
effect a positive change in farmers’ organisations. 
 
Poole (2017) discusses financial innovations for farming. Some supply of 
financial services can empower farmers’ participation in the markets, such as 
value chain links, social capital development and private-sector contractual 
finance (ibid.). Although these financial products will not be discussed individual 
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in detail in this section. It is important to highlight that one thing they have in 
common is using leverage power.  
 
Table 3.1 briefly describes 16 agricultural value chain finance instruments that 
are implemented in the agribusiness markets. What is important for this study is 
the way an agricultural value chain approach can build on and improve farmers’ 
livelihoods. As discussed earlier, the development of value chain can result in 
upgrading that enables farmers to become profitable. The right types of financial 
products and services can then accelerate rural development. Therefore, the thesis 
analyses the processes of building a capable farmers’ organisation as an 
instrument to improved farmers’ livelihoods. Understanding the types of 
financial instruments is crucial to make a connection between farmers’ 
organisations, value chain business models and the available financial 
instruments. For example, warehouse receipts as a financial instrument could be 
used to better serve farmers’ organisations, more than in its current use as a 
certified warehouse receipt. When carefully designed and implemented, such 
receipts could potentially be put forward as a loan guarantee when partnering 
with suitable farmers’ organisations or millers. This is an example of where a 
capable farmers’ organisation can harness existing financial instruments better 





















1.Trader credit Traders advance funds to producers to be repaid, usually in 
kind, at harvest time. This allows traders to procure 
products and provides a farmer with needed cash (for farm 
or livelihood usage) as well as a guaranteed sale of outputs. 
Less commonly, trader finance can also be used ‘upward’ 
in the chain whereby the trader delivers products to buyers 
with delayed payments. 
2.Input supplier credit An input supplier advances agricultural inputs to farmers 
(or others in the value chain) for repayment at harvest or 
other agreed time. The cost of credit (interest) is generally 
embedded into the price. Input supplier credit enables 
farmers to access needed inputs while increasing sales of 
suppliers. 
3. Marketing company 
credit 
A marketing company, processor or other company 
provides credit in cash or in kind to farmers, local traders or 
other value chain enterprises. Repayment is most often in 
kind. Upstream buyers are able to procure outputs and lock 
in purchase prices and in exchange farmers and others in 
the value chain receive access to credit and supplies and 
secure a market for selling their products. 
4. Lead firm financing A lead firm either provides direct finance to value chain 
enterprises including farmers, or guaranteed sales 
agreements enabling access to finance from third party 
institutions. Lead firm financing, often in the form of 
contract farming with a buy-back clause, provides farmers 
with finance, technical assistance and market access, and 




5. Trade receivables 
finance 
A bank or other financier advances working capital to 
agribusiness (supplier, processor, marketing and export) 
companies against accounts receivable or confirmed orders 
to producers. Receivables financing takes into account the 
strength of the buyer’s purchase and repayment history. 
6.Factoring Factoring is a financial transaction whereby a business sells 
its accounts receivable or contracts of sales of goods at a 
discount to a specialized agency, called a factor, who pays 
the business minus a factor discount and collects the 
receivables when due. Factoring speeds working capital 
turnover, credit risk protection, accounts receivable 
bookkeeping and bill collection services. It is useful for 
advancing financing for inputs or sales of processed and 






7. Forfaiting A specialised forfeiter agency purchases an exporter’s 
receivables of freely-negotiable instruments (such as 
unconditionally-guaranteed letters of credit and ‘to order’ 
bills of exchange) at a discount, improving exporter cash-





8.Warrehouse receipts Farmers or other value chain enterprises receive a receipt 
from a certified warehouse that can be used as collateral to 
access a loan from third party financial institutions against 
the security of goods in an independently controlled 
warehouse. Such systems ensure quality of inventory, and 
enable sellers to retain outputs and have opportunity to sell 
for a higher price during the off-season or other later date. 
9.Purchase agreements 
(repos) 
A buyer receives securities as collateral and agrees to 
repurchase those at a later date. Commodities are stored 
with accredited collateral managers who issue receipts with 
agreed conditions for repurchase. Repurchase agreements 
provide a buy-back obligation on sales, and are therefore 
employed by trading firms to obtain access to more and 
cheaper funding due to that security. 
10. Financial lease 
(lease-purchase) 
A purchase on credit which is designed as a lease with an 
agreement of sale and ownership transfer once full payment 
is made (usually in instalments with interest). The financier 
maintains ownership of said goods until full payment is 
made making it easy to recover goods if payment is not 
made, while allowing agribusinesses and farmers to use and 
purchase machinery, vehicles and other large ticket items, 





11.Insurance Insurance products are used to reduce risks by pooling 
regular payments of clients and paying out to those affected 
by disasters. Payment schedules are set according to 
statistical data of loss occurrence and mitigate the effects of 
loss to farmers and others in the value chain from natural 
disasters and other calamities. 
12.Forward contract A forward contract is a sales agreement between two parties 
to buy/sell an asset at a set price and at a specific point of 
time in the future, both variables agreed to at the time of 
sale. Forward contracts allow price hedging of risk and can 









13. Futures Futures are forward contracts (see definition above) that are 
standardized to be traded in futures exchanges. 
Standardization facilitates ready trading through 
commodity exchanges. Futures provide price hedging, 
allowing trade companies to offset price risk of forward 






Cash-flow producing financial assets are pooled and 
repackaged into securities that are sold to investors. This 
provides financing that might not be available to smaller or 
shorter-term assets and includes instruments such as 
collateralized debt obligations, while reducing the cost of 
financing on medium and longer term assets. 
15. Loan guarantees Agricultural loan guarantees are offered by 3rd parties 
(private or public) to enhance the attractiveness of finance 
by reducing lending risks. Guarantees are normally used in 
conjunction with other financial instruments, and can be 
offered by private or public sources to support increased 
lending to the agricultural sector. 
16. Joint venture 
finance 
Joint venture finance is a form of shared owner equity 
finance between private and/or public partners or 
shareholders. Joint venture finance creates opportunities for 
shared ownership, returns and risks, partners often have 
complementary technical, natural, financial and market 
access resources. 




















3.2 Value chain research methodology 
 
When it comes to methodology, value chain analysis has been flexible to 
accommodate different methods. At its simplest definition, the value chain 
analysis involves the flow of products and services along the value chain from 
production to marketing (Porter, 1985; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2000; Miller & 
Jones, 2008; Gereffi, 2015; Poole, 2017). However, the analytical framework 
allows its application to be design-specific and suitable for purposes of selected 
value chains.  Many value chain scholars agree that the world of production is 
complex and heterogeneous. The value chain dynamics often require a specific 
design to suit a particular study and contingent circumstances (Kaplinsky and 
Morris, 2000; Donovan et al., 2014; Poole and Donovan, 2014; Rohit and 
Bhavani, 2018). Although such a statement makes sense in the context of 
dynamic agricultural development, it is nevertheless important to have some 
established methodological guidelines, at least for the start. Kaplinsky and Morris 
(2000) define eight issues to be covered as broad guideline of how to conduct 
value chain research: 
• The point of entry for value chain analysis 
• Mapping value chains 
• Product segments and critical success factor’s in final markets 
• How producers access final markets 
• Benchmarking production efficiency 
• Governance of value chains 
• Upgrading in value chains 
• Distributional issues 
 
Many of these issues were introduced already in the previous sections. However, 
it is noticeable that the issues listed above tend require a different degree of 
attention in a particular analysis due to the nature of studied value chains. For 
example, a farmers’ organisation that sells rice paddy to a miller may not need to 
pay as much attention on distributional issues as those who process and sell to 
wholesalers and retail markets. Meanwhile, a farmers’ organisation that produces 
 75 
and packages rice for a retail company may not need to concern how the products 
reach consumers on the market. 
 
In the agricultural context, much of the literature has concentrated on the value 
added from increased productivity, lower production costs and improved 
processing efficiency (as discussed in Chapter 2). Rice markets are, however, 
often unpredictable from the perspective of farmers and can easily erase the 
benefits of successful process improvements. Evidence shows that smallholder 
farmers hold limited market negotiation power. Therefore, the focus of this thesis 
is on how capacity development, resources and capitals enable farmers to 
reposition themselves and upgrading in a value chain. Value chain is thus used as 
a descriptive analytical tool and a qualitative research method that is gaining 
popularity in the field. Most commonly, value chain study starts with a desk 
analysis of literature and secondary data. Primary data collection is then typically 
conducted using qualitative methods. Participant observation, semi-structured 
interviews, focus group meetings and questionnaires are among the most 
commonly used data collection methods for value chain research (Hellin and 
Meijer, 2006 Nang’ole et al.,2011; Donovan et al., 2014). For example, Bhavani 
and Rohit (2018) use a desk analysis of literature and secondary data to examine 
food distribution value chains under the integrated child development services in 
India, prior to collecting primary data. The role of desk analysis is to help 
researchers to map the value chain and define stakeholders which are important 
elements for conducting a field study. 
 
Value chain approach has been applied to different levels of analysis from 
household, business, value chain, market and organisational level. There is a 
range of methods that are employed to conducting and analysing value chains. In 
general, data collection techniques are used to gather information from primary 
and secondary data sources. Secondary data sources are utilised by reviewing 
extant documents and a desk analysis. Qualitative techniques can include 
interviews, focus group discussions, and participatory observations (Stein and 
Barron, 2017). At the same time, surveys and questionnaires can be used to 
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extract quantitative data. Document analysis can yield both types of data, 
depending on the data sources to be analysed. This is often done prior to 
conducting primary data collection as it can improve the quality of collected 
empirical data. Many studies favour the use of combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods such as Poole and Donovan (2014) and Rohit and Bhavani 
(2018). The desk analysis of secondary sources of information has been widely 
used as an initial step to support data collection. For example, Rohit and Bhavani 
(2018) performed a desk analysis to establish the value chains of two fortified 
foods manufactured by private sector businesses in India. Poole and Donovan 
(2014) employ a combination of quantitative and qualitative data collection in the 
study focussing on building cooperative capacity of coffee sector in Nicaragua. 
Rohit and Bhavani (2018) conduct qualitative and quantitative assessment 
surveys in the study focussing on nutrition and agri-food value chains. Much of 
the rice value chain analyses published after 2010 urge the usefulness of the tool 
(Poole and Donovan, 2014; Trade Development Authority of Pakistan, 2016; 
Poole, 2017; Rohit and Bhavani, 2018). On the other hand, value chain analysis 
has also sparked questions on research methodology and methods to 
appropriately conduct the studies. The fact that value chain analysis is perceived 
to be a tailor-made approach means that research design can be adapted to fit a 
specific setting. The flexible nature of the methodology can help solve specific 
problems in business enterprise of the value chain. By contrast, these can bring 
confusion for practitioners and managers who may not familiar with the value 
chain analytical methods. 
 
With a careful design, the analysis of the value chain can offer insights into 
production, and governance relations between actors through value-creating 
activities. This is significant to understanding why production and market 
systems work the way they do, and how they can be improved to benefit 
smallholder farmers. Organisation setting plays a crucial role in mobilising 
resources to its members (i.e. farmers). Considered this way, the organisation can 
impact farmers’ economic activities and performance, behaviour and capabilities. 
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These can have implication towards entrepreneurial skills, social and human 
capitals, which can lead to improved livelihood and poverty reduction. 
3.2.1 Rice value chain framework for improved livelihoods 
 
The rice value chain framework used in this study builds on key concepts of 
agricultural value chain analysis as discussed earlier. The main objective is to 
improving farmers’ livelihoods, based on the assumption that this can be 
achieved by upgrading the rice value chain and building a capable farmers’ 
organisation. This sets farmers’ organisation as the unit of analysis and a 
respective rice value chain to draw a system boundary. The study looks from the 
perspective that improved livelihoods build on human and infrastructure 
development becoming a capable farmers’ organisation. Farmers’ organisational 
competency can be substantiated through their business performance and 
livelihood improvement. The conceptual framework serves as a guide for this 




Figure 3. 2 Rice value chain framework  
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 78 
Figure 3.1 shows the rice value chain framework for this research. It draws on 
value chain governance and models, in search of upgrading, enhanced innovation 
and improved finance. All arrows represent dynamic of value chain governance 
on value chain actors’ coordination and interaction across value activities. 
Relationships and interaction between chain actors of primary activities can 
influence value added, transaction costs and leveraging resources. Each stage of 
primary activities require finance to operate its value activities, although products 
and services might be different. For example, the types of financial products and 
services for smallholder rice farmers at rice farming stage is clearly different from 
that of the processing stage. 
 
Value chain structure involves identifying value activities and their actors. It 
defines relationships and how actors influence value activities in terms of the 
movement and quality of supplies, and finance as shown in Figure 3.1. The core 
rice value chain builds on four stages: i) jasmine rice farming; ii) rice paddy 
processing; iii) warehousing and product distribution; and iv) marketing and 
sales. Identifying value chain activities and actors is the first stage of constructing 
a value chain analysis. The objective of identifying value activities is to capture 
important value-added activities that enhance the value by supporting profit 
earning and rent generation along the value chain. This approach highlights how 
value chain analysis can be used in an impactful way to inform policymaking. 
Value activities involve primary and support activities. 
 
Primary activities include business actions that directly create products. In other 
words, value cannot be created without performing these activities. In the rice 
value chain, these typically include rice farming, processing, and marketing. 
Support activities are identification provision tasks that helps to facilitate and 
enhance the effectiveness of primary activities. These activities can include an 
array such as procurement, product and technology development, human resource 
management, and organisation infrastructure. Clearly, a range of support 
activities depends on company structure, finance, capabilities and missions. 
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In this framework, the vulnerability evaluation is set as a primary study to 
understand current livelihood status of farmers. There are two factors to consider: 
trade capability and vulnerability context. First, trade capability will consider the 
breakeven price of rice. It helps to understand farmers’ situation and point to the 
right direction for what different factors mean for farmers’ livelihood. For 
example, if rice farming can barely reach breakeven, and in some cases even 
cause the accumulation of more debt, why do farmers still farm rice? Is it due to 
some political intervention? Or, is it the only income-generating activity available 
to smallholder farmers in the area? These are some examples of issues that could 
rise after knowing the breakeven point of rice farming. In addition, the analysis 
helps to form questions to be used for interviews. Second, the vulnerability 
context concerns the stages of livelihood that could be altered by shocks, trends 
and seasonality. The DFID’s sustainable livelihoods guidance sheets (2001) 
defines vulnerability context as follows: 
“The Vulnerability Context frames the external environment in which 
people exist. People’s livelihoods and the wider availability of assets are 
fundamentally affected by critical trends as well as by shocks and 
seasonality – over which they have limited or no control.”  
DFID, 2001 (p.15) 
 
The vulnerability context is made up of factors that “have direct impact upon 
people’s asset status and the options that are open to them in pursuit of beneficial 
livelihood outcomes” (DFID, 2001:15). To this end, it is sensible to ask: How is 
the vulnerability context relevant to value chain analysis and, resource 
mobilisation and capital allocation? Answering this question would help 
understand a relevant context that impacts farmers’ participation in the rice value 
chain, which is the main means for generating income for farmers. Changes to 
economic activities involving farmers that could directly alter value chain 
performance are farm inputs, production and processing (if farmers process their 
rice paddy). The majority of farmers are involved in input and, obviously, 
production stages. Understanding the vulnerability context would help 
practitioners and planners to make adjustments that could lead to improvement 
in the foreseeable future. For example, it should be possible to better plan how to 
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manage high demand for harvest machinery and finance during harvesting 
season. 
 
The evaluation of the vulnerability context can provide hints about how various 
institutions and/or organisations can help farmers to cope with different demands 
placed on them. This could help to narrow down the type of interventions needed 
to better manage resources and capabilities. The following excerpt from DFID’s 
sustainable livelihoods guidance sheets (2001:15) describes shocks, trends and 
seasonality: 
 
“Shocks can destroy assets directly (in the case of floods, storms, civil 
conflict, etc.) They can also force people to abandon their home areas and 
dispose of assets (such as land) prematurely as part of coping strategies, 
recent events have highlighted the impact that international economic 
shocks, including rapid changes in exchange rates and terms of trade, can 
have on the very poor. Trends may (or may not) be more benign, though 
they are more predictable. They have a particularly important influence 
on rates of return (economic or otherwise) to chosen livelihoods 
strategies. Seasonality shifts in prices, employment opportunities and 
food availability are one of the greatest and most enduring sources of 
hardship for poor people in developing countries.”  
 
DFID, 2001: p.15 
 
It is important to note that the vulnerability context could influence rice value 
chain performance especially at certain periods of time. For example, the success 
of a cropping season during the year depends on factors such as geography, 
political intervention and the like, which can have direct impact on the value 
chain performance. In addition, the context will inform what resources and 
capitals would need to be mobilised and allocated in order to help improve 
farmers’ livelihood. Better access to resources and capitals is likely to improve 
farmers’ vulnerability. In practice, these are the parts which need to be updated 
in a timely manner.  In the current study, the analysis can only be present at one 
point in time of data collection. This can demonstrate an importance of timely 
evaluation between the vulnerability context and value chain analysis. The 
following are examples of what is meant by timely matters that are relevant to 
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rice value chains and farmers’ livelihoods. For example, some farmers’ 
organisations have a dryer that helps improve the quality of rice paddy, resulting 
in a higher selling price and extended storage life. At the same, some farmers’ 
organisations have purchased a drying machine model that is too expensive to 
run (e.g., fuel and maintenance costs). Therefore, farmers may not benefit from 
using the dryer as a value-added infrastructure. Another classic example is a 
seemingly good cropping season, which is ruined by a rainstorm just days before 
harvest. 
 
Results from vulnerability context evaluation would allow an organisation to 
know its business positioning and potential factors that could enhance its value 
creation. Such knowledge would also allow a farmers’ organisation to frame its 
strategy based on its existing resources and potential resource expansion from 
their allies in the business environment. With this new perspective, the value 
chain analysis is expected to offer a more rigorous outcome on produce/process 
and how it can generate value added and economic rents. It is anticipated that the 
framework will allow insights into capturing added value from economic rents. 
This emphasises the role of organisation capital in value creation. 
3.2.2 Rice value chain analysis 
 
The aim of value chain analysis is to understand the current performance of value-
creating activities and how they can be upgraded. More specifically, this means 
looking into activities that are generating profits, economic rents and product 
differentiation in the value chain. The description of an overall value system helps 
to define the scope of the selected value chain analysis, and guides the 
identification of relevant stakeholders. The aim is to identify and map 
connections between actors and agents that are directly and indirectly involved 
in the chain. Mapping value chain brings forward issues in value chain 
governance and key relationships between actors related to these. This helps to 
understand the roles, interrelationships and outcomes of each actor and activity 
resulting in an overall picture of how the rice value chain is organised and 
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governed. This is a stage where process/product differentiation can be pinpointed 
for upgrading. Knowing what is the product/process to be upgraded can then 
make salient, for instance, the routine task changes that would support an 
enterprise’s competitiveness. 
 
The interaction between value chain actors and their agribusiness activities plays 
an important role and influences the way they relate to other actors. For example, 
some co-operatives may offer a wide range of services including supply, lending 
and saving, and aggregating paddy rice as a trader. Therefore, they tend to reduce 
the interaction role between individual farmers and individual services providers 
as mentioned above. By contrast, without effective farmers’ organisation, farmers 
are likely to deal with service providers directly on an individual basis. The 
implication of the two practices is that they likely offer different livelihoods to 
smallholder farmers. Differentiation through upgrading the right factors can 
enable a farmers’ organisation to become successful. It can also highlight 
opportunities for a possible replication by other organisations both in term of 
organisational and value chain models. However, it is likely that a farmers’ 
organisation may not own all necessary resources to upgrade their activities and 
therefore this is the point where resource mobilisation and new capital allocation 
would make the difference. 
 
The dynamic of value chain governance will also communicate how value chain 
coordination and interaction can affect or improve information symmetry. For 
example, a farmers’ organisation with trade and milling facility is likely to offer 
a more transparent market information to farmer members. By contrast, millers 
are less likely to be more open to market information to farmers, who are not part 
of their business entity. This type of dynamic of value chain governance can help 




Figure 3. 3 An analytical approach for rice value chains 
Source: Adapted from Poole, 2017 
 
Figure 3.3 shows an analytical approach guiding rice value chains in this research. 
A farmers’ organisation is an entry point as well as a unit of analysis. It is a centre 
of value chain activities by which its success enhances farmers’ livelihood, and 
vice versa. As the figure shows, a farmers’ organisation can represent individual 
farmers to participate in the markets. These can bring many benefits through 
economy of scale such as access to rice market and other farmer produces on 
market demand. With better product and service linkages and flows of finance 
and information, a farmers’ organisation is likely to improve its business 
performance. The capability to deliver such success is significant. Such 
development process and dynamic are what this thesis called, a capable farmers’ 
organisation.  
 
Using such analytical approach, the case study analyses vulnerability context of 
the farmers’ organisations. This is an important step to help narrow down factors 
that alter farmers’ livelihood and ability to gain access to markets. Then, rice 
value chain is analysed with the emphasis on the interaction between farmers and 
millers/farmers’ organisations. At last, the results from previous analysis can 
enable value chain development such as value chain upgrading and improve 
policy implementation.  
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Analysing the rice value chain concerns the key aspects achieving value creation 
and, by implication, improving farmers’ livelihoods. Value creation is core to 
value chain analysis. In a rice value chain, this means investigating both the direct 
and indirect aspects of value creation. Direct aspect can include improved quality 
and increased productivity (quantity). Such direct improvements to value creation 
can be expected to be achieved by strategies such as farm skills development, 
farm mechanisation, improved post-harvest facilities, and disaster preparedness. 
For instance, natural disasters (e.g., in the event of flood and drought) are an 
element that can eliminate the development progress that has been already 
achieved. This is the reason why the livelihood context is set to be assessed as a 
preliminary evaluation. Indirect aspects can mean development of farm skills that 
help to increase quality and productivity. It is important to note that value creation 
is not fixed, due to the dynamic nature of value chain and markets (World Bank, 
2012). In other words, profits in one year may not be achieved in the following 
year due to changes, for instance, to livelihood conditions. 
 
It is important to note that the aim of the analysis is not to present value in the 
form of an absolute figure. The emphasis is on the way farmers can make the 
most of rice value chain by understanding and adapting to their business 
environment. This view reflects a highly dynamic and uncertain nature of farming 
activities and agribusiness. For example, this study aims to understand how 
farmers organisation could reconfigure rice value chain finance, instead of how 
much farmers earn per unit. In addition, the analysis demonstrates how value 
chain analysis could be used as to understand new organisational models and 
behaviours such as creating shared value partnerships. In particular, the analysis 
looks to business activities that enable farmers to make profit, build capabilities 
and to access capitals. As Kaplinsky and Morris (2000, p. 29) emphasis, “power 
asymmetry is central to value chain governance” and that it is important to 
distinguish value chain governance from the co-ordination of activities. The term 
‘interaction’ has a broad meaning that allows value chain researcher to move from 
a bigger picture to a narrower view on specific issues. It reflects the nature of 
 85 
marketplace that is not only about exchanging goods typical of capital markets, 






Chapter 4 Methodology 
      
This chapter discusses the methodology and methods used for data collection and 
analysis in the study. The chapter consists of three parts: case study research 
design, data collection, and data analysis. These are built to match the conceptual 
framework discussed in Chapter 3 aiming at analysing the relationship between 
rice value chain development and farmers’ livelihoods. The actual empirical 
evidence is produced by three case studies that are constructed to support the 
analysis. Together, the cases reveal how a capable farmers’ organisation enables 
farmers to minimise their vulnerability at an individual level and to improve rice 
value chain performance at an organisation level. 
 
4.1 Case study research design 
 
Choosing the right research methods plays a crucial role in understanding the 
ways in which a farmers’ organisation is influenced by internal (e.g., farmers’ 
attitudes, behaviour, capabilities) and external (e.g., price policy, government 
incentives, production costs) factors. From this perspective, case study research 
is a suitable approach to explaining current social phenomena such as the one 
studied here (Yin, 2014), and has been shown to be an applicable research design 
for value chain analyses (Webber and Labaste, 2009; Miller and Jones, 2010; 
Trienekens, 2011; Donovan and Poole, 2013; Rohit and Bhavani, 2018; Poole, 
2018). In particular, the case study research design can help explain how type 
questions such as: how do farmers’ organisations develop rice value chains and 
improve farmers’ livelihoods? To elaborate, remember that the current study 
seeks to understand the mechanisms involved in the development of farmers’ 
organisations and rice value chains, and assess how well such development 
mechanisms impact farmers’ livelihoods. Each individual rice value chain 
selected for the study has a farmers’ organisation as an entry point as well as a 




The unit of analysis is thus defined as a farmers’ organisation. This can offer a 
holistic picture of the following: i) the rice value chain activities, governance and 
its relationship with actors and other stakeholders within and between the primary 
activities; ii) factors that strengthen the farmers’ organisation to become a more 
capable one, iii) the causal relationship between a farmers’ organisation and the 
development of the rice value chain, and iv) the process of improving farmers’ 
livelihoods. 
 
Three cases of farmers’ organisations were purposefully selected, representing 
different farmers’ organisation models that are producer-driven, buyer-driven and 
facilitator-driven models. As discussed in the literature review chapter on 
farmers’ organisation and value chain models, studying these different models 
will help to explain farmers’ behaviour and capability development by allowing 
comparison between the models. Constructing them as a multiple case study 
offers robust analytical opportunities particularly on the development 
mechanisms of farmers’ organisation and on rice value chains contributing to 
farmers’ livelihoods. As such, the multiple case study approach can offer rich 
insights into the business environment where the population of selected farmers’ 
organisations is based. The models represent different types of organisations that 
together involve a large number of Thai rice farmers. 
 
Knowing that social phenomena are dynamic and sensitive to external factors 
(e.g., natural disasters, political interventions), identifying and monitoring 
relevant contextual factors can be a challenge. Various economic, social, 
environmental and political background factors are separate issues from the focal 
phenomenon, yet they have impact on the subjects of the research enterprise. To 
manage these, the business environment of the cases was considered as the 
boundary within which to apply the rice value chains framework. Against this 
background, the multiple case study design can help to understand the dynamics 
of different cases. The comparative analysis of multiple cases can offer new 
insights through the juxtaposition of different farmers’ enterprises in the given 
business environment. Table 4.1 shows a list of categories used to compare the 
cases. Examples of associated factors of each category are also listed. For 
example, the models include producer-driven, buyer-driven and facilitator-driven 
 88 
farmers’ organisations. Each model, then, influences farmers’ behaviour in 
specific ways and contributes to the processes of capability development. The 
categorisation is particularly useful when organising and analysing qualitative 
data that will be explained in the following sections. 
 
Table 4. 1 The list of categories to be compared between cases 
 
Categories Examples of associated factors  
Model of a farmers’ 
organisation/ value chain 
Producer-driven, buyer-driven, and facilitator-driven 
model; farmers’ behaviour and capability development 
Financial instruments, 
products and services 
Trader credit, input supplier credit, farm insurance, loan 
guarantees, savings 
Primary activities Rice farming, rice processing, warehousing, marketing 
and sales  
Support activities Development of farm skills, procurement and supply, 
finance, technology development, infrastructure and 
human resource 
Rice varieties Non-glutinous Khaw Dok Mali 105 and RD 15 rice 
varieties 
End products Rice paddy, milled rice 
Market systems Intermediary and middlemen 
Land rights Government’s land allocation for agriculture 
Value chain governance Legislative, judicial and executive governance 
Products/activities that 
create value  
End products, improved quality, value chain upgrading, 




New types of financial instruments, branding, 
networking, resources 
Partnerships with other 
organisations, both formal 
and informal setting 
Collaboration with other trade actors, research 
collaboration with universities/research institutions 
Government intervention Collaboration, policy intervention, trade agreements 
Organisational processes Managerial processes, leadership, farmer-leadership, 
organisational learning 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
The same data collection methods were applied in each of the cases with some 
variation to adapt to the specifics of each case setting. This reflects the nature of 
the value chains analysis that can be structured and systematic yet provide 
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flexibility with respect to individual cases. Kaplinsky and Morris (2000) describe 
the nature of value chain methodology as “there is no mechanistic way of 
applying value chain methodology” (p. 49). This can be a challenge for 
practitioners and managers who have limited experience of value chain analysis 
particularly in an agrarian context. A more systematic framework could enable 
analysts to develop more thorough insights into the rice value chain. Value chain 
analysis, as a descriptive analytical tool, calls for qualitative research techniques, 
but should not be necessarily limited to them. 
 
The primary data collection was conducted through semi-structured interviews, 
life-history interviews, participant observation and primary documents, whereas 
secondary data were used to examine farm and organisational performance. It is 
important to note that the essence of an interview is to ask with curiosity and 
listen to understand, particularly when interviewing farmers. A good flow of 
conversation that fully engaged with respondents was more important than to 
follow bluntly with prepared questions. 
4.1.1 Case selection 
 
This section discusses the case selection process including reasons why each case 
was initially chosen, an eventual change in the site selection, and problems faced 
during fieldwork. We begin by describing the selected cases, including a 
discussion of a few other cases that were initially selected but dropped from the 
analysis. The three selected cases are farmers’ organisations located in Sisaket 
Province. Sisaket is located in the Northeast region of Thailand covering a part 
of Tung-kula-ronghai plateau. Tung (means plateau) - Kula (the indigenous tribe) 
- Ronghai (means, cry) – the Thai name derived from an old myth illustrating that 
the land was so extremely arid that it made even the toughest Kula people cry 
miserably. However, it is the extremely arid conditions that impose stresses on 
jasmine rice cultivation that enables the region to produce some of the best natural 
aroma and texture (Thailand’s Rice Department, 2017). 
 
Why three farmers’ organisations? The three most common farmers’ organisation 
models are producer-, buyer-, and facilitator-driven models (Gereffi, 1999; Miller 
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& Jones, 2011). Each of the cases follows a different organisation model 
commonly found among farmers’ organisations, which lead to different value 
chain models, farmers’ behaviour, capability building and financial instruments. 
Distinctively, the cases are located in the same geography offering comparative 
advantages in terms of physical similarity and the same overall human culture 
and business environment. As this study seeks to understand the development 
mechanisms of farmers’ organisations and rice value chains, and their impacts on 
farmers’ livelihoods, the setting offers controlled variation to observe and 
evaluate the impact social phenomena on farmers’ livelihoods. 
 
According to the National Statistics Office – Sisaket provincial office (2016), 
there are only 4 rice varieties grown in Sisaket province. The majority of farmers 
grow the non-glutinous Khaw Dok Mali 105 and RD 15 rice varieties that yield 
jasmine rice. These account for approximately 91 percent or 1.2 million tons of 
jasmine rice paddy and are mainly grown for commercial purposes (NSO - 
Sisaket, 2016). The province also grew RD 6 and RD 10 which are glutinous rice 
varieties mainly for household consumption and local commercial purposes. 
Glutinous or sticky rice is the main staple for Sisaket people and, more generally, 
in the northeast and north regions of Thailand. 
 
Only 11 percent of Sisaket’s rice farms are situated within irrigation networks 
(411,491 rai or about 65,838 hectares). 3,151,856 rai or around 504,296 hectares 
are rain-fed rice due to the location of most farms outside the irrigation network. 
In 2015, Sisaket saw 1,455,285 tons of rice paddy produced of which 91 percent 
was jasmine rice varieties (Sisaket NSO, 2016).  
 
Figure 4.1 shows a map of Thailand and Sisaket province from satellite images 
acquired from the Thailand’s Geo-Informatics and Space Technology 
Development Agency (2018). The red square in the left-hand side figure is where 
the Sisaket province is situated. This particular geopolitical region of Thailand, 
Cambodia and Vietnam is known for its rice production that provides the basic 
means for people’s livelihood including both food security and income. As such, 
rice and its production can be used as a focal matter for international cooperation 
 91 




Figure 4. 1 Map of Thailand (a) and map of Sisaket province (b) 
Source: GISDA, 2018 
 
Case 1: The Baan Um Sang Organic Rice Community Enterprise 
 
The Baan Um Sang Organic Rice Community Enterprise, so-called the Um Sang, 
is a producer-driven farmers’ organisation established by a collective group of 
smallholder farmers of Du sub-district, Rasi Salai district, Srisaket province, led 
by Uncle Boonmee Surakot. Highly respected by the members, “Uncle 
Boonmee” is used as the enterprise’s tradename and logo. The trade name has 
economic value for its reputation for premium quality certified organic jasmine 
rice. The rice from the community enterprise is a milled product that has been 
granted the Thailand’s five-star provincial award for ‘one tumbol (district) one 
product’ (OTOP). The aims of organic rice farming are to reduce farm production 
costs, improve market quality and improve the low returns from selling mere rice 
paddy to millers. The mission of the organisation is to produce certified organic 
products (e.g.,, packaged milled rice and rice noodles) instead of selling as low 
value added rice paddy. 
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The enterprise has about 1,200 members who farm on individual small plots that 
cover the total of approximately 3,200 hectares of certified organic farmland. The 
annual production of certified organic rice paddy is around 10,000 tons of jasmine 
rice paddy. Each individual farmer is responsible for their own farm credit, with 
help from the enterprise to source organic grade input supplies. The enterprise 
regularly organises farm training activities and social activities for members to 
get together and learn from each other. Therefore, its value chain covers all four 
stages of Inbound Logistics, Operations, Outbound Logistics and Marketing and 
Sales. In addition to higher than the common farm-gate prices, its members 
receive an additional 15 percent dividend from the collective enterprise. 
Approximately 80 percent of the enterprise certified organic rice is exported. 
 
Case 2: The Bangsue Chia Meng and rice farmers dibbling partnership  
 
The Chia Meng and rice farmers dibbling partnership is a buyer-driven farmers’ 
organisation setting through a lead firm. It is created by the Bangsue Chia Meng 
Rice Mill Co., Ltd. (BSCM) or known as the Chia Meng to help farmers tackle 
the problems of low-quality jasmine rice paddy and low returns from the farm, 
improvements to which would obviously also benefit the mill. The BSCM is the 
leading Thai rice exporter under the Golden Phoenix tradename. It has an annual 
production capacity of 400,000 tons of rice paddy and exports jasmine rice 
worldwide. 
 
The original idea came from Mr Vallop Manathanya, the BSCM Chairperson, 
who was been inspired by the development work of the late King Bhumibhol for 
mitigating farmers’ vulnerability. Initially, the focus was on improving farmers’ 
income and the quality of their rice paddy by using purified jasmine rice seed 
(Khaw Dok Mali 105) and the dibbling method of rice planting. Since then, the 
partnership has evolved to offer more supports to member farmers due to the 
practical problems faced through cropping seasons forcing many members to 
quit. At the current stage, the BSCM engages more closely with its members from 
financing input supplies (e.g., seed, fertilizers and machineries) with no interest 
to giving price incentives for those who successfully farm and sell their paddy to 
the Chia Meng. In the 2016/17 crop year, out of 465 Sisaket farmers participated 
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in the partnership programme with the total farmland of 1,065 hectares – only 
318 farmers remained in the programme. The value chain of case 2 also covers 
all four stages of Inbound Logistics, Operations, Outbound Logistics and 
Marketing and Sales. 
 
Case 3: The Sisaket’s Agricultural Cooperatives for Marketing  
 
The Agricultural Cooperatives for Marketing Sisaket Ltd. (ACM) is a facilitator-
driven farmers’ organisation aiming to increase access to markets for farmers. 
The ACM receives financial and marketing support from the Bank for 
Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC). The focus is on the 
marketing of rice product. By contrast to two other cases, the activities of the 
cooperative span from Operations to Marketing and Sales in the value chain. The 
ACM mission is to offer rice paddy at a higher price than local millers to help 
farmers improve their income. The ACM has a milling facility and packs 100 
percent Jasmine rice, with 40 tons of rice paddy daily production capacity and 
shelves its rice products at BAAC branches nationwide and at many modern 
shops. As of 2013, the AMC has 220,000 members, who are BAAC’s customers 
located in all districts of Sisaket province. 
 
4.1.2 Challenges in case selection: fieldwork, logistics and parenting 
 
It is important to note that the case selection evolved from an initial research 
design based on a desk analysis. At the early stages of the fieldwork, I 
concentrated on the rice value chains in the central region of Ayuthaya, 
Suphanburi, Nakhonprathom and Chachoengsao provinces. I chose the central 
region due to high value-added products and more manageable fieldwork 
logistics. The plan was to construct cases in Thailand’s central region for two 
reasons. First, the central region has the most extensive irrigation network, which 
allows farmers to produce up to three crops a year, yet it is there that farmers have 
the highest debt per household. Second, the region seemed logistically 
manageable for commuting to the research sites on daily basis. The initial 
fieldwork period allowed me to understand the factors that affect farmers’ 
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circumstances and thus to assess the appropriateness of specific cases for the kind 
of comparisons that the study would require. 
 
For example, some farmers’ organisations I visited did not represent the business 
conditions as described in the documents assessed in the desk study. This was 
learning that could have not been achieved by desk analysis. Besides, there were 
factors present that might have complicated the analysis within the available time 
and budget. First, the farmers in the areas used a wide selection of rice varieties 
which may require different treatment and vary in terms of the cost of rice 
production even though these would be classified in the same market category as 
non-glutinous rice. Second, farmers in the central region tend to farm larger size 
plots compared to those of the north and northeast regions. Also, land rights can 
vary from family-owned land, to a combination of owned and rented land, and to 
wholly rented land, which shapes the circumstances of individual farmers 
substantially. Third, the cases were scattered in different provinces, which seems 
to result in somewhat different socio-economic contexts. I visited farmers’ 
organisations in Suphanburi, Ayutthaya and Chachoengsao. These were some of 
the farmers’ organisations that offered well-known successful examples of 
helping their members to mitigate debt. However, the cases were often 
disconnected when looked at from the perspective of their business environment, 
which would complicate the analysis when considering, for instance, resourcing 
issues. Therefore, the cases were not included as key material for analysis, even 
though they offered significant background insights into the rice industry and rice 
production, and helped to refine the appropriate case selection. 
 
In addition, in the early stages of the work the study focused on market price and 
value-added activities in the rice value chains, meaning that value was understood 
predominantly as economic value. As a result, the perspective pushed the analysis 
to focus heavily on product development to maximise the profit of farmers’ 
organisation, while paying less attention on other aspects that could improve 
individual farmers capabilities. Many farmers’ organisations I have visited were 
based on the market-driven model and mostly led by a small team of founders. 
Some of their rice products were lucrative, but benefited only small group of core 
members, instead of all members of the farmers’ organisation. The main objective 
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in many of these cases was to earn more income than by trading traditionally with 
millers. The organisation members would only get involved in the trading part, 
but ignore other aspects such as farm skill development and shared business risk 
bearing, which arguably are necessary for long-term organisational sustainability. 
This was how I came to realise that my comparative case selection lacked the 
organisational model aspect, which eventually turned out to be the influential 
factor towards improving farmers’ livelihoods. 
 
Another problem specific to the study was the importance of not treating ‘rice’ 
as an heterogenous product. It was important to take into account the variety of 
rice produced by the original set of organizations and their members. In the 
central region of Thailand, farmers grow a wide selection of rice varieties such 
as rice berry, Prathumthani, Saohai and provincial Jasmine rice1. This turned out 
to be problematic for case comparisons, because different rice varieties are likely 
to require different factors that make comparisons questionable such as the life 
cycle of crops, farming techniques, production costs and market demand, support 
from the government, etc. 
 
Also, the research questions evolved through study period. At the early stage, my 
research inquiry emphasised farmers’ debt. The statistic shows that the provinces 
in the central region are among the highest in terms of productivity, but farmers 
also tend to carry high household debt (Thailand’s National Statistics Office, 
2011). The high productivity derives from a relatively good access to input 
supply, credit, natural water sources and irrigation systems. Therefore, although 
many farmers have high debt, they actually manage to maintain a decent level of 
farmer livelihood due to the productivity of their farming operations. Among 
other things, many households have brand-new cars, smart phones, children have 
higher education, and so forth. Although the vicious circle of debt was to some 
extent visible, the farming in these areas also seemed to involve sometimes high 
degrees of financial mismanagement and personal spending behaviour. So, I 
 
1 In the context of Thai rice market, non-glutenous Khaw Dok Mali 105 and RD 15 rice 
varieties that grow outside designated Jasmine rice farming area would be called provincial 




decided to look further in search of for more appropriate cases to explain the 
relationship between rice value chain development and livelihood improvement 
that is of central interest to this study. From this perspective, the Sisaket province 
offers a fitting context to observe social phenomena in a relatively homogeneous 
business environment. There are three farmers’ organisational models situated in 
the area that provide a relatively similar context to each case. However, the 
decision to choose Sisaket for the case selection was not made lightly. Major 
obstacles were logistics, parenting and costs, knowing that I had already spent a 
large part of my fieldwork budget in the central region fieldwork. 
 
Logistics problems involve getting to the relatively remote region from Bangkok 
where I was based and around the actual study sites in the region. Sisaket is about 
340 miles from Bangkok from where it can be reached by road and airplane. The 
closest airport is Ubon Ratchathani International Airport, which is about 60 miles 
or about 1.30 hours’ drive to Sisaket’s center city. The combination of cost, time 
and childcare issues was key to planning the data collection. Each trip covered a 
period of 34 hours for a round trip night bus and 12 hours of interview 
appointments. I did a total of 6 trips. 
 
4.2 Data collection 
 
Researchers generally agree that interviewing is a relatively straightforward and 
often an effective way to obtain information from others (Silverman, 1998; 
Harmanns, 2004; Schmidt, 2004; Cloke et al., 2007; Longhurst, 2012). In social 
science research, semi-structured interview is one of the most common and 
effective methods for collecting qualitative data (ibid.). It has the advantage that 
the interviews can take place in an informal setting, allow time to negotiate and 
clarify information between parties, and are relatively cheap to conduct (ibid.). 
In particular, interviewing has been successfully used to study value chain 
development in previous studies (e.g., Donovan and Poole, 2013; Rohit and 
Bahvani, 2018). 
 
Stakeholder interviews and documents are the key empirical evidence collected 
for this study. The purpose of data collection was to harvest relevant data and 
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information in order to answer the research question. To keep focus on what kind 
of data would the most relevant, a farmers’ organisation is taken as an entry point 
and the nexus of data collection and analysis for each case. The categories in 
Table 4.1 were used to guide the data collection and the interviews in particular. 
Overall, the study combines interviewing, participant observation and secondary 
data gathering techniques as the primary means to extracting rich material on the 
farmers’ organisations that consequently shape their behaviour and livelihood. 
Also, the study further uses relevant rice statistics such as production, market 
prices and farmers’ debt to depict the business environment in which the farmers 
operate. Such data were available from reliable institutional sources and statistics 
published by government agencies. Many of the relevant documents could be 
located through Google searches, yet some documents were not posted online or 
were outdated. These documents were obtained by contacting the respective 
organization directly. The main sources of documents for analysis include the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, the National Statistical Office and Thai 
Rice Exporters Association. Examples of these data include monthly price data 
(national average price) from Thai Rice Mills Association and Thai Rice 
Exporters Association and, farmers’ debt and debt relief from Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives. In the event some statistics were not made 
available from an official source but appeared to be published in media such as 
newspapers. Triangulation of data sources was used to facilitate validation of data 
by cross-verifying them from two or more sources. All in all, data collection was 
aligned with the analytical methods to be discussed in the next section. 
4.2.1 Preliminary value chain mapping  
 
Drawing a value chain map visualises interconnections between actors, 
organisations and activities within a value chain as shown in Figure 4.2. It 
identifies relevant actors and their business activities in value chains. The 
function of the map is to illuminate how each value chain is organised and 
governed. It also helps identify those actors and business activities that can 
influence and benefit the chain. This identification can then guide how to improve 
bottlenecks in value chain performance such as farmers’ skill development (e.g., 
farming and financial management) and remedying the lack of capitals and 
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limited accessibility to resources. The essence of the value chain concerns the 
flows of products, services, information and finance; accordingly, the following 
questions guide the mapping of agricultural value chains in the study.   
 
● What are the core processes in the value chain that each farmers’ 
organisation participates?  
● How is the value chain organised?  
● Who are the key actors of the core processes?  
● Who are key partners to these actors? 
● How do products, finance, services and information flow through the 
chain?  
● What internal and external influences affect the value chain?  
 
These questions and the schematic value chain map helped to form a list of 
stakeholders as shown in Table 4.2. A simplified value chain mapping was the 
first step helping to draw a system boundary for the data collection and analysis. 
In this study, the initial value chain map (pre-fieldwork) was done based on 
document analysis of the Thai rice industry. This helped to map who to be 
contacted for what type of data to be extracted. It also highlights how a purposive 
sampling method is particularly suitable for conducting a value chain analysis. In 
this initial stage, secondary data were obtained from official documents, company 
documents and from media coverage. The media content included various 
sources of knowledge and televised programmes such as farmers’ best practices 
documentaries and agricultural extension programs that are produced to boost 
farmers’ capabilities. These are produced by Thai National Television 
Companies, Governmental bodies and NGOs. It is worth noting that the televised 
agricultural documentaries are generally short and cover only general information 
that is easy to digest by general audiences. Therefore, this could not replace 
primary data collection by which researchers have the opportunity to explore the 




Figure 4. 2 Rice value chain framework 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 
Upon embarking on the field research, the understanding from real world 
problems in the Thai rice industry helped to focus the research questions. In 
addition, I found that the best way was to keep analysing data and not to wait 
until the completion of the field research. Documents, notes and interview 
transcripts were often initially analysed already on the same day, which helped 
to shape interview questions and improve the quality of data collection methods 














Table 4. 2 Interviewed stakeholders’ affiliations (interviewed)  
 
Affiliation  Number of 
informants 
Sisaket province business environment  66 
The Baan Um Sang Organic Rice Community Enterprise - Leadership 
team 
3 
The Baan Um Sang Organic Rice Community Enterprise - Farmers 15 
The Bangsue Chia Meng Rice Mill Co., Ltd. (BSCM) - Leadership 
team 
3 
The Bangsue Chia Meng Rice Mill Co., Ltd. (BSCM) - Farmers 5 
The Sisaket’s Agricultural Cooperatives for Marketing - Leadership 
team 
0 
The Sisaket’s Agricultural Cooperatives for Marketing - Farmers 10 
Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives – Sisaket 
provincial branch 
2 
Agricultural Cooperatives - Sisaket 1 
Ministry of Commerce Sisaket provincial office 1 
A local miller in Sisaket province 2 
Local agricultural suppliers  3 
Rice paddy middlemen  4 
Farm Women Group Association 4 
Sole traders in morning market  12 
Ubon Ratchathani Rice Research Center 1 
Relevant stakeholders involve in selected rice value chains 24 
Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives – Headquarter  4 
Department of Rice, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives  1 
Kasertsart university 3 
Thai Rice Exporters Association  3 
The Land Bank Administration Institute (Public Organization)  1 
Department of Land Development, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives 
2 
Siam Kubota Corporation Co., Ltd. 1 
Shipping broker companies – rice exporting logistics  2 
Agricultural machineries  2 
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International rice merchandise based in London and Birmingham, UK 2 
International rice merchandise based in Helsinki, Finland 1 
International rice merchandise based in Philadelphia, USA   1 
Interviewed but excluded in the three cases  38 
Khaokwan Foundation  1 
Rice Community Enterprise in Suphanburi province - Leadership team 3 
Rice Community Enterprise in Suphanburi province - Farmers 6 
Rice Community Enterprise in Ayuthaya province - Leadership team 3 
Rice Community Enterprise in Ayuthaya province - Farmers 4 
Rice Community Enterprise in Chachoengsao province - Leadership 
team 
3 
Rice Community Enterprise in Chachoengsao province - Farmers 5 
Local miller in Suphanburi province 1 
Local miller in Chachoengsao province 1 
Agricultural Cooperatives - Suphanburi 1 
Agricultural Cooperatives - Chachoengsao 1 
Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives – Suphanburi 
provincial branch  
2 
Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives – Chachoengsao 
provincial branch  
2 
Farm Women Group Association  4 
Rice Science Center(RSC), Rice Gene Discovery Unit (RGDU), 
Kasetsart University, Kamphaengsaen 
 
1 
Source: Own elaboration. 
4.2.2 Stakeholder Interviews  
 
Stakeholder interviews were used as the main data collection strategy. It involved 
semi-structured interviews, life histories, and participant observation of which 
semi-structured interview was the main conversational method. The semi-
structured interviews were framed and conducted with the help of a set of pre-
planned questions. I conducted interviews with 128 informants, of which 90 
respondents were used for the three selected cases in the end. Table 4.2 shows 
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the list of interviewed stakeholders. Informants were categorised into three 
groups. 
 
The first group consists of rice value chain actors who are directly involved with 
the three selected cases in Sisaket province business environment. This group 
consist of 66 interviewed informants. These included the leadership team and 
individual farmers of each case, local millers, farm suppliers and middlemen rice 
traders. Sole traders in a morning market turned out to be an interesting addition 
to the study (Photo 4.2). Table 4.2 also shows interviews undertaken but not used 
in case analysis. That was because the initial case selection was planned 
differently as mentioned earlier.  
 
Some further interesting, serendipitous findings were made at informal 
gatherings at morning markets that are a centre for local shopping and transit, and 
by visiting a women’s silk weaving network. Many of the participants at the 
morning market and the network were rice farmers or members of a farm 
household. These places offered farmers an opportunity to earn additional income 
on top of rice farming. Some farmers sold milled rice, some drove a motorbike 
taxi, some sold ‘grab and go’ food. Observing these activities provided further 
insights into how farmer households generated additional income and managed 
their cash flow throughout the year. For instance, I met an elderly lady who 
skilfully wove silk at home as a hobby (see Photo 4.3), and told about an informal 
women’s silk weaving network. The network was primarily about knowing each 
other in the villages and less for trading purposes. 
 
These informal workforce activities can generate substantial income for farmers’ 
households. The ‘informal’ refers here particularly to the lack of access to formal 
financial loans, while women were often dominant in these informal activities. 
The positive side is that these women can continuously exercise their 
entrepreneurial skills through daily trade, mastering networking skills and 
building resilience through informal markets. The down-side is that such business 
activities are not recognized, for instance, by financial institutions. As a result, 
the access to credit, for instance, is limited and therefore many of these actors 
turn to local informal creditors. Some use the microfinance services from co-op 
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or BAAC. Although the size of microfinance is small, it is sufficient for small 
subsistent farming purpose.  
 
 
Photo 4. 1 Women sell (left) milled rice and (right) operate a local coffee counter at a 
morning market, Meung district, Sisaket  
Source: Fieldwork, 2017  
 
 
Photo 4. 2 Silk making process (top left and right); an elderly woman weaves on a 
traditional loom (down left and right)  




Interview appointments were arranged through respective organisations as listed 
in Table 4.2. The table lists only informants’ affiliation but not name or a specific 
position to protect the anonymity of the informants. Official letters with SOAS 
letterhead were used to make the appointments with informants. Most 
organisations accepted the letter to be sent electronically in a PDF format, while 
a few organisations also requested a hard copy to be sent to them in mail. In all 
interview appointments, I had the letter printed and ready to be presented if 
required. Interviews were conducted in Thai language and recorded with 
informants’ consent.  Most of the informants were comfortable with recording. 
However, there were two informants who asked not to be recorded. Recording 
allowed a good flow of conversation, while note-taking was done alongside to 
capture key information and to help to locate where to look for these in the 
recording. Selected interviews, such as the heads of farmers’ organisations, were 
transcribed verbatim. 
 
Organisational leadership and individual farmers were the main respondents in 
each case about a farmers’ organisation; the appointments had to be made through 
the respective farmers’ organisation. The organisation then arranged the 
interview setting, which caused difficulties in ensuring that the data collection 
would yield rich evidence about the farmers’ livelihoods. I could not always 
immediately interview the farmers as I had requested. For example, I asked to 
interview both male and female farmers that represent age range between 20 to 
65 (see table 4.4 d). The main condition was to get access to those who have 
experience of heavy indebtedness but successfully improved after joining the 
farmers’ organisation. However, those who turned up in an interview meeting 
were usually in their fifties or sixties as the younger need to work in farm and 
were busy with household chores.  Consequently, I planned to visit farmers 
individually at their home, which also turned out to entail unexpected difficulties. 
For example, some farmers forgot their appointment, or some other, more 
important things came up. Once, I waited for an informant for two hours and still 
could not reach the person on phone. The respondent’s mother who lived in the 
same household suggested me to wait. I waited, not only that I wanted to have 
information for my thesis but also the village was not easily accessible, which 
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made waiting a more sensible decision than to rescheduling the interview. This 
is to illustrate some of the difficulties I had to overcome during the fieldwork. 
 
Many informants especially in senior positions in their organisations expressed 
that they were surprised by the fact that my research concerned the most pressing 
political problem on Thailand’s agricultural development agenda. They thought 
that this could be a type of research that could benefit government policy making 
process. The fact that my research was not sponsored by the Royal Thai 
Government Scholarship made the informants often wonder why I should care 
about these matters. This usually opened an opportunity for me to explain my 
research objectives in depth and at some length and the informants’ subsequent 
reflections turned out to be particularly valuable in helping me frame my research 
questions and improve the methods used. Many informants had years of 
experience in the rice industry and the majority of them expressed interest in 
value chain development knowledge. They indicated that learning value chain 
analysis could benefit them but were unsure how to undertake such an analysis 
in practice. Handling the analytical framework was among the key problems they 
felt when considering conducting a value chain analysis, and the conversations 
helped me to improve the understanding of value chain analysis from different 
perspectives. 
 
Finally, having limited funds meant that I had to use existing resources in most 
efficient way possible. For example, I made several contacts to stakeholders via 
telephone and email before the actual fieldwork. This helped to establish 
relationships and minimise costs by carefully planning the fieldwork activities in 
advance. To my surprise, many key informants felt special as I approached them 
from the other side of the world showing determination to conduct the study. 
Also, many respondents offered informal follow-up conversations to update 







Table 4. 3 Actors/informants mapped to key analytical categories 
 
Categories Example of associated 
factors  
Actors/Informants   










Trader credit, input supplier 
credit, farm insurance, loan 
guarantees, saving 
Bankers, co-op administrator, 
farmers, millers and suppliers 
Primary activities Rice farming, rice processing, 
warehousing, marketing and 
sale  
Leaders and farmers of 
farmers’ organisations, rice 
exporters, rice merchandises, 
agricultural machinery 
companies, export brokers 
Rice varieties Non-glutinous Khaw Dok 
Mali 105 and RD 15 rice 
varieties 
Leaders and farmers of 
farmers’ organisations, rice 
exporters, rice merchandises, 
governmental agricultural 
officers, middlemen 
End products Rice paddy, milled rice Leaders and farmers of 
farmers’ organisations, rice 
exporters, rice merchandises, 
agricultural machinery 
companies, export brokers 
Market systems Intermediaries and middlemen, 
future price 
Leaders and farmers of 
farmers’ organisations, rice 
exporters, rice merchandises, 
export brokers, governmental 
commerce officer 
Land rights Governmental land allocation 
for agriculture 
Leaders and farmers of 
farmers’ organisations, 
governmental land 








commerce officer, rice 
traders, export brokers 
Products/activities 
that create value  
End product, improved 





officer, rice traders, export 
brokers millers,  
Organisational value 
added 
New type of financial 
instrument, branding, 
networking, resources 
Leaders of farmers’ 
organisations, millers, rice 
traders 
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Categories Example of associated 
factors  
Actors/Informants   
Partnership with 
other organisations, 
both formal and 
informal setting 
Collaboration with other trade 
actors, Research collaboration 
with universities/research 
institutions 
Leaders and farmers of 
farmers’ organisations, rice 
exporters, rice institute 






intervention, trade agreement 
Leaders and farmers of 
farmers’ organisations, 
governmental agricultural 







Leaders and farmers of 
farmers’ organisations 
Note: This table elaborates from Table 4.1 
 
Table 4.4(a), 4.4(b), 4.4(c) and 4.4(d) show examples of templates that guided 
what information would be required from rice farmers. In particular, Table 4.4(a) 
shows examples of data acquired and organised in a way that elaborates from 
Table 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. Table 4.4 (b) and 4.4(c) show examples of how 
information from farmers’ organisations and farmers were organised and 
prepared for analysis.   
 
Table 4. 4a Example of data organisation from interview transcriptions, case 1 




ts   
Type of information to 






Rice farming activities 
such as input supply, 
farm skills, financial 
instruments 
- Dibbling technique 
- SME business loan  
- post-harvest facilities  
- Value added by improved rice 
quality (farm)  
- Value added by processing - 
value added through research and 
product development 








Table 4.4 a An example of a format for data organisation from interview and 
documents for full costing of rice production  
 




farmers as members 





farmers as sole 
traders and not as 
members of a 
farmers’ 
organisation 
Certified organic Hom Mali 105 
seed, 62.5 kg 
  
Hom Mali 105 seed, 156.25 kg   
Organic fertilizer    
Chemical fertilizer   
Chemical herbicide   
Labour and machine rent   
Harvest machine rent    
Farm insurance    
TOTAL    
   Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 
Table 4.4 b An example of data organisation from interviews and documents on farm 
performance 
 
Farm performance Value ($/weight) 
% of harvested area/total farm area  
Production cost ($/hectare)  
Rice yield (ton paddy/hectare)  
Farm gate price ($/ton paddy)  
Profit ($/ton paddy)  
Other crop(s)  





Table 4.4 c An example of data organisation from interviews and documents on 
farmers personal details  
Information  Elaborate questions 
Age range (years) -10-19       -20-29         -30-39 
-40-49       -50-59         -60-69 
- 70 and more 
Gender  - Male      - Female  
- Prefer not to say 
Level of formal 
education 
- Never attend school 
- pratom 1-4            -pratom 1-6 
- matthayom 1-3    - matthayom 1-6 
- vocational education   - university   - other  
On-the-job training  - Farmers’ school 
- Learn from other farmers 




- share housework e.g., laundry, cooking 
- share childcare duty 
Take home income - < 9,000 Baht 
- 9,000 – 15,000 Baht 
- _____ Baht  
- I work with husband and count towards his income 
- Other  
Type of business 
models:  
- Contract farming 
- farmer owned (stand-alone) 
- farmer owned (join community enterprise) 
Farm size - 1-5 rai          - 6-10 rai 
- 11-15 rai      - 16-20 rai 
- please specify, ___  rai 
Farm size (own) - 1-5 rai        - 6-10 rai             - 11-15 rai 
- 16-20 rai    - please specify, ___  rai 
Farm size (rent)- 
how long is the 
rental contract?  
- How long is the rental contract? 
- How much does it cost annually?  
- How much is the sharecropping proportion? 
Labour wage and number of hours 
- Self, working hours _____ 
- Family members’ labour, working hours _____ 
- Hire labour, working hours _____ 
Source of financial 
investment  
- Profit from previous cropping season 
- Saving from other source of income 
- Borrow from formal financial institution  
- Borrow from cooperative 
- Borrow from local creditor 
- Borrow from relative (interest-free) 
  Source: Own elaboration. 
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During the fieldwork, it turned out that some of the prepared questions would not 
yield useful data and could even cause some tension among informants. For 
example, a question about the level of formal education sometimes made farmers 
feel that they were inferior. Besides, the level of formal education may not have 
causal relation to an individual farmer’s livelihood. For example, some old 
farmers of case 1 (in their fifties or sixties) indicated that they lived a comfortable 
life (i.e. a debt-free lifestyle while children sent money home), as they were no 
longer responsible for the expenses of their adult children. Instead, they received 
a monthly allowance from their children – it is a Thai norm for adult children 
give back to their parents as a way to show gratitude. Interestingly, there were 
also some young graduate professionals who had relocated from Bangkok to 
Sisaket province to work locally. They indicated that learning to farm proved to 
be a hardship for them as it required a new skill set considerably different from 
what they learned in college. Nevertheless, they felt farming allowed them to 
have additional sources of income (i.e. by having an office job and doing farming) 
and to live locally with their families. 
4.2.3 Some limitations of the data collection 
 
Besides logistics and budget already discussed earlier, gaining access to some of 
the relevant documents and informants was considerably hard. There were 
logistical issues in managing the fieldwork and building trust and collaboration 
required to access the data. Value chain analysis requires business-specific 
information from a focal organisation which can be sensitive to disclose. 
Although the study was for academic purposes and not conducted for commercial 
reasons, the results are expected to be published. This made access to certain 
organisational information difficult. More generally, these difficulties highlight 
the importance of the value chain framework in ways that is important to 
managers to understand when doing self-conducted value chain analysis. 
Domestic traveling costs were high, because the public transportation network 
did not cover major parts of rural area of Thailand. Most of my fieldwork required 
me to hire a car from local drivers who knew the area.  
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4.2.4 Qualitative data analysis  
 
The aim of data analysis is to explain how farmers’ organisations improve their 
position in rice value chains and, consequently, farmers’ livelihoods, based on 
empirical data. To help filtering data, farmers’ livelihood means human 
development and financial-related improvement such as higher productivity, 
higher and more stable income and access to capacity building. It involves the 
mapping and analysis of rice value chains using qualitative data. Qualitative data 
analysis can be understood generally as a process of organising, filtering and 
analysing information. As documents and interviews are the key data sources, the 
methods of data analysis focus on document and interview transcript analysis 
techniques. A systematic data organisation is critical because the materials 
involve a large amount of text from interview transcripts and documents. Without 
systematic organisation, important information may be unintentionally excluded 
from the analysis. Well-organised qualitative data analysis can support 
systematic vulnerability evaluation, value chain governance, upgrading and 
finance.   
 
The analytical strategy of this study is relatively straightforward, stemming from 
the exploratory nature of the research. The approach is to extract and identify key 
constructs and ideas from what the farmers say about rice farming, farmers’ 
organisations and their livelihoods. This involves careful transcription, coding, 
sorting and sifting of collected data. Detailed fieldwork notes were used to 
recover informants’ non-linguistic expressions along with their body language to 
reinforce the quality of analysis. The analyses were carried out in several steps 
involving listening to the interview tapes; transcribing interviews; reading the 
transcripts several times; connecting relevant codes across respondents; 
translating selected quotations from Thai to English; and writing it up in 
conjunction with value chain analysis (Strauss and Corbin, 1997). The selected 
quotations were then translated to English. The labelling system of stakeholder 





Table 4. 5 Stakeholder interview labelling system  
 
Stakeholders’ affiliations  Number of 
informants 
Labels 
Micro level - Sisaket province business 
environment  
47  
The Baan Um Sang Organic Rice Community 
Enterprise - Leadership team 
3 Case1_01 to Case1_03 
The Baan Um Sang Organic Rice Community 
Enterprise - Farmers 
15 Case1_04 to Case1_18 
The Bangsue Chia Meng Rice Mill Co., Ltd. 
(BSCM) - Leadership team 
3 Case2_01 to Case2_03 
The Bangsue Chia Meng Rice Mill Co., Ltd. 
(BSCM) - Farmers 
5 Case2_04 to Case2_08 
The Sisaket’s Agricultural Cooperatives for 
Marketing - Leadership team 
0 Case3_01 
The Sisaket’s Agricultural Cooperatives for 
Marketing - Farmers 
10 Case3_02 to Case3_11 
Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperatives – Sisaket provincial branch 
2 Sisaket_BAAC_01 to 
Sisaket_BAAC_02 
Agricultural Cooperatives - Sisaket 1 Sisaket_AC_03 
Ministry of Commerce Sisaket provincial 
office 
1 Sisaket_Commerce_04 
Local millers in Sisaket province 2 Sisaket_miller_05 
Sisaket_miller_06 
Local agricultural suppliers  3 Sisaket_supplier_07 to 
Sisaket_supplier_09  
Local extension worker  1 Sisaket_extension_01  
Rice paddy middlemen  4 Sisaket_middleman_10 
Sisaket_middleman_13 
Farm Women Group Association 4 Sisaket_Women_14 to 
Sisaket_Women_17 
Sole traders in morning market  11 Sisaket_morning_18 to 
Sisaket_morning_29 
Ubon Ratchathani Rice Research Center 1 Sisaket_riceseed_30 
Macro level 19  
Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperatives – Headquarter  
4 Macro_BAAC_01 to  
Macro_BAAC_04 
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Stakeholders’ affiliations  Number of 
informants 
Labels 
Department of Rice, Ministry of Agriculture 
and Cooperatives  
1 Macro_Rice_05 
Kasertsart university 3 Macro_Kaset_06 to 
Macro_Kaset_08 
Thai Rice Exporters Association  3 Macro_RiceEx_09 to 
Macro_RiceEx_11 
The Land Bank Administration Institute 
(Public Organization)  
1 Macro_LandBank_12 
Department of Land Development, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives 
2 Macro_LandDev_13 to 
Macro_LandDev_14  
Siam Kubota Corporation Co., Ltd. 1 Affiliate_01 
Shipping broker companies – rice exporting 
logistics  
2 Affiliate_02 to 
Affiliate_03 
Agricultural machineries  2 Affiliate_04 to 
Affiliate_05 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Interview recording and transcription are simple yet powerful tools to preserve 
the originality of evidence. The transcripts can be cross-referenced to other 
interviews or data retrieved from government documents. It also helps to 
elaborate analysis when new ideas or recommendations have emerged. For 
example, upon receiving comments from my PhD supervisor and feedback from 
the PhD examiners, I was able to go back and retrieve additional insights from 
the rich data even if was not possible to do further data collection. I found that I 
have already had plenty of additional relevant data that had not been incorporated 
into the earlier version of the analysis. For these reasons, recording and 
transcribing were effective tools to maintain data quality, and supported revisiting 
data, so that I could elaborate my research on the basis of the feedback. 
 
Selected interviews were transcribed verbatim. Despite being a time-consuming 
process, the work allowed me to absorb and develop a rich understanding of the 
way respondents feel about issues through their verbal expressions, pauses and 
emotional cues during the conversations. For instance, a simple answer like “rice 
farming can be profitable” (interview code: Macro_RiceEx_09) can carry much 
more rich implications that its literal English meaning.  
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Incorporating non-linguistic expressions into the analysis helped interpreting 
whether the respondent really thought what they said or, for instance, whether the 
informant was actually hesitating or ambivalent about his or her own views. 
Macro_RiceEx_09 was a person of a senior position, assigned by an organisation 
to be interviewed. An unexpected joint interview by another rice exporter (code: 
Macro_RiceEx_10) had introduced a nuance into the conversation. From what is 
mentioned above, the new person said, 
 
Macro_RiceEx_10: “I don’t think it [rice farming] is profitable to be 
honest and government should not do this [market price intervention] to 
gain popularity. You know, and I know and everyone knows, why they 
[the government] are doing it [price intervention]. If they want to do 
something useful, they should expand irrigation network and make 
farming into large scale.  Let me tell something honestly [...] small farmers 
will never be better off no matter how high price government tried to 
intervene because their farms are too small to achieve economy of scale 
and that [...] you tell me, how can they [farmers] win traders? I know I am 
outspoken, you are doing this for your PhD thesis, right? So, I will be 
frank.” 
 
Scholars have introduced various ways to systemically analyse interview 
transcripts. For example, Burnard (1991) proposes a 14-stage guide for analysing 
interview transcripts, including coding which is one of the most common 
qualitative analytical tools found across different types of qualitative analysis. 
The process involves defining the list of categories, sub-headings and codes 
(Saldaña, 2015; Fletcher, 2017), which are then used to aggregate the material 
into similar and different chunks or excerpts. In this study, a coding technique 
was used to identify and categorise thematic keywords from the interviews. It is 
important to note that a code in this study refers to a categorised word or short 
phrase describing the material excerpt (and not a programming language). As 
Saldaña (2015) described as: 
“A code in qualitative inquiry is most often a word or short phrase that 
symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or 
evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data. The data 
can consist of interview transcripts, participant observation field notes, 
journals, documents, drawings, artifacts, photographs, video, Internet 
sites, e-mail correspondence, literature, and so on.” 
 
Saldaña, 2015 (p. 3) 
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In this study, the coding process is driven by the categorisation introduced earlier; 
the rice value chain framework was used as a guide to define the categories and 
codes. For example, Table 4.1 offers a list of categories to be used for cross-case 
analysis. From there, each category and associated factors were elaborated 
throughout data collection and analysis. This approach helps analysis to remain 
rigorous as the focus narrows on the core issues in a more specific way, reflecting 
Table 4.3 and 4.4. In practice, simple coloured highlighter pens are among the 
most popular tool to distinguish and allocated categories and sub-headings in 
printed evidence (Burnard, 1991; Gibbs, 2007; Blair, 2015). After this phase, I 
transferred the coloured categories and codes into tables as shown in Table 4.4(a), 
4.4(b) and 4.4(c) to help organise findings. 
 
Examples of thematic keywords include the models of farmers’ organisations, 
financial instruments, rice varieties, to name but a few. It is important to note that 
there are many ways to analyse data by using coding techniques. For example, 
Onwuegbuzie et al. (2009) used a matrix technique to capture the frequencies of 
the number of thematic keywords expressed by the participants. While such a 
technique might be effective in some studies, it was not useful in my analysis due 
to different personal styles and verbal expression ability of the informants. For 
example, some respondents repeatedly talked about the same things yielding a 
large number of similar thematic keywords expressed in their speech. However, 
when considered together with the fieldwork notes and notes about informants’ 
non-linguistic expressions, it become clear that differences in keyword 
frequencies occurred often due to the personal style of the informant rather than 
the intensity of the issue expressed.  This suggested that such a technique based 
on counting frequencies might not be suitable to assess the farmers’ livelihoods 
in the context of value chain analysis. The challenge of the study was then to find 
the right balance of between specific data analysis techniques and holistic 
judgement. Judgment in this context concerns personal experience from the field 
and resulting ability to filter informant emotions and facts, and thus the ability to 
deeply analyse what is seen and heard in the collected empirical evidence. While 
doing this this, the categorisation, coding and table templates were helpful in 
guiding data analysis by maintaining academic rigor and allowing a systematic 
engagement with the material. 
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Computational software for qualitative analysis such as NVivo was considered 
as a potential tool for the analysis. The decision to code my interview transcripts 
manually instead of using computer software, like NVivo, resulted mainly from 
concerns over linguistic issues. Thai language is not supported with NVivo 
transcription (QSR International, 2021). On a personal level, I felt most efficient 
working through documents and transcriptions on paper. This method allowed 
me to easily go back and forth on physical materials and recollect my memories, 
giving tangible quality to my analysis. This proved to be particularly helpful 
when I had to revisit my materials at different occasions such as working on the 
thesis examiners recommendations. 
 
Value chain analysis 
 
Data used for rice value chain analysis obtained from qualitative analysis in the 
previous section as discussed with some examples are shown in Table 4.4. Then, 
the value chain analysis carries on using the framework discussed in Chapter 3 
Conceptual Framework on how the three value chains of farmers’ organisations 
improved farmers’ livelihoods. Key considerations were primary and support 
activities, value chain governance, upgrading and innovation, and finance. 
Collected information was organised into their categories (Figure 4.3) and 
analytical interaction (Figure 4.4). Figure 4.3 shows a template for qualitative 
data analysis which is adapted from Porter’s generic value chain. It shows the 
overview of the value chain. This template would help collect data to organise 
what is relevant to the value chain analysis. The total product value or selling 
price can be calculated from the total cost of production cost, profits and 
economic rents. Figure 4.4 shows an example of analysis of each stage of value 
chain. This analytical template drills down at each stage allowing a close 
assessment of the interaction between primary and support activities at selected 




Figure 4. 3 Template for data analysis, adapted version of Porter’s generic value chain 
with additional to economic rents  
Source: Adapted from Porter (1991) 
 
 
Figure 4. 4 Example of analysis at each stage of value chain  




Evaluations from previous stages would offer informed understanding of an 
organisation positioning. This stage is about enabling an organisation to mobilise 
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resources and capitals in order to develop product differentiation as well as 
organisational development. The approach is to build a causal pathway that can 
improve products or services of the value chain. A more detailed analytical 
































Chapter 5 Case Context 
 
In this chapter, a vulnerability evaluation sets the stage of the overall analysis to 
understand the current livelihood status of farmers, as discussed in Chapter 3 
(conceptual framework). The aim is to understand farmers’ vulnerabilities and 
their current level of competitiveness in the rice trade. The DFID’s vulnerability 
assessment is used as a general guide for the evaluation, while a breakeven 
analysis is used to set the reference point for farmers’ rice trade competitiveness. 
The findings in this chapter offer a preliminary idea about the direction where 
rice value chain development could provide better opportunities for farmers 
through collective organising.   
 
5.1 Farmers’ settings 
 
The Thailand’s northeast region (so-called I-san region) produces about 85 per 
cent of Hom Mali rice of total annual jasmine rice production in Thailand as 
shown in Table 5.1 (Thailand’s Office of Agricultural Economics, 2018), where 
the Sisaket province accounts for around 10 per cent of the total Thailand’s 
jasmine rice paddy production. The average jasmine rice paddy productivity in 
Thailand at 15 per cent moisture is about 2.35 tons paddy per hectare, whereas 
Sisaket province averages at 2.26 tons paddy per hectare (ibid.). The market price 
of jasmine rice paddy is usually about 80–100 per cent higher than non-glutinous 
rice paddy. Yet, non-glutinous rice paddy yields about 50 per cent more output 
than jasmine rice paddy when grown under the same farming conditions (OAE, 
2018). This highlights that to grow jasmine rice commercially, Sisaket province 
has followed a successful path in growing exclusively jasmine rice. Earning more 
from jasmine rice can be achieved by i) increasing productivity; ii) lowering 
production costs, and iii) gaining higher a farm-gate price. Gaining ahigher farm-
gate price is probably the most difficult part to achieve by individual farmers as 
it relies on many external factors (e.g., millers, international markets) that farmers 
have little control over, which weakens their negotiating power. 
  
An average household farm-size in the Sisaket province is about 3.04 hectares 
(19 rai) (Sisaket’s NSO, 2017). Importantly, the majority of farmers own their 
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farmland, which means that most farmers have control over the use of land in 
terms of what crops to grow and an opportunity to use it as a collateral for farm 
loans. At the same time, they have traditionally had limited access to other 
important factors of production such as high-quality input supply and water 
source. Rice farmers farm rain-fed rice for about 6 months per year and earn from 
other crops or non-farm employment during the dry season. Their income pattern 
thus comprises one major payment from the rice crop, together with other 
smaller, uneven sources of income throughout the year.    
 
Table 5. 1 The production of 4 major rice varieties in the crop year of 2017/18 
 




















24,934,349 2.83 (0.45) 













758,289 4.3 (0.68) 














5,931,026 2.49 (0.39) 
Northeast region (Isan) 




12,189,325 2.27 (0.36) 






7,405,184 2.25 (0.36) 
Prathumthani 1 
(non-glutinous)  
2,795 (17,470) 2,616    
(16,353) 
8,535 3.26 (0.52) 














4,382,206 2.27 (0.36) 
Sisaket  




1,016,850 2.28 (0.36) 










0 0 0 0 
Other variety of 
Non-glutinous 
rice 
7,429 (46,434) 6,723    
(42,021) 







91,005 2.48 (0.39) 
Source: Thailand’s Office of Agricultural Economics, 2018 
Note: Unit conversion factor 1 hectare = 6.25 rai 
 
Non-glutinous rice is the dominant type of rice in Thailand. Domestic market 
classifies rice into four categories that are i) Hom mali rice or Jasmine rice (non-
glutinous), ii) Prathumthani 1 (non-glutinous); iii) other non-glutinous rice 
varieties, and iv) glutinous rice, as show in Table 5.1. Hom mali or Jasmine rice, 
ขา้วหอมมะลิ, is rice that is grown out of Khaw Dok Mali 105 seed. To market the 
produce as Thai Hom Mali rice, the products are required to have the Thai Hom 
Mali trade mark as show in Figure 5.1. 
 
 
Figure 5. 1 The trademark of the Thai Hom Mali Rice endorsed by the Thailand’s 
Department of Foreign Trade 
Source: Department of Foreign Trade (2013)  
 
The Thai Hom Mali rice can be only traded and priced as Hom mali rice when all 
requirements set at the national level are met. For example, 42 grams of rice 
paddy is used as reference weight to determine farm-gate price. The full weight 
(i.e. 42 grams in the form of rice paddy) will give a high proportion of head rice, 
which is the most valued part of the rice seed after the rice has been milled. Rice 
weight is important as it reflects the quality of farm management including the 
use of appropriate farming techniques and farming inputs application. Qualified 
rice products will then receive a Thai Hom Mali rice logo as shown in Figure 5.1. 
The percentage of amylose and moisture content are used in particular to 
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determine the selling price. According to Hom Mali rice standard by the National 
Bureau of Agricultural Commodity and Food Standards, Ministry of Agriculture 
and Cooperatives (2003), standard quality at is 13–18 percent of amylose starch 
of white rice at 14 percent moisture content. This can be difficult for individual 
smallholder farmers to achieve without post-harvest facilities such as a dryer and 
a commercial grade milling machine. 
 
Thailand’s Foreign Trade department has tried to rebrand Thai jasmine rice as 
Thai Hom Mali rice hoping to make the name and labelling to distinguish it from 
foreign Jasmine rice products. This has, however, a new problem. Thai Jasmine 
rice has been awarded several times the best rice in the world from several 
competitions, and rice consumers globally know its characteristics as top quality 
in terms of taste, texture and aroma. Abandoning the Jasmine rice name can mean 
losing some of the advantage of these perceived qualities that are typically 
associated with the name, to other rivals in global markets.  It is likely that a new 
trade name as Thai Hom Mali rice will require several years to become 
established among consumers as a similar brand and a standard of quality. 
 
Milling process and production  
 
Rice milling is a vital value-added activity that means processing rice paddy into 
milled rice that is a ready-to-cook product. A key objective of rice milling is to 
produce the maximum amount of head rice or rice kernel (i.e. white and brown) 
which is the part that is most preferred by consumers, but there are also other by-
products from the milling process. Maximising the amount of head rice can be 
achieved by using high quality rice seed and manufacturing grade milling facility 
(Agricultural Research Development Agency, 2015). Figure 5.2 shows the 
typical output of rice milling from non-glutinous rice paddy (Agricultural 
Research Development Agency, 2015). On average, the process should yield the 
following fractions from a ton of paddy: 42 percent head rice (423.17 kg rice 
kernel), 17 percent (173.21 kg) broken-milled rice A1, 7 percent (66.68 kg) 
broken-milled rice C1 and C3, 7 percent (72.84 kg) fine rice bran, 3 percent 
(29.04 kg) coarse rice bran, and 24 percent (235.06 kg) husk and impurities 
including moisture (ibid.). Put simply, farmers and millers would be 
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commercially better off if they could increase proportion of head rice and 
respectively reduce the other parts that attract lower price as listed in Table 5.2. 
 
The total price miller earns is 42,480 Baht ($1,416) per ton of milled rice before 
costs. Suppose that a miller or a farmers’ organisation pays 38,173 Baht ($1,272) 
for the price of 2.36 ton paddy, which is expected to yield one ton of milled rice 
(rice kernel). Therefore, the miller can earn 4,307 Baht ($143) for every ton of 
milled rice before other costs such as transaction costs (e.g., middleman and 
banks), transportation, marketing and so on (Figure 5.3). In practice, rice millers 
earn by selling large volumes of milled rice that generate only slim profits per 
unit. Figure 5.3 shows the market value of rice composition. To produce 1 kg of 
milled rice requires an average of about 2.36 kg rice paddy as raw material, 
depending on the quality of the rice paddy and processing efficiency. In general, 
rice millers consider an ideal rice paddy quantity input would be 2 kg rice paddy 
for producing 1 kg milled rice, but that is hard to achieve. Around 80 per cent 
market value of milled rice can be achieved with the combination of 100 per cent 
jasmine rice head rice, broken rice A1, and broken rice C1, C3 (Figure 5.3), 
whereas increasing the relative amount of head rice is a feasible approach to 
elevating profits. This would require increasing the quality of rice paddy that is 
sent into milling, which could be achieved by using high quality rice seed and 




Figure 5. 2 Typical output composition of rice milling of non-glutinous rice paddy. 
Source: Agricultural Research Development Agency, 2015 
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Table 5. 2 Production cost (supply cost only) of processing one ton of milled rice 
Condition: 2.36 ton rice paddy is needed to produce 1 ton of milled rice (rice kernel), costs 
$1,272.4 (38,173 Baht)* 
 





Head rice (rice kernel) 423.17 $1,116.7 
(33,500 Baht) 
33,500 









Rice bran – fine 72.84 $333.4 
(10,000 Baht) 
1,719 
Rice bran – coarse 29.04 $200.0 
(6,000 Baht) 
410 
Husk and impurities 
including moisture 
 
235.06  N/A 
Total   $1,416 
(42,480 Baht*) 
Source: Thai Rice Mills Association, November 2017 
 
* The cost of rice paddy supply. Rice paddy price is normally set at 15 percent moisture. 
There is a price reduction for each per cent moisture increase (or in rice market terms 
as ‘point’). For example, farmers may sell newly harvested rice paddy without drying, 
which entail moisture content at approximately 22 percent. That is 7 percentage point 
or 7 points higher than 15 percent moisture market price reference. Suppose that a 
miller gets 225 Baht ($7.5) reduction for each percentage point moisture exceeded. In 
this case, total reduction will be 1,575 Baht. Therefore, miller will pay 16,175 Baht 





Figure 5. 3 Market value ($) of rice composed of 2.36 kg rice paddy or 1 kg milled 
rice  
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
5.2 Vulnerability evaluation  
 
Vulnerability context consists of shocks, trends and seasonality that can affect 
farmers’ ability to perform farm business activities, resulting to the change of 
their livelihoods (DFID, 2001). The understanding of their vulnerability context 
can consequently help farmers to prepare for shocks, trends and seasonality – the 
factors may impact their assets and capabilities, and thus make positive or 
negative impact on their livelihoods. The focus here is thus on how resources, 
capitals and assets help preventing damage from such factors. The vulnerability 
context is analysed in this section across the three cases because the farmers share 
largely similar geographical conditions and government intervention 
programmes. The data used to analyse the vulnerability context is extracted from 
interviews and secondary data on local rice market and weather forecast 
information. This understanding will then help to explore how and in what ways 
value chain development can offer positive impact to farmers’ livelihood, which 






In Sisaket province, the most frequent natural shocks are floods and drought 
(Thailand Meteorological Department, 2020). Repeated water-related disasters 
cause serious livelihood disruption among rice farmers due to damage to farm 
activities and the resulting loss of income. Improving such water-related 
problems could mean improving farmers’ livelihoods. Interviews with local 
farmers (e.g., Case1_06, Case2_05, Case3_02) allowed me to understand the 
situation that the farmers faced, which is briefly summarised in Table 5.3. Rice 
is generally a water intensive crop but requires different amounts of water at 
different stages of plantation. In general, rice requires a good amount of water, as 
is typical for a rainfed crop, during germination stage (the early stage of 
plantation). If drought occurs at the beginning of a cropping season, rice may not 
germinate and grow properly. By contrast, rice fields do not require a lot of water 
during the time when rice produces grain. As described by the local farmers, the 
worst situation is having drought at the early stage of rice plantation and then 
flooding towards harvesting. The interviewed farmers had faced such situation 
many times during their farming careers.   
 
Additional data from news archival can be used to assess some impacts from 
rainstorm disasters at some level, as shown in Photo 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. Floods often 
occur due to rainstorms. Figure 5.2 shows a weather forecast map of Thailand’s 
provincial area at risk of heavy to severe rainstorm on 15 October 2020 and 28 
October 2020. The level of rainstorm severity had elevated from heavy to severe 
during two weeks’ time of the forecast, which is an example of how rainstorms 
can intensify in a short period of time. The result of such severe rainstorm as 
forecasted shown in Photo 5.1. can be severely flooded rice field in Sisaket 
province, which leaves little for affected farmers to harvest. A rainstorm season 
usually takes place between June to October. October is particularly a critical 
time as it is the peak period of jasmine rice production, which is then usually 
ready to be harvested by early November. During this time, any amount of rain 




  Table 5. 3 A brief vulnerability evaluation focusing drought and rainstorm  
 




Asset required to reduce 
vulnerability 
Examples how a farmers’ 
organisation can help cope 
with the needs 
Drought 
-Rice production  
-Soil quality 
-Land value 
1.Farm skills and knowledge 
 
2.Water source 
Dibbing technique requires 
less amount of water which 
has proved to help farmers 
particularly in the area prone 
to drought 








-Flooded rice field 
1.Harvest machine:  
A harvesting would help 
farmers to harvest as much 
as they can, instead of losing 




2.Water pumping machine 
and a reservoir/water way to 
release water. If water stands 
for a long period of time 
(e.g., 2 weeks), rice field can 
start to be fermented and 
create methane gas. This is 
not good for soil quality and 
likely to yield negative result 
for the later cropping season. 
 
Farmers organisations can 
stand a better position to ease 
harvest machinery scarcity in 
two ways. 
i) Leasing/financing harvest 
machines when having their 
own harvest machineries is a 
practical solution to deal with 
such situation.  
ii) Arranging a group machine 
hire is a practical back-up 
plan. Contractors are likely to 
be willing to come for a large-
scale hire, as compared to 
individual small farm plots.  
   Source: Fieldwork, 2017 and 2018 
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Figure 5. 4 A weather forecast map of Thailand’s provincial area at risk of heavy to 
severe rainstorm on 15 October 2020 (left) and on 28 October 2020 (right) 




Photo 5. 1 Flooded rice field after a rainstorms in Sisaket province 





Thailand’s Ministry of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives, and the 
Ministry of Finance have implemented a disaster financial assistance program 
with the aim of easing smallholder farmers from natural disasters. According to 
the 2019 disaster financial assistance guideline, a rice farmer can claim the 
amount of $231 per hectare (1,113 Baht/rai) for no more than 4.8 hectare per 
household (National News Bureau of Thailand, Sisaket branch, 2019). A claim 
procedure involves a disaster assessment done by assessors. These assessors 
include village heads and agricultural officers who assess the damages and sign 
the disaster financial assistance claims. Farmers indicated that the process has 
been helpful, albeit slow, when the disaster has been severe, such as the flooding 
shown in Photo 5.1. However, some natural shocks may not leave similar 
evidence as flooding but are powerful enough to substantially damage much of 
the farmland. For example, rainstorms may leave a temporary flood only 30 cm 
above ground, whereas the rice yields are greatly damaged by associated strong 
winds as shown in Photo 5.2. This is an example of a situation in which farmers 
are less likely to be able to claim disaster financial assistance as indicated by 
respondents Case2_05 and Case3_02. Also, the stage of rice farming cycle is 
related to the level of potential farm damage. For example, strong winds cause 
the most damage when they happen during the harvest season in November.   
 
In general, some government agencies such as the provincial branches of the 
Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation can provide assistance for 
releasing excess water deposits from farm as shown in Photo 5.3. The photo 
shows the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Sisaket branch 
helping to release water from 32 hectares of flooded rice field (ONB News 2020) 
as an emergency measure. However, given its limited resources, the agency may 
not cope with all requests in a timely manner and thus meet the needs of wider 
farmer population. This particular problem requires extensive resources and 
partnership as a Thai government shown to have limited resources to prepare and 
mitigate risks. Local businesses are among those whose resources could further 





Photo 5. 2 Collapsed rice field due to strong winds 




Photo 5. 3 The Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation releasing water 
from flooded rice field after heavy rain storms in Sisaket province 




Besides water-related disasters, pests and plant diseases are some of the most 
common shocks farmers face. According to the interviewed farmers, crop health 
issues such as brown grasshopper attacks have been dealt well over the years. 
Agricultural extension workers have been fast at acting and communicating 
through farmers’ organisations and co-operatives to advise farmers.  Some 
farmers (Case3_07, Case3_08, Case3_09) expressed that they were intrigued by 
how extension workers raised an assessment of the brown grasshopper situation 
in India and Myanmar to warn local Thai farmers. At first, such warnings sounded 
irrelevant to the interviewed farmers, but it eventually turned out that due to these 
warnings the farmers managed to prevent damage very well in that year.  
 
Economic and political shocks 
 
Also, price and market interventions have been expressed as a factor creating 
economic and political shocks. These can have consequences on the farmers’ 
livelihood by making them earn less than expected, as briefly discussed in Table 
5.4. Most farmers expressed that having a stable market price and system is the 
best way to help them achieve a better livelihood. Speaking from their own 
farming experiences, higher selling price of rice paddy often comes with higher 
costs of production factors such as farm inputs, machinery and interest rates. By 
contrast, a stable price means that farmers can plan their investments better for 













Table 5. 4 A brief vulnerability evaluation from the perspective of economic and 
political shocks  
 
Asset that can be 
directly damaged by 
shocks 
Asset required to 
reduce vulnerability 
Examples of how a farmers’ 





If used as loan 
collateral – risk of 
land repossession  
i)Access to a systematic 
market price scale 
ii) human capital 
iii)organisation  
Effective farmers’ organisation 
may help farmers to cope with 
price and market uncertainties. 
This is particularly effective for 
those that have post-harvest 
facilities such as a rice mill. The 
system will enable a farmers’ 
organisation to plan ahead and to 
stockpile to cope with the changes 
of demand and supply in the 
markets.  
 
Elections   
Risk of land 
dispossession due to 
being used as loan 
collateral. Borrow 
more to invest in 





such as peer-to-peer 
network among the 
community of practice. 
This could take place 
among farmers, 
neighbor or even just 
casual conversations 
over coffee shop, 
commonly known in 
Thai as “Sa-pha-kafae”, 





5.3 The breakeven analysis of rice production  
 
Breakeven analysis has long been used as an essential tool to determine risks and 
profitability in farm business (Berry, 1972; Dillon, 1993). Maximising profit 
from rice farming revolves around increasing yield, reducing production costs, 
and managing price fluctuations. Although these three factors are important, 
breakeven pricing is largely ignored by farmers themselves. As some farmers 
(e.g., interview codes: Case1_03, Case1_11, Case2_06, Case2_08, Case3_02, 
Case3_03) pointed out that their main concern was the selling price. According 
to the aforementioned farmers, they believed that a high selling price could help 
solve many financial problems. However, when asked about breakeven analysis 
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(explained in a non-technical way without using the term breakeven analysis), 
the farmers still gave the same answer that the main concern was on a selling 
price, without considering other factors that may be associated with the higher 
price or other ways to increase profits. By contrast, breakeven pricing brings the 
fundamental factors (i.e., production cost, market price and product quantity) into 
the calculation of rice price in a way that could help farmers to make more 
informed decisions. The basic formula for breakeven analysis appears in many 
books and articles for example, AGMRC, 2007; CFI, 2018: 
Breakeven point (units sold)  
= Fixed costs / (Sales price per unit – Variable cost per unit) 
Where: 
• Fixed costs are the costs that do not change with varying output (e.g.,, 
salary, rent, building machinery) 
• Sales price per unit is the selling price (unit selling price) per unit 
• Variable cost per unit is the variable costs incurred to create a unit 
Putting these values into the calculation, the formula tells the quantity of product 
needs to be sold to hit the breakeven point. The calculation uses three factors: 
fixed cost, sales price and variable cost per unit; i.e. there are two types of costs, 
variable and fixed, that are to some degree in farmers’ control. Variable costs are 
those that depend on production volume, such as seed, fertilizers and insecticide 
(Hahn, 2017). Fixed costs such as labour, equipment and land rent depend less 
on the production volume and thus these costs tend to adjust more slowly. 
The point here is that variable and fixed costs play a different role in different 
sectors and on different levels of economic development. For example, farm 
business in developed countries (e.g., USA and the Netherlands) tend to be 
organized as large commercial-scale enterprises and well equipped with 
machinery. Creditors in such geographies, as Hahn (2017) suggests, focus on 
fixed costs to improve agribusiness returns. For less developed countries such as 
Thailand, farms tend to be small and less equipped with machinery and, as a 
result, variable costs tend to have the biggest impact on the return of investment. 
The following elaborates the details of fixed and variable costs discussed in this 
section. It is important to highlight that the aim of the following breakeven 
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calculation is to understand the potential impact of different factors, whereas the 
actual breakeven points are less relevant. 
Fixed and variable costs 
Fixed costs are costs that are largely independent of a sales volume. Put simply, 
these costs remain the same when sales volume and production volume change, 
such as rent and farm insurance. The Office of Agricultural Economics estimates 
the cost of rice production is $827 per hectare (3,968.21 Baht/rai) (OAE, 2016). 
Meanwhile, the Bank of Thailand – Northeast region office came up with an 
average jasmine rice production cost of $462.7 (13,881 Baht) per ton of Jasmine 
rice paddy or $952 per hectare (4,567 Baht /rai) (BOT, 2014). My fieldwork data 
suggests roughly $646 per hectare (3,100 Baht /rai), as shown in Table 5.5. 
However, there were no breakdown costs of OAE (2016) and BOT (2014) data. 
For the purposes of calculation, the breakeven point is estimated using only 
fieldwork data as shown in table below. 
Table 5. 5 Average full costing of rice production (2016/17 cropping season) of local 
farmers (who used the broadcasting method) 
 
Items required  
 
Rice farmers, before 
joining the initiative. 
Production cost in $/hectare 
(Baht/rai)  
Type of costs  
Khaw Dok Mali 105 seed, 
40 kg – broadcast seeding 
$135.42 (650) Variable 
Chemical fertilizer $164.58 (790) Variable 
Chemical herbicide $60.41 (290) Variable 
Labour and machine rent $152.08 (730) Fixed 
Harvest machine rent  $125.00 (600) Fixed 
Farm insurance  $8.33 (40) Fixed 
Transport and sale service 
by middleman 
$15  
(150 Baht/ton paddy) 
Variable 
Total cost $646 (3,100)  
     Source: Fieldwork, 2017 and 2018 
     Note: Farmers in the area are more likely transport their own rice to sale in small    





Sales price per unit 
Sale or market price is the price that farmers get from selling their rice paddy. It 
is a factor that farmers have no control over, yet they rely heavily on it. The nature 
of rice market price is to fluctuate under the influence of demand and supply of 
rice in the markets. For the purposes of calculation, I use the 2020 local market 
price of Sisaket and nearby provinces as a reference. Thailand’s Office of 
Agricultural Economics (2020) records the price for eight rice traders (four 
millers, two central markets, and two agricultural marketing cooperatives) in 
Sisaket, Khonkhaen, Roi-Ed, Burirum and Surin. These records show that 
Jasmine paddy reached its highest price of 18,500 Baht/ton during May–June 
2018. The lowest price was recorded at 10,000 Baht/ton paddy in September 
2020. For the purposes of calculation, the highest, lowest and mid-point are used, 
as shown in Table 5.6. 
Table 5. 6 Breakeven quantity of rice paddy  
Fixed cost $912 $912 $912 
Price/unit 







Variable cost  








(ton of rice paddy) 
3.1 2.3 1.6 







I use data from the fieldwork among farmers in the Sisaket province. The 
production cost is roughly $646 per hectare (3,100 Baht /rai). The average 
household size of farmland is 3.2 hectares. Sisaket province’s jasmine rice paddy 
yields on average 2.7 ton per hectare (435 kg/rai). For an average household 
farmland size, the total yield is 8.64 ton of rice paddy. The total fixed cost for the 
total farm production is $912, and variable cost is $41.7 per ton of rice paddy. 
Therefore, 
Fixed cost  = $285.41 per hectare*3.2 hectare 
Variable cost  = 360.41 per hectare/8.64 ton of rice paddy 
Price/unit  = Price of rice paddy at low, mid, high point as shown above 
 
 
The calculations suggest that increasing productivity may not be an effective 
strategy for building a more stable income for rice farmer household without 
controlling fixed and variable costs and stabilising the market price. This 
highlights the importance of a combination of increasing yield and reducing 
production costs, especially as the real rice market involves many factors that can 
alter farmers’ profits. For example, the price of rice paddy can be affected by 
various reasons and the farmers are likely to have limited negotiation power, for 
instance, in the case a large rice paddy supply flows into the market. For Thai 
Jasmine rice, November and December are the peak harvest season. This suggests 
farmers could capture more value from their rice paddy if they have the ability to 
store rice paddy beyond such period to avoid having to sell on a low price due to 
high seasonal supply. Reducing fixed cost has been an important objective of the 
financial assistance policy implementation by Thai government. For example, 
financial assistance programmes for rice farmers of 2017/2018 cropping year 
included (Thailand’s Department of Internal Trade, 2017): 
• helping farmers to arrange harvest machine hiring, and 
• financial support for the cost of harvesting and rice paddy quality 
improvement. Farmer households can claim such support at the rate of 
$250 per hectare (1,200 Baht/rai), but no more than $400 per household 
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Such support is a one-off payment and could be used in a more sustainable 
manner when turned a one-off cash payment into working capital such as 
machinery. Although this idea has not been implemented at least in a large-scale, 
it is a pragmatic thing that would benefit farmers in many ways. The following 
example is to show how such ideas can be realised in a practical way. Suppose, 
30 farmers households decide together how they want to use the money received 
for harvest costs. Instead of hiring a labour and a machinery, they together buy a 
harvest machine as each family receives $400 in total from the harvest support 
programme. According to the farmers, a harvest machine has a capacity of 
harvesting about 8 hectares per day. As discussed earlier, farmers’ household 
farmland is approximately 3 hectares. By grouping together to lease a machine, 
farmers could turn a one-off financial support into a working capital. This would 
also resolve a seasonal problem of hiring harvest machine, which are often under 
constrained supply during the harvest period. In addition, farmers can earn from 
leasing the machines to other farmers as a way to generate additional income. 
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Chapter 6 Creating a shared value partnership as a means to 
improving farmers’ livelihood: the case of BSCM Dibbling Initiative   
 
 
Purpose of the case 
The case presented in this chapter examines how a shared value partnership can 
function as a mechanism that contributes to the improvement of farmers’ 
livelihoods through capacity building, resource mobilisation and capital 
allocation. The developments may occur when actors leverage their existing 
resources to create shared value among other value chain actors. The strategy not 
only aims to understand how to accelerate the poverty reduction process but also 
to tackle multifaceted societal issues caused by poverty, which are often rooted 
in issues such as lack of access to finance, knowledge and markets. 
 
Data and methods used 
Date retrieved from secondary data source and interview with stakeholders. Data 
collection methods included desk-based analysis and stakeholder interviews 
during September and November 2017 at the Bangsue Chia Meng rice mill and 
various places as agreed. Details of interviewed stakeholders’ affiliations were 
given in table 4.2 and 4.5 of Chapter 4.  
 
Theoretical contribution 
The key contribution of the chapter is in the understanding of how a shared value 
partnership enables economic and societal benefits relative to actors’ mutual 
interests. Shared value fundamentally offers accessibility to economic 
opportunities, resulting in an improvement of farmers’ livelihoods and a 
reduction in poverty. The case reveals that a determined leadership is an essential 
factor of shared value mechanisms. In this case analysis, the outcomes of a shared 
value partnership driven by a determined leadership result in the upgrade of 
farmers’ negotiation power and reconfiguring rice value chain finance. It also 
reveals a distinctive mechanism of shared value partnership, which differentiates 
the type of organisational setting from typical Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) and philanthropic business activities. The findings also suggest that the 
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shared value approach could be adopted as an institutional innovation, enabling 
companies to compete with rivals by doing good along with earning profit. 
 
Practical contribution  
The understanding of the change process will contribute toward enabling project 
replication among rice farming stakeholders who might find the findings relevant 
to their economic activities. These include, for instance, smallholder rice farmers, 
rice millers and government agencies. The new knowledge may help the Thai 
government to become more effective in rice policy implementation by 
leveraging resources from rice traders nation-wide. Meanwhile, millers and 
traders can adopt new ideas of a shared value partnership and incorporate those 
into their business models and marketing plans. 
 
Originality/value 
The originality of results from the chapter lies in the observation that Thai rice 
millers possess underutilised resources. The case also challenges the general 
perception of farmers and millers as having a ‘wolf and sheep’ relationship. By 
building on the best of their capacities, a shared value partnership can create a 
new organisational culture. Note that ‘value’ refer to financial value (i.e. profit, 
debt, economic rent) and human development (i.e. human and social capitals). 
Creating shared value partnerships offers a new form of collective action and a 
practical business model benefiting all partners. Millers can act in the role of 
economic rent sharing where farmers can co-benefit through resource 
mobilisation. Millers can take a role as institutional entrepreneurs in restructuring 
production and market systems. This can result in reconfiguring value chain 
finance in the rice market and enable farmers to be repositioned in the rice value 
chain. 
 
6.1 Case profile 
 
The Bangsue Chia Meng rice mill (BSCM) dibbling initiative is a collaborative 
programme between local jasmine rice farmers and the BSCM. The dibbling 
initiative is privately funded by the BSCM to help farmers tackle the low quality 
of jasmine rice paddy. The BSCM is a leading Thai rice exporter trading under 
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the Golden Phoenix brand. It has an annual total capacity of 400,000 tons of rice 
paddy, and exports rice worldwide. The original idea came from Dr. Vallop 
Manathanya, the BSCM Chairman, who was inspired by the work of the late King 
Bhumibol in mitigating farmers’ vulnerability. Initially, the focus was on 
improving farmers’ income and their quality of rice paddy by using purified 
jasmine rice seed (Khaw Dok Mali 105) and a farming technique known as 
dibbling. The partnership gradually evolved to offer greater and broader support 
to participating farmers to mitigate the risk that forced many members to quit the 
initiative. Business activities included financing for input supplies and farm 
machinery and incentives to improve the quality of rice paddy. In the 2016–17 
crop year, 465 Sisaket farmers participated in the partnership programme with a 
total farmland of 1,065 hectares, but only 318 farmers remained in the programme 
at the end of the 2016-17 season. BSCM’s rice value chain activities cover all 
stages of primary and support activities. Farmers’ are involved in the rice 
production stage. 
 
The BSCM’s main business activities are premium rice milling and packaging. 
One of the key primary activities is to source premium quality Thai jasmine rice 
paddy to feed into its processing system. The rice purity (percent) is a factor 
determining premium grade of Jasmine rice. The impurity of Khaw Dok Mali 105 
rice seed can occur due to: i) farmers’ self-stored rice seed after harvest to use in 
the following cropping seasons; ii) carriers such as birds or wind; and iii) a high 
proportion of other rice varieties. Therefore, the initiative has tried to tackle the 
root cause of jasmine rice impurity by sourcing purified Khaw Dok Mali 105 rice 
seed. The initiative is not a form of contract farming and, therefore, farmers have 
the liberty to sell their rice anywhere after harvesting. The BSCM initiative has 
found that persuasion is more effective than forcing contracted farm to supply 
high-quality rice paddy. In addition to support of production, the initiative offers 
incentives of around $17 (500 baht) per ton of rice paddy on top of the market 




6.2 The structure of rice value chain 
In this section, the rice value chain approach is used to analyse how the dibbling 
initiative affects farmers’ livelihood. The rice value chain framework starts by 
portraying the rice value chain structure, followed by value chain analysis. This 
involves the analysis of vertical and horizontal linkages as ways of helping 
farmers to reduce transaction costs. The BSCM helps farmers to earn benefits of 
economies of scale which the cannot otherwise exploit because they do not have 
adequate access to resources on an individual basis. The analysis focuses 
prominently on the rice farming stage of which rice farmers and millers are the 
main actors. 
 
Identifying value chain activities and actors is the first stage of analysing a value 
chain. The objective of identifying the value activities is to help understand the 
connections between activities and actors. This understanding helps guide the 
analysis of value-added activities and opportunities for profit earning and rent 
generation along the value chain. This also highlights how value chain analysis 
can be used in an impactful way to inform policymaking. The value activities 
involve primary and support activities. Primary activities include business actions 
that directly create products and value. In other words, market value may not be 
created and captured without performing these primary activities. 
 
In a rice value chain, these activities typically include rice farming, processing 
and packaging, transportation and marketing. Support activities are tasks that help 
to facilitate and enhance the effectiveness of primary activities. These activities 
can include an array of activities such as procurement, product and technology 
development, human resource management and organisational infrastructure. 
Clearly, a range of support activities depend on the company structure, financing, 
capabilities and mission – it is likely that farmer-led organisations often have 
limited capacity to maintain such support activities. Meanwhile, working in 
partnership with large exporting companies like the BSCM could allow better 
access to such support activities. To this end, support activities of the BSCM’s 
dibbling initiative include procurement, product and technology development, 
and human resource management. These support activities have contributed 
heavily to the rice farming stage for participating farmers of the BSCM dibbling 
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initiative. Overall, the case covers four stages in the rice value chain: jasmine rice 
farming, rice paddy processing, warehousing and product distribution, and 
marketing and sales. 
Stage: Jasmine rice farming  
 
Primary activity Jasmine rice paddy production 
Actors for the primary 
activity 
Rice farmers 
Supporting activities Input supply and agricultural machinery procurement, farm skill 
development 
Actors for the 
supporting activities 
BSCM, local extension officers, BAAC bankers 
 
Rice farming or jasmine rice paddy production is the foundation of the BSCM 
dibbling initiative. It is a product farmers and rice millers look to produce and 
trade. As indicated above, the BSCM has faced continuous problems due to 
inconsistent quality of jasmine rice paddy sold by local rice farmers to its milling 
process, which has a direct impact on the BSCM profit and reputation. This is the 
rationale for the BSCM investing in dibbling initiatives. The partnership model 
tries to demonstrate shared values between the BSCM and participating farmers 
the way in which leveraging joint resources enable to mitigate vulnerability. For 
this purpose, the BSCM is capable of mobilising resources that could directly 
benefit participating rice farmers. The results of this actions are supposed to 
include an improvement in jasmine rice paddy quality, while farmers could obtain 
better income and millers get a better quality of rice paddy into their processing 
system. 
 
In interviews with the BSCM’s production manager and the BSCM’s agronomist, 
they explained that quality issues are linked to farmers lack of appropriate 
farming skills and insufficient financial investment. Farming jasmine rice does 
not guarantee a high market price, unless the rice quality meets relevant trade 
standards. By contrast, rice farmers can obtain more bargaining power in trade 
by delivering a high quality of jasmine rice, which typically reflects appropriate 
farming techniques and resources. This requires good quality Khaw Dok Mali 
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105 seed2, enriched soil quality, appropriate use of fertilizer and insecticide, 
appropriate quantities of water and appropriate care of rice throughout different 
farming stages. The BSCM can leverage their resources to create an organisation 
as a resource for participating farmers. What this means is that the dibbling 
initiative serves as a launchpad to mobilise resources and capital to help 
participating farmers overcoming these problems. 
 
Premium quality rice can provide the BSCM with a sustainable business. In fact, 
farm-gate price pressure not only provides a direct financial disadvantage to 
farmers, it also directly impacts rice quality as farmers would be likely to have 
insufficient funds to farm in the following cropping seasons and the lack of 
funding may threaten their ability to advance farm skill development and 
ecological wellness. This is reflected in the opinion of a rice exporter (Interview 
code: Macro_RiceEx_10) who expressed “if farmers die [he means cannot make 
profit], we [rice exporters] die too”. At the same time, the BSCM can trace back 
the quality of its rice paddy as the organization knows where its rice is farmed 
and who provides the source of input supply. Strengthening rice farmers’ 
capability could thus support more sustainable business because it maintains both 
the viability of both production-side and the sales-side of the BSCM operations. 
This suggests that leveraging resources jointly can be a powerful tool for the 
business to tackle problems faced by trade partners while still gaining profit. 
 
Rice paddy production involves two significant movements of input supplies and 
finance. Without these two factors, farmers cannot farm. First, the BSCM’s 
dibbling initiative helps to source and supply input materials to participating 
farmers. The inputs include purified Khaw Dok Mali 105 rice seed, fertilizer, 
insecticide, farm machinery and a team of agronomists. The BSCM procured 
purified Khaw Dok Mali 105 rice seed from the Ubon Ratchathani Rice Institute, 
which costs around $20-24 (600-700 Baht) per 25 kg sack depending on 
distribution channels, which is around $0.9/kg (26 Baht). Second, the BSCM 
offers an option for financing an interest-free input supply which farmers can pay 
 
2 Khaw Dok Mali 105 seed is a rice variety that grow into jasmine rice 
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back when rice paddy is sold to the company. This way, farmers have more 
flexibility to manage their cash flow. According to an interview with the dibbling 
initiative manager, many farmers can better manage cash-flow to pay off some 
mounting debt and manage household expenses without borrowing more. 
Clearly, the dibbling initiative helps farmers to have the ability to manage better 
their cash flow while having access to good quality farm supply. 
 
Support from the BSCM’s human resource management and company’s 
infrastructure play important roles to achieve premium quality rice paddy. The 
main function of the dibbling initiative is to source purified Khaw Dok Mali 105 
rice seed and to help participating farmers to develop required farming skills. This 
arrangement creates the BSCM’s competitive advantage by sustaining its 
superior performance as a commercial company and improving farmers’ farming 
performance. The BSCM’s dibbling initiative has successfully strengthened the 
linkages between millers and participating farmers. This is not only cost effective 
(i.e. rice paddy production cost, cost of finance, and transaction costs) but also 
enhances process differentiation. This results in building farmers’ capability and 
lowering the degree of financial hardship. The dibbling initiative has also 
introduced and financially sponsored the use of farm machinery, which further 
enables farmland to become more productive. Access to agricultural machinery 
has been largely an unaffordable for many farmers due to the lack of access to 
finance. 
 
Photo 6.1 on the right-hand side shows neatly laid out rice plots using dibbling 
technique, while the left-hand side shows a dibbling machine. It should be noted 
that the plot has good spacing in between each row. This allows farmers to 
observe and manage weeds, insects and diseases. This way, farmers can optimise 
the amount of chemical fertilizer and insecticide in the rice field. The technique 
has a clear difference from broadcast seeding – a common practice used by local 
farmers. Farmers expressed that the broadcast seeding technique was more time 
and labour efficient than dibbling, but they also accepted that the downside was 
the excessive amount of seeds, which created a high cost. Farmers tend to use 
more seed than recommended to cover risks such as being eaten by birds, blown 
away by wind and seeds not germinating. Also, densely populated green plants 
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in the rice field can be a mixture of rice, weeds and grass. The more chemical 
fertilizer is added into the farm land, the better chance for weeds to grow strongly, 
and compete with the rice plant. The dibbling method allows farmers to observe 
and apply fertilizer and insecticide when it is required for the rice. In addition, 
this method encourages scientific observation skills among farmers. They can 
learn more about their ecosystems in the rice field and understand the changes in 
cropping season. Such knowledge is a part of human capital development which 




Photo 6. 1 Left: rice seed dibbling machine; right: rice field planted using the dibbling 
machine.  
Source: Siam Kubota (2017) 
 
One of the advantages of the financing scheme for participating farmers is that 
they have access to input supplies without having to borrow from financial 
institutions or being charged high interest rates by local input suppliers. 
Interestingly, local input suppliers expressed that they were no longer seeing 
advanced credit as a purchase option, as it is high risk. 
“We take all sorts of high risks and a lot of headache to advanced [input] 
supplies. To be honest, it is not worth it. We still allow a few old 
customers to take this type of credit for the sake of a friendly relationship. 
Most of the time, they [farmers] say we are like a loan shark. I sometimes 
feel the opposite, feeling myself as a victim [of complaints and money not 
paid on time]. So, no more credit!” 
 
Interview code: Sisaket_supplier_07 
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The input suppliers feel that farmers could easily borrow from agricultural banks 
at low interest rates which is sufficient to cover seasonal production costs. By 
contrast, farmers also expressed that the size of loans required to cover production 
costs was low. Another benefit of participating in the dibbling initiative was that 
farmers would receive a $17 per ton of rice paddy, adding on to market price at 
the point of sale. Optimising loan amounts can help farmers reduce debt burdens 
by reducing costs of finance (e.g., loan interest and transaction cost). They felt 
this financing scheme from the BSCM was the fairest and best option for them. 
 
Table 6. 1 Average full costing of rice production (2016/17 cropping season) of the 
BSCM dibbling initiative and local farmers (who used the direct seeded rice method) 
 
Items required  
 
BSCM farmers. 
Production cost in 
$/hectare (Baht/rai) 
Rice farmers, before joining 
the initiative. 
Production cost in $/hectare 
(Baht/rai)  
Purified Khaw Dok Mali 105 
seed, 25 kg – dibbling seedling 
$54.16 (260) N/A 
Khaw Dok Mali 105 seed, 40 
kg – broadcast seeding 
N/A $135.42 (650) 
Chemical fertilizer $129.16 (620) $164.58 (790) 
Chemical herbicide $54.16 (260) $60.41 (290) 
Labour & machine rent $145.83 (700) $152.08 (730) 
Harvest machine rent  $125.00 (600) $125.00 (600) 
Farm insurance  $8.3 (40) $8.33 (40) 
Total cost $517 (2,480) $646 (3,100) 
  Source: Interview and BSCM data (2017) 
 
Table 6.1 shows an average full costing of rice production for farmers before and 
after joining the initiative. By joining the BSCM’s dibbling initiative, farmers 
saw their total production cost reduced by 30 percent, of which they invested 
$517 per hectare as shown in Figure 6.1. It shows that the combination of using 
purified Khaw Dok Mali 105 and dibbling seed technique help farmers to invest 
less but yield more. Farmers found that using the dibbling technique helped them 
to reduce cost by 30 percent while yield increase by 10 percent. Purified seed 
ensured a better quality of rice paddy than self-stored seed. This finding 





Figure 6. 1 Cost comparison of rice farming before and after joining the BSCM’s 
dibbling initiative ($ per ton rice paddy) 
Source: Interviews and BSCM data (2017) 
 
The average yield per hectare was higher than before joining the programme. The 
farmers of the BSCM dibbling initiative saw an average of 2.8 tons rice 
paddy/hectare (446 kg/rai). Before joining the programme, they saw an average 
yield of about 2.5 tons rice paddy/hectare (400 kg/rai), around 10 percent higher 
than with traditional farming methods. The BSCM offers a further incentive of 
$17 per ton of paddy (500 Baht) at the point of sales. In total, farmers in the 
BSCM dibbling partnership programme could earn $77 per ton of paddy more 
than prior to joining the BSCM dibbling programme. 
 
Table 6.2 highlights the potential added value the dibbling initiative has to offer 
to participating rice farmers, which is roughly $319 per hectare or $113.86 per 
ton of rice paddy. This means the farmers in the dibbling initiative would see an 
income of $1,620/hectare or $578.57 per ton rice paddy. Using the average size 
of farmland of 3.07 hectare (19.2 rai) in Sisaket, cropping rice under the BSCM 






Table 6. 2 Potential value-added earnings by participating in the BSCM dibbling 
initiative 
 




$/hectare (Baht/rai)  
Potential 
earning/saving 
$/ton rice paddy 
Cost saving from lower cost of supply 
 
$129.17 (620) $46.13 
Cost saving from interest free financing 
(7percent annual BAAC) 
(calculated from the difference between total 
production in Table 6.1) 
 
$9.04 (43.4) $3.22 
Higher yield 
46 kg/rai or 287.5 kg/hectare 
(Farmgate was $566 per ton paddy, 2018 
price) 
$134.17 (644) $47.92 
Incentive sell price from being a member of 
the Dibbling Initiative 
Incentive = $17 per ton paddy  
 
$46.46 (223) $16.59 
Total $319 (1,530.4) $113.86 




Procurement deals with activities that make resources or input supply available 
to primary activities. For the dibbling initiative, this involves sourcing supplies 
from the suppliers that can support the production of premium quality rice paddy. 
Financial resources play a significant role in making it possible to source high 
quality inputs. To this end, the dibbling initiative is financially backed by the 
BSCM itself and it is fair to say that effective procurement has contributed to the 
success of the dibbling initiative. Key procurement activities include sourcing 
purified Khaw Dok Mali 105 rice seed from the Ubon Ratchatanee Rice Institute, 
farm input supplies and agricultural machinery. Farmers who do not participate 
in the dibbling initiative do not earn the extra price incentive of $17 (500 Baht) 
per ton rice paddy when they sell to the BSCM. The high quality of rice paddy 
from purified seed should enable farmers to earn value added at the point of sales 
in comparison with typical rice seed. 
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The initiative procured agricultural machinery from Kubota company, a leading 
Japanese agricultural machinery corporate based in Thailand. This has brought 
benefits not only in obtaining farm machinery, but also potentially increasing 
farm productivity and farmer skills. Kubota organised demonstration sessions, 
where farmers learned about using machinery for rice farming which was their 
main crop. They also learned different types of machines for dry season crops 
such as Japanese sweet potato and soybeans, which are high value produce. This 
enhances the chances of earning more in the dry season by increasing the 
productivity of land that is otherwise left deserted. Farmers have also indicated 
that dry season farming helped to increase rice productivity in the following year. 
 
However, the BSCM’s dibbling initiative has also encountered problems, which 
include the high drop-out rate among farmers, as they found the dibbling 
technique too laborious. To ease farmers’ burdens, the BSCM agreed to invest on 
dibbling machines so that the farmers could continue farming with the dibbling 
method. To this end, an effective way to convince farmers was found by having 
them see improved yields and better income. This requires, however, waiting 
until the harvest season, which turned out be the hardest part for many farmers, 
causing them to leave the initiative. At the time of the interviews (November 
2017), the company had already invested about $500,000 (15 million baht) in the 
initiative. Despite the unforeseen expenses, the BSCM owner was determined to 
continue investing in the initiative. This highlights the importance of the 
continuity of projects, which is also the case for many development agencies. The 
development process can involve disruptive factors that either disrupt the project 
or allow lessons to be learned. In any case, it is clear that continuity and 
persistence are crucial elements of a successful project. 
 
Farm skills development 
 
Product and technology development involve processes and activities that allow 
improvements of the products and their production processes (Miller et al., 2013). 
In the case of the BSCM’s dibbling initiative, such farming skill development 
includes the dibbling technique, pest management and appropriate fertilizer use. 
The BSCM hired a lead agronomist to advise farmers participating in the 
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initiative. This has proved to be an effective way of farm skill training. The fact 
that farmers already have farming experience, means that adopting new farming 
skills would not be difficult for them. The dibbling method is known as a 
systematic plantation technique, which helps farmers to visibly separate rice 
plants from weeds. As shown in Table 6.1, this technique helps farmers to reduce 
rice seed cost by $81 per hectare. All in all, the new farming technique offered 
technical and financial benefits such as reduced production costs and increased 
yield. And yet, despite knowing the advantages of the technique, farmers’ 
perception seems to play a key role in either adopting or rejecting the new 
knowledge. Those who stayed with the initiative adopted the dibbling technique, 
while ones who left were rejecting it. By having agronomists working closely 
with farmers, they can observe, evaluate and report back on how issues can be 
managed. This emphasises that human capital development plays a significant 




Firm infrastructure plays a vital role to the success of the BSCM’s dibbling 
initiative. As a leading Thai rice exporter, the BSCM owns post-harvest facilities 
including processing and warehousing. These allow the company to store large 
volumes of rice, both in the form of rice paddies as its supply, and milled rice as 
its trade product. This also helps to minimise the risk of price fluctuation and cash 
flow management. Unlike small and medium size millers that could face price 
fluctuation and insufficient cash flow during a harvest season, the financial 
stability offered by the BSCM with its facilities can create trust among the 
members.  The most striking feature is that, by mobilising company 
infrastructure, the BSCM demonstrates how farmers and millers working in 
partnership can contribute to reducing the financial burden. It can help farmers to 
benefit from shorter supply chains while increasing net earnings. This can 






Human Resource Management 
 
Human resource management provides important support to run and maintain the 
BSCM’s dibbling initiative. According to Grant (2001), firms’ superior 
performance can be constructed from “an integration of individual functional 
capabilities” (p.121).  Although this research looks at the BSCM’s dibbling 
initiative as separate from the overall business performance of the company, it is 
sensible to relate the management of dibbling initiative to the BSCM’s business 
performance. As the BSCM is a large corporation, it has a competent human 
resource management team to support its company activities (i.e. the dibbling 
initiative) to achieve its objectives. 
 
At the centre of the BSCM’s human resource people is the company owner, Dr 
Vallop Manathanya. He is a rice trader who is also farming rice at an experimental 
farm. According to Dr. Manathanya, his passion for rice farming was inspired by 
the late King Bhumibol, to understand how rice farming development can be a 
means to improve farmers’ livelihoods. Being an owner of a large-scale family 
business, he has the capacity to make interventions to the business that are swiftly 
implemented to by his employees. The BSCM also operates the dibbling initiative 
with professional human resources workers, for example, agronomists play a key 
role in operating the dibbling initiative. The lead agronomist works in close 
collaboration with participating farmers and is approachable by phone and Line 
app, a mobile application popular among Thai people. The outcomes of such 
human resource support further highlight the importance of capital, assets and 








Stage: Rice paddy processing 
 
Primary activity Rice paddy processing 
Actor BSCM 
Supporting activity Product development, technology development 
Actors for the supporting 
activities 
Rice farmers, BSCM workforces, and trade 
partners 
 
The main functions of rice processing stage are to process and package rice paddy 
into finished products such as rice packs. The BSCM is a rice exporter that trades 
under the name Golden Phoenix. It prides itself for producing premium quality 
jasmine rice which is sourced from the Tung Kula Rong Hai plateau that has the 
geographic advantages discussed earlier, which allows the BSCM to charge its 
economic rents. Global rice traders know that the geography produces the best 
jasmine rice. For example, interviews with London-based (Interview code: 
Intertrade_01), Helsinki-based (Interview code: Intertrade_02) and Philadelphia-
based (Interview code: Intertrade_03) rice traders suggest that they would choose 
jasmine rice from Thailand over rice produced by other countries. From this 
perspective, the BSCM continues to improve its product line by funding the 
dibbling initiative. Rice paddy from the initiative yield superior jasmine rice 
which can be labelled as purified jasmine rice. 
 
According to the BSCM’s factory manager (interview code: Case2_01), the 
company faced a series of problems linked to the quality of jasmine rice paddy 
sold by farmers. He indicated that many of these problems could be largely solved 
by the use of purified Khaw Dok Mali 105 rice seed. To produce 1 kg of milled 
rice requires an average of about 2.36 kg rice paddy as raw material, depending 
on the quality of rice paddy and processing efficiency. An ideal rice paddy 
quantity input would be 2 kg rice paddy for producing 1 kg milled rice, but that 
is hard to achieve. In the milling process, the average rice composition is as 
follows: 
- 42–55 percent of 100 percent Jasmine rice milled, so-called head rice;  
- 17–20 percent broken rice A1;  
- 7–10 percent broken rice C1, C3;  
- 10–15 percent rice barn; and  
- 18–25 percent moisture and impurities 
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Around 80 percent market value of rice milled can be achieved with the 
combination of 100 percent jasmine rice, broken rice A1, and broken rice C1, C3. 
Such a composition can increase in relation to quality of rice paddy. For example, 
the factory manager (interview code: Case2_01) told that using purified Khaw 
Dok Mali 105 rice seed helped increase the proportion of head rice up to 60–65 
percent. The more the proportion of head rice increases, the less broken rice, and 
the higher market value earnings. Therefore, the BSCM dibbling initiative has 
tackled such problems at the very root cause faced by both farmers and a rice 
miller. 
 
The BSCM’s offers slightly higher purchase price than other rice millers in the 
area (interview code: Case2_01 and Case2_03). This perhaps reflects the need for 
sourcing high quality jasmine rice paddy. Yet, some farmers hope to earn more 
from their paddy by adding impurities such as different rice varieties, moisture 
and even stones to their paddy, which damages the reputation of jasmine rice 
paddy sold by local farmers as a whole. If impurities were found at the selling 
point, then farmers would earn less than the market price. If impurities went into 
the milling process, millers would had to pay the price, depending on the type of 
impurities. For example, a mixture of different rice varieties can damage 
company’s reputation, which has sometimes created lack of trust in the 















 Stage: Warehousing and product distribution 
 
Primary activity Store rice products and distribute products to markets 
Actor BSCM 
Supporting activity Product development, technology development, logistics 
Actors for the 
supporting activities 
BSCM workforces and trade partners including logistics 
companies 
 
The BSCM at Sisaket branch produces approximately 250,000 tons of rice 
annually. The company trades about 80 percent of total production in 
international markets. In practice, international rice buyers will order in advance, 
which allows the company to plan its operations, delivery and logistics well 
ahead. Since rice is farmed in an open space farmland, productivity can be 
affected by natural disasters, such as drought and flooding. For this reason, it is 
common for large-scale rice companies to stockpile rice paddy in their 
warehouses for supply management purposes. 
 
Warehousing and product distribution involve delivering products to wholesale 
and retails traders in domestic and international markets. Products require 
warehousing before delivering to consumers both in domestic and international 
markets. This is a great barrier for typical farming organisations to make their 
entry into these markets. The quality standards and efficiency of warehousing and 
distribution can have a direct impact on the quality of packaged rice including 
shelf-life, physical appearance and chemical characteristics. A shelf-life of white 
rice can be up to 5 years, while vacuum sealed rice can have a longer shelf-life. 
The BSCM has continued investing in skilled workers as well as state-of-the-art 
technologies. 
 
This case of the BSCM and farmers partnership is evidence of an alternative 
option to enable farmers’ organisations to enter into markets. Warehousing and 
distribution channels are existing facilities available in most areas of rice farming 
nationwide. Many local millers have indicated that they would welcome farmers 
(individuals and groups) to hire their milling facility. Farmers can commonly mill 
their rice paddy free of charge in exchange for broken rice and other rice 
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compositions. For some rice mills who produced their own electricity, rice husk 
can be used as fuel to generate electricity. Farmers are also encouraged to use rice 
husk as organic fertilizer. 
 
In an interview with a rice miller, who asked not to be named, it was stated that 
the lack of rice stockpiles data has influence on price fluctuation. This is an 
unexpected finding as general market understanding would focus on the price 
points during rice production and processing. The ability to manage rice stockpile 
inventories would mean prices would likely become more predictable. In 
addition, farmers can benefit by planning to grow something else when it is 
known that supply is sufficient in the market, yet there is no inclusive information 
system that would keep track of the rice inventory in the Thai market. Also, some 
traders took advantage from better communication within their networks to 
control rice supply in the markets, causing price fluctuation. 
Stage: Marketing and sales 
 
Primary activity Marketing rice in wholesale and retail markets 
Actor BSCM 
Supporting activity Advertisement, shelving strategy 
Actors for the supporting 
activities 
Trade partners, advertising agencies 
 
 
Marketing and sales involve activities that encourage purchasing and customer 
loyalty. These activities can include advertisement, sales promotion and customer 
relationship management. The BSCM has built its reputation as a leading 
premium Hom Mali rice producer over the last 80 years. Participating farmers 
immediately benefit from such recognition through the partnership programme, 
while the BSCM can benefit by strengthening its reputation through partnership 
with local farmers. Figure 6.2 shows a rice advertising poster that uses the 
partnership story to portray the BSCM’s contribution to the society and the 
environment. Rice farmers have been affected by unpredictable rice policy 
particularly during the past ten years. After a decade of political instability which 
caused slow economic growth, the results of the dibbling initiative have satisfied 
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Figure 6. 2 Commercial advert of limited edition jasmine rice from the 2018 crop 
From left to right (translate from Thai advert captions): 1. prepare purified 
jasmine rice seed; 2. prepare appropriate soil, 3. farm with dibbling technique; 4. 
look after farm with love; and 5. harvest and package to meet the manufacturing 
compliance. 
Source: Adapted from the BSCM brochure of November 2018  
 
The BSCM’s dibbling initiative can be considered as an instrument that enhances 
the company’s competitive advantage. Rice markets are fiercely competitive both 
domestically and internationally. There are a large number of rice exporters from 
various countries such as Cambodia and Vietnam, producing jasmine rice. The 
key question for any rice trader is how to build a strong brand loyalty between a 
company and its customers. Product uniqueness can derive from a product’s 
development as well as a marketing strategy, and help a company to survive the 
threat of product substitution. These are some of the underlying reasons why 
Thailand’s Department of Foreign Trade decided to rebrand Thai jasmine rice to 
Thai Hom Mali rice. However, rebranding Jasmine rice may not be sufficient to 
build customer loyalty and it, at least initially, means that the Thai rice exporters 
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lose the band value built around ‘jasmine rice’. The BSCM, like other rice firms, 
faces the threat of product substitutions where quality and price competitive 
strategies may not be sufficient to sustain markets. The BSCM’s dibbling 
initiative can serve also as a strategic public relations asset, helping the company 
to earn strong brand loyalty. Some of the key moments include the success of 
marketing and sales of the new 2018 crop from the dibbling initiative. This 
suggests that both farmers and the BSCM benefit from the shared value 
partnership. The first product from BSCM’ dibbling initiative was launched in 
2018 with the emphasis is on superior quality of jasmine rice. The BSCM gives 
its consumers the experience of distinctive purified jasmine rice and the desire to 
taste this special product. Despite a small product line, it is a successful marketing 
strategy that creates brand loyalty among consumers. 
 
6.3 Rice value chain analysis 
 
The case study demonstrates how value chains can be used as a facilitating 
mechanism for creating shared value partnership and enhancing farmers’ 
livelihood. In particular, it shows that business can leverage resources to enable 
farmers making profit, build capability and access capitals. For example, the 
dibbling initiative shows how partnership formation enables the BSCM to support 
individual rice farmers. This is particularly motivating since rice millers are often 
perceived by general Thai society as exploitative profit makers. By contrast, the 
case suggest that millers have also tried to help small farmers in different ways. 
For example, some millers (not included in this study as discussed in Chapter 4) 
had conversations with farmers when they come to sell paddy rice. However, such 
conversational exchange has been solely on an individual basis. Therefore, the 
dibbling initiative opened a platform for millers and farmers to communicate. 
6.3.1 Governance and coordination 
 
The focus of value chain governance and coordination framework is to analyse 
how well value actors perform individually and collaboratively to develop rice 
value chain. This case study highlights the different viewpoints when using 
different value chain mapping strategies, as shown in figure 6.3 and 6.4. Both 




Figure 6.3 exhibits a commonly known method of illustrating value chain 
analysis of price build up. It is important to note that higher value in each stage 
may not necessarily mean higher profits in the stage. This is true particularly in 
the rice industry where economies of scale are key to generating profit. Despite 
being a common way to represent the value chain, a mapping strategy used in 
Figure 6.3 omits the details of how the corporate body and the partnership with 
farmers help to improve farmers’ livelihood. The lack of this connection may 
affect opportunities to identify potential profit earning and rent generating 
through value chain activities. Figure 6.4 integrates these approaches and shows 
the coordination of primary and support activities. Such value chain ordination 
can help to identify gaps in existing infrastructure or services, as well as highlight 
opportunity for business development.  
 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter the focus of value chain analysis has been on 
the rice production stage. The main concern of this analysis is on the rice farming 
stage which involves smallholder farmers. Figure 6.3 shows the flow of physical 
input/outputs and value added from production to marketing. It illustrates the 
initiative that supports a total of 465 rice farmers with total farmland of 1,065 
hectares registered to participate the initiative in the 2016/17 cropping season. At 
the end of that cropping season, there were only 393 rice farmers with a total 
farmland of 881 hectares remaining in the dibbling initiative. In general, the rice 
value chain starts from the production stage where rice paddy production and 
input supplies are the key economic activities. The value chain boundary is 
framed to cover actors and activities relevant to a farmers’ organisation for the 
rice commodity from production to consumption. These stages include rice 
production, input supply, processing, transportation, marketing and consumption 
(as shown in Figure 6.3). In this study, the focus is on farmers’ activities and their 
performance at the primary production stage, while the subsequent marketing and 




Figure 6. 3 The value chain of rice under the BSCM dibbling initiative  
Source: Own elaboration. 




One thing to note is that the link to direct and indirect value chain actors can be 
extended. However, such an extension may not necessarily be helpful in 
achieving study objectives. For example, the value chain of rice can extend to the 
other value chains that make up the value system such as the chemical fertilizer 
value chain and alternative crop value chain in the dry season (e.g., horticulture, 
hemp, and beans). The degree of governance can be extended from local to 
national level, but this may not necessarily useful to the objectives of the current 
analysis. Here, the focus is on an immediate linkage that have direct impacts on 
farmers’ livelihoods. However, understanding the whole value chain would 
enable value chain upgrading, resource mobilisation and capital allocation. 
 
Cropping rice as a monocrop is a high-risk business even when considering the 
best-case scenarios, such as farmers partnering with the BSCM. Farmers need to 
diversify their sources of income. However, the partnership can offer a turning 
point in that direction offering opportunity to achieve farm diversification. 
Farmers can use the partnership as a launchpad to build capability as a way to 
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generate more income. This highlights how small farmers can achieve the benefit 
of economy of scale by joining the BSCM partnership. The average size of a farm 
in Sisaket province is suitable for subsistence farming. Farm output can meet the 
needs of farmers and their families, but transforming farms to a commercial scale 
may not be profitable. This is a clear difference when compared to rice farmers 
in the central region of Thailand, where renting to expand farmland has been 
common practice. As a result, rice farming has become more large-scale and 
profitable in the central region. Since farm expansion is not easily achievable at 
individual basis, the Sisaket farmers can achieve the benefit of economy of scale 
by working together as a farmers’ organisation. 
 
 
Figure 6. 4 The value chain process coordination of the BSCM 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Figure 6.4 and 6.5 show the coordination of horizonal and vertical linkages 
between primary and support activities to enhance the functions of rice 
production. This highlights the importance of capital, assets and capabilities in 
order to enhance functions and become more efficient. To achieve these roles, the 
BSCM requires effective support activities in the same vertical line of function. 





Figure 6. 5 Coordination matrix of primary and support activities in jasmine rice 
farming   
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 
As Kaplinsky and Morris (2000) emphasise, “power asymmetry is central to 
value chain governance (p.29)” and that distinguishes value chain governance 
from co-ordination of activities. In the context of the Thai rice market, it has been 
shown that there was a status hierarchy between rice millers and farmers. The 
possession and accessibility of resources and capital are known to be factors that 
create power asymmetry between these two actors. 
 
The case of the BSCM demonstrates that working in partnership can be a 
powerful tool to achieve process efficiency and profits for both of these parties. 
Power asymmetry makes one in better position than another. It also entails power 
in negotiations, which can influence the behaviour of farmers. By creating more 
equality, the dibbling initiative has initiated a sustainable business practice 
through creating fair organisational behaviour among farmers. Such behaviour 
enables farmers to build human, social and physical capital, that can add to their 
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assets. The basic rules that define the conditions for dibbling initiative 
participation are to apply dibbling techniques and participate in farm skills 
training. This type of governing rule offers shared value to both parties. It also 
builds relationship between participating farmers and the BSCM as rice millers. 
The most striking feature is that this governing rule is not only for organisational 
management purposes, it also offers the ability to gain entry into a market and 
factors of production. 
 
It is important to understand the role of governance in this rice value chain 
because it would offer informed decisions for other rice traders who might want 
to follow suit. It is also essential for farmers to understand such governing rule if 
they were to participate in similar schemes. When considering jasmine rice as a 
means to achieve mutual benefit, the dibbling initiative offers economic inclusion 
to participating farmers. In the jasmine rice market, the rule of participation can 
include using trademark and manufacturing compliance which can be hard for 
smallholders to obtain. Such legislative governance is clearly a great barrier to 
entry into a market. 
6.3.2 Upgrading 
 
Entering into a market as a trader is one of the most challenging tasks for 
smallholder farmers. Limited resources can mean that a lack of assets, capital, 
capabilities, and networking create barriers to entry into markets. Through the 
dibbling initiative, the BSCM has leveraged their resources, paving the way for 
smallholder farmers to become more inclusive in the market. All in all, the 
partnership enables farmers to benefit from economies of scale, capability 
building, improve access to financial investment and technical assistance. These 
are key achievements in the pursuit of better livelihoods. 
 
It is noteworthy that leveraging the BSCM’s resources has offered significant 
benefits to farmers and that this type of organisational arrangement is different to 
a typical farmer-led organisation. Generally speaking, organizing for collective 
action, for example, as agricultural cooperatives is a familiar strategy for groups 
of farmers to benefit from economies of scale. However, such collective actions 
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may not necessarily be effective in leveraging resources external to those that the 
farmers already possess.  This highlights the importance of resource leveraging 
in the value chain analysis. For example, a typical rice farmers’ organisation may 
hope to earn financial profit from processing rice paddy, and earn better income 
from milled rice packs. In doing so, the farmers’ organisation will need to invest 
in rice paddy production and post-harvest facilities. They would also need to 
operate business and marketing activities. The whole process would require a 
variety of professional skills such as factory management, marketing and 
accounting, to name a few. Such collective actions without resource leveraging 
may not enable farmers to achieve profits as planned. As shown in Figure 6.6, 
jasmine rice farming requires a variety of tasks and coordination between primary 
and support activities. Rice farming may seem like a simple day job to some 
people, but operating it at high levels of quality and profitability would require 
systematic management and a variety of resources. 
 
When considering it from a marketing perspective, the BSCM has introduced 
innovative marketing strategies for farmers that promote win-win relationships. 
The BSCM extended their resources and capital to enable farmers to grow rice 
paddy in the way the company needed the farmers to do. This resulted in a better 
selling price. In addition, farmers benefit from lower production costs, improved 
yields, regenerative soil ecology and human capital development. It is clear that 
the dibbling initiative can enable higher profits, economic rents and human 
development. The key mechanism involved in the initiative is that it enables more 
effective utilisation of the factors of production. Particularly, the right to farmland 
has a fundamental role in this process of change, as the land ownership has 
improved farmers’ livelihoods despite generally small average farm-size. In 
general, farmer-led enterprises tend to have limited complementary support 
activities. By contrast, the BSCM leverages their resources and capital into the 
dibbling initiative. Support activities of the BSCM’s dibbling initiative can 
include procurement, product and technology development, human resource 
management and the BSCM infrastructure. These support activities have 




Factors of production 
 
For many smallholder farmers, land and capital are unaffordable factors of 
production. However, the organisational model formed by the dibbling initiative 
has made it possible for farmers to gain access to such factors of production. As 
the case shows, a farmers’ organisation – in this case the collective action 
between the BSCM and participated farmers - is a resource for building assets 
and capabilities. This outcome may further explain “organisational rents (p.28)” 
discussed by Kaplinsky & Morris (2000). The extra value earned by an 
organisation serves as a resource. This explanation is clearer when we look at the 
products as shown in Figure 6.5. Total value in Figure 6.6 refers to economic 
profit plus economic rents. Economic profit can derive from a product itself, 
while economic rent is an extra value earned by a resource, in this case an 
organisation. 
 
Through a shared value partnership, the change in business activities in the 
production system includes the use of purified Khaw Dok Mali 105 seed input, 
supply financing and on the job training. The change in business activities in the 
market system includes fair negotiation of quality for good price and reducing the 
involvement of arbitrageur. Financing programme funded by the BSCM has 
significantly contributed to a stability and continuity of the initiative. This is 
significant factor because the BSCM is an active rice processor and trader in the 
market. It has the capacity to support the continuation of the initiative and the 
process of building resilience can take a long time. Having primary stakeholders 
(i.e. millers and rice traders) mobilising resources through trade can mean 
sustainability. 
 
Capital provides the ability to gain access to primary inputs for farming and 
processing equipment, where profits are generated. Farm labour is mostly self-
employed and household labour. However, the challenge lies in the capabilities 
of labour, as skills and knowledge of available workers may vary. Human capital 
can be accumulated through training programmes as well as on-the-job training. 
Farm skills earned through the dibbling initiative enable soil regeneration 
allowing soil quality to improve and become more suitable for farming. Farm 
 166 
knowledge developed through training from an agronomist enables farmers to 
improving their own farmland such as soil restoration. This proved to be an 
effective and affordable method to improve soil and land resources. 
 
One important thing to highlight is that having access to factors of production 
offers many opportunities. Value creation does not need to be only based on rice 
farming but may also take place by alternative farming and non-farming 
activities. According to the Thailand Institute of Scientific and Technological 
Research (2012), the quality of rice seed influence quality and quantity of rice 
yield. It is a foundation of cost reduction as good quality rice seed would require 
lower input of fertilizer and insecticide, while yields would be higher than with 
lower quality seeds (Thailand ISTR, 2012). This particular change in production 
system has been made possible through the BSCM’s financing. It provides 
participating farmers with access to purified Khaw Dok Mali 105, resulting in 
higher yields and lower production costs. 
 
BSCM financing emphasises providing tools and infrastructure for product 
improvement. Farmers have choices to either pay now or pay later for farm input 
supplies. The pay later scheme aim to help farmers to reduce borrowing burden 
by allowing them to repay the interest free advanced credit after selling their 
paddy to the BSCM. The dibbling initiative manager explained that, although the 
BSCM aimed to help farmers to reduce their debt burden, it was farmers’ personal 
choice if they felt the necessity to borrow from creditors. However, they found 
that the participating farmers gained a greater ability to repay existing loans and 
move towards savings. The BSCM’s financial support programme can thus help 
to reposition rice farmers in the value chain (as seen in Figure 6.7). The company 
offers an interest-free financial support to participating farmers. This comes in 
the form of input supply and agricultural machinery without hidden costs, which, 
in turn, reduces production costs. Such a support contributes to farmers’ debt 





As jasmine rice is a premium product, the BSCM focuses on its product 
development and maintaining its superiority by having efficient procurement 
systems to source high quality inputs and heavy agricultural machinery. This can 
be made possible by having good cash-flow in the business. In the interviews, a 
factory manager indicated that the company has a healthy cash-flow and that it 
can operate an initiative using its own budget. This financial freedom allows the 
BSCM to operate the initiative persistently. In this case, the outcome turns out 
well as the BSCM and farmers find a shared value in their business partnership. 
 
 
Figure 6. 6 Comparison of the value chain finance of rice farmers as BSCM dibbling 
members and rice farmers as sole traders 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
The dibbling initiative is small in size and faces a number of problems including 
individual issues that could affect the quality of rice farming. Examples of such 
issues include drop-out rate from the initiative due to objections by family 
members not willing to use dibbling method because it is more laborious, and the 
fear of being different from neighbours. However, a swift response by 
procurement and human resources teams has made dealing with such problems 
easier. Particularly, these types of problems can be best resolved by showing 
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results. Having a good funding enables the dibbling initiative to implement 
activities effectively. Evidence suggests that the BSCM’s role as a supplier to rice 
farmers helps to overcome the company’s threats to substitution. The outcome 
can be further developed into a more market value production upgrade, such as 
obtaining organic certification. Potential rent generation would be likely higher 
than before as any produce from certified organic land would be classed as a 
certified organic product. The result of farm development can expand from rice 
cropping season to dry season.  For example, alternative crops, such as Japanese 
sweet potatoes and beans, can be considered after rice farming season depending 
on market demand. 
 
Farmers benefit from an advanced, interest-free supply loans with by $9.06 per 
hectare (43.5 Baht/rai). Cost savings from an interest free loan may look small 
when compared with the BAAC interest rate. However, this can be greater when 
compared to other lenders such as informal lenders. Interest rates charged by 
informal lenders could vary from 2 percent to 10 percent interest monthly. This 
is one of the causes of farmers becoming trapped in the vicious cycle of debt. It 
is worth noticing that potential transaction cost reductions could be added to 
income. 
 
Rice farming is a major source of Thai farmers’ income, yet the majority of 
farmers depend on many sources of income to make ends meet. Capacity building 
and networking can offer future opportunities to venture into other areas 
generating more income. A capable farmers’ organisation can create opportunity 
to learn new skills and about new markets, while improving factors of production 







6.3.3 Distributional outcomes  
 
From rice farmers’ standpoint, distributional outcomes concern income 
improvement (i.e., higher and more stable), wider access to human and social 
capital, and better access to physical and financial capital. Such outcome can 
strengthen value chain activities and minimise vulnerability, subsequently 
facilitating improved livelihoods.  
It means building capabilities of value chain actors to upgrade their activities. 
Particularly, it aims at loosening barriers that obstruct actors from pursuing their 
business activities. In this case, it can build on what is discussed in the previous 
section. The BSCM creates an organisational arrangement as a resource to help 
participating farmers overcome farm and market problems. 
 
The aim of distributional outcome is to maintain stability and continuity of good 
business activities, while supporting possible scaling up schemes. The findings 
show that the improvement of production systems and market systems enable 
farmers to improve their livelihoods. For example, farmers see a better household 
cashflow from income, instead of borrowing for consumption. Farm skill 
development, agricultural machinery and finance are important components that 
enable farmers to develop more options such as alternative crops during dry 
season. These would also make way for an exit plan, if farmers would consider 
allocating their capitals to proceed with other high value crops. Interestingly, 
many farmers have mechanical skills and knowledge to make so-called 
homemade inventions such as water drip and dibbling machines. In fact, 
functional but affordable agricultural equipment and machinery are in high 
demand. Machinery is an area where farmers could expand their skills and join 
the business environment as a local inventor. This discussion takes a viewpoint 
where an organisation as a resource coordinator takes a centre stage to allocate 
capitals. Such transformation facilitates building resources, capabilities and 
capital, and are further discussed in Chapter 9. The following discusses 
distributional outcomes as results of the farmers’ organisation.  
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Wider access to human and social capital development  
 
The principal objective of the dibbling initiative is to build farmers’ capabilities. 
The combination of farm training and on-the-job training was used for human 
capital development. As discussed in the previous section on the rice value chain 
analysis, farmers highlight considerable skills and knowledge acquired though 
the initiative. It is fascinating that the initiative’s objective is improving quality 
of rice paddy by encouraging the use of dibbling techniques. However, farm 
management knowledge can be applied to other types of farming as well. This is 
a great advantage for farmers to prepare for either future farm investment or an 
exit plan from rice farming.  In other words, their newly acquired human capital 
provides a foundation for expanding to other forms of capital accumulation. For 
instance, farm skills help to care for soil and enrich ecosystems, which is an 
important contribution to physical (land) and natural (soil and ecosystem) 
capitals. Intangible assets earned as a result of human capital such as goodwill 
and brand recognition can contribute to gaining market share. These in return 
enhance financial profits. 
 
Farmers’ behaviour can be intellectually influenced by farmers’ organisations. 
While social capital would enrich social networking, it may also influence 
farmers’ behaviour through peer-to-peer learning. This would be particularly 
helpful when a farmers’ organisation has become a community of practice 
offering hands-on and on-the-job training. It is important to note that cultural 
influence, in some cases, may not bring positive energy into farmers’ 
communities. For example, the dibbling initiative experienced a large dropout 
rate during initial stages. Many farmers faced a situation in which they had to 
drop out of the dibbing initiative due to disagreements in their close social circle. 
Basically, disagreement and anxiety occur when farmers do things differently 
from the nearby others. For example, some farmers use excessive amount of rice 
seeds as a way to mentally guarantee that the excess amount can cover the loss of 
seeds before they germinate. This is mainly related to pressure from in-laws and 
extended family members and neighbours, which suggests that cultural aspects 
contribute to improving (or not) livelihood responses. 
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A community of practice can be used as a structure to guide and maintain social 
capital development. Although it depends on the lifestyles of individual farmers’ 
communities, the combination of structured programmes such as skill training is 
often a good start. Frequency is crucial to maintain social networking among 
farmers. The continuity can be effective where the setting is informal. This is 
something I did not quite notice in the case of BSCM but is quite obvious in the 
Um Sang enterprise (further discussion of the Um Sang case is provided in 
Chapter 7). Cultural aspects should be considered in the development of social 
capital. 
Better access to physical and financial capital  
 
Rice farmers have limited market negotiation power because of their level of 
dependency on scarce resources. These resources include input supplies and post-
harvest facilities. Partnering with the BSCM has improved farmers livelihood by 
gaining access to working capitals. These include: 
 
• purified Khaw Dok Mali 105 seed; 
• agricultural machinery; 
• post-harvest facility; 
• affordable transportation;  
• advanced credit, and 
• market information.  
 
Rice paddy is a perishable product. Without appropriate drying and storage 
facilities, the longer farmers keep wet rice paddy, the lower the price farmers can 
earn. This means that individual farmers are likely to have limited bargaining 
power over buyers (millers) due to the lack of post-harvest facilities. This implies 
that the dibbling initiative has brought about unintentional change in the market 
system. Low farm-gate price has long been a strategy due to the fact that farmers 
do not have sufficient post-harvest facility. The BSCM partnership leverages its 
commercial resources through fairly traded rice paddy. 
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Flood and drought are natural factors in farming which are outside human control. 
However, resources provided by the BSCM enable farmers to prepare for rain 
and drought. Normally, if they were to get help to deal with rain and drought, this 
would likely come from the government or civil society. Having a systematic 
support from a miller was effective in terms of disaster preparedness, as they 
usually understand problems occurring in the rice farming. In this case, the 
BSCM helped by allocating financial capital to fund machinery suitable for 
farmers’ needs in order to cope with the situation. Participating farmers can 




The BSCM dibbling initiative has demonstrated how shared value partnership 
can be used as a principal organisational model which influences farmers’ 
livelihoods and their behaviours. It shows the importance of business 
coordination between primary and support activities and how to create value (i.e. 
profits and rent) to enhance value chains. This can be effective under the 
circumstances where actors are willing to mobilise their resources within and 
across organisations. The most striking feature is that by mobilising company 
resources and infrastructure, the BSCM demonstrates partnership between 
farmers and millers could contribute to improved farmers’ livelihoods. The 
findings signify that the dibbling initiative was a means to repositioning farmers 
in the rice value chain and a mechanism to reconfiguring value chain financing. 
The analysis also points out that the value chain governance through the dibbling 
initiative reduces power asymmetry. As a result, such value chain governance 
enables farmers to be treated more inclusively and fairly. 
 
A surprising finding is that the organisation becomes an effective facilitator of 
capital allocation. This condition differentiates between having a farmers’ 
organisation as a business model and as a resource facilitator. In addition, the 
generation of economic rents can be considered an important factor that 
differentiates such shared value partnership model from general corporate social 
responsibility activities. The BSCM performs a rent sharing role that can benefit 
its participating farmers. It mobilises resources to enable business partners to 
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create economic rents. This is particularly interesting when common perceptions 
about economic rents are that it is a physical asset such as land value and business 
location. This highlights the role of value chain approaches to obtain economic 
rents through different value chain activities. The empirical evidence shows how 
a new model? of an organisation can improve farmers’ financial management in 
terms of a more effective debt management, and eventually lead to improved 
livelihoods. It is noticeable that by reconfiguring the flow of finance provided by 
the BSCM, farmers are able to gain greater ability to pay back existing loans. 
Farmers saw their total production cost reduced by up to 30 percent, while yields 
increased by up to 10 percent. As the initiative progressed through time, farmers 
found themselves financially better off, not only breaking the vicious circle of 
debt, but also managing to save for future farm investment. The case offers 
evidence that the shared value partnership can be constructed in a way benefit to 
both parties. Farmers saw constructive and systematic ways to improve 
livelihoods, showing that shared value can be instrumental for building resilience 
by having institutional entrepreneurs as a mean to mobilise resources. 
 
The BSCM has a firm market position in rice markets. An understanding of the 
dibbling initiative mechanism can help to point out in what way farmers’ 
livelihoods can be improved. This understanding is both novel and practical 
because it offers a new way of looking at how CSR development processes can 
work. In addition, this new knowledge will help in coming up with replication 
logics for other millers or interested industries willing to adopt such strategies. 
Also, the knowledge of creating share valued partnership models can contribute 
towards the formation of Thai rice policy and strategy. Findings highlight that 
existing rice millers can potentially act as resources to improve farmers’ 
livelihoods. The BSCM’s dibbling initiative has also demonstrated that 
businesses can contribute to their respective community development while 
continuing their economic activities profitably. It shows that business as usual is 
unsustainable because it cannot offer competitive advantage to a company itself. 
From the value chain perspective, it shows that incompetent actors or business 
activities in each stage of the value chain inevitably affect business performance 
of other stages. 
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This case study suggests that institutional innovation can provide effective 
mechanisms that help a company to compete with its rivals. It can enhance 
organisational competency where resources and capabilities are available. This 
also movement suggests that millers are underutilised resource in the rice value 
chain. In general, rice milling is a family business and has been continued through 
generations. Rice millers have seen societal, economic and political changes 
through time and have a unique position in rice value chains. They can be 
involved in both production and processing, making them a strong asset to 
production and market systems adjustment. In Thailand, there are over 700 rice 
milling facilities nationwide, mostly in Central, Northeast and Northern regions 
where rice is grown.  
 
The dibbling initiative is not only a programme that enhances farmers’ skills and 
financial development but can be understood as a bridge between farmers and 
millers. This can offer benefits to farmers in many ways. This bridge creates 
conversational platforms between farmers and millers, allowing farmers as 
producers to understand what millers as buyers look to buy and help them to 
achieve that standard, which can means better selling price for rice paddy. It is 
fair to say that business and marketing knowledge is distant to most farmers in 
general. Participating in such initiatives allows farmers to become a part of the 
value chain as more recognised producers. This also increases farmers’ 
negotiation power through product quality improvements. By producing rice 
paddy that is better fit for the market demand, farmers gain more negotiation 
power. This can build farmers’ foundation towards entrepreneurial mindset which 








Chapter 7 Enhancing farmers’ organisational capabilities as a driver 
towards improved livelihoods 
 
 
Purpose and Propositions 
The case analyses how enhancing farmers’ organisational capabilities contribute 
to the improvement of farmers’ livelihoods. Being a capable farmers’ 
organisation involves competencies and business legitimacy such as operating as 
a formal business entity. This case is purposefully selected to examine how 
becoming a business entity affects value chain development and farmers’ 
livelihoods. 
 
Data and methods used 
Date retrieved from secondary data source and interview with stakeholders. Data 
collection methods included desk-based analysis and stakeholder interviews 
during September and November 2017 at the Baan Um Sang certified organic 
rice community enterprise and various places as agreed. Details of interviewed 
stakeholders’ affiliations were given in table 4.2 and 4.5 of Chapter 4.  
 
Theoretical contribution 
This research uses rice value chain as conceptual framework, discussed in 
Chapter 3. It focuses on value chain governance, organisational model, upgrading 
and finance as key analytical guide to examine how farmers’ organisation 
improve farmers’ livelihood. The results reveal that a capable farmers' 
organisation serves as a platform to empower smallholder farmers, for instance, 
by providing access to skills development and inclusive market participation. 
Such understanding can foster projects that bring together economic activities of 
rice farmers, rice millers and government agencies in a new way in Thailand and 
elsewhere.  The new knowledge can provide answers to some unanswered 
questions among farmers organisations, including why replication of successful 
farmers' organisations has been difficult. 
 
Originality/lesson learned 
This case study offers empirical evidence that as a business entity, a farmers’ 
organisation enables farmers’ collectives to gain access to finance, markets, 
knowledge and collaboration. Such access enables a farmers’ organisation to 
improve their business activities, business performance and community 
development. Specifically, the study found that the Um Sang offers a unique 
organisational development integrating a hybrid model for both producer and 
buyer-driven models. Such unique outcome highlights that such integration 
encourages farmers’ inclusion and market participation. The findings highlight 
how vulnerable actors can successfully improve their market negotiation power 





7.1 Case profile 
 
The Baan Um Sang certified organic rice community enterprise (in short, the Um 
Sang) or Kasedtip group (literally meaning ‘heavenly agriculture’) was 
established in 2004 by a collective of smallholder rice farmers in the Du sub-
district, Rasisai district, Srisaket province, led by Mr. Boonmee Surakot, so-
called uncle Boonmee (Photo 7.1). The Um Sang is a farmers’ enterprise that 
specialises in producing certified organic rice products. As of 2017, the enterprise 
has 1,258 smallholder farmers. The original idea for organic farming came from 
an attempt to resolve farmers’ debt caused by low returns on investment due to 
high production costs (e.g., chemical fertilizer and insecticide) and a low farm 
gate price.  
 
According to Mr. Surakot, rice production cost for community members was as 
high as $1,000 per hectare (4,700-4,800 Baht per rai), before forming an organic 
rice farmers’ organisation. It included the cost of rice seed, chemical fertilizers, 
middleman service charge and labour. By contrast, the price of jasmine rice paddy 
is always fluctuating influenced by factors such as market demand, political 
interventions and advanced trade in international markets. At the same time, the 
production costs have risen especially for chemical fertilizer, insecticide and 
herbicide, which made rice farming often unprofitable for the community 
members. To counter the issue of rising production costs, the Um Sang aimed to 
apply organic farming to their farmland of around 300 rai, or 48 hectares. The 
first cost reduction strategy was to apply self-made organic compost which 
helped to reduce production costs by $84 per hectare (400 Baht per rai). The 
second was to process rice paddy and sell milled rice to wholesalers and 
consumers, instead of selling rice paddy to millers. Typically, jasmine rice, also 
known as Thai Hom Mali rice paddy, has a market price of around 8–9 Baht per 
kilogram of rice paddy, whereas milled and packed rice can be sold for 12 Baht 
per kg. Later, the Um Sang’s rice products were promoted as provincial 
recommended product, and today around 80 per cent of its products are exported. 
The ability to produce certified organic rice has been the key factor for creating 




Photo 7. 1 Mr. Boonmee Surakot proudly presenting the Um Sang enterprise’s 
products  
Source: Fieldwork, 2017 
 
7.2 The structure of rice value chain 
 
In general, rice value chains start at the production stage where rice paddy 
production and input supply are the principal economic activities. A farmers’ 
organisation is a unit of analysis and the centre of this study. The value chain 
boundary is defined to cover actors and activities relevant to farmers’ 
organisations, from production to consumption. These stages include rice 
production, input supply, processing and packaging, transportation, marketing 
and sales. Although in this study, the concentration is on farmers’ activities and 
their performance, the marketing and sales stage was observed to help shape the 
analysis and discussion. 
 
The following value chain activities are specific to the Um Sang case and use data 
acquired from interviews, the Um Sang Facebook page, documents and media 
coverage. The Um Sang rice value chain comprises of four stages: certified 
organic jasmine rice farming; rice paddy processing; warehousing and product 
distribution; and marketing and sales. 
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Stage: Certified organic jasmine rice farming 
Primary activity Certified organic jasmine rice paddy production 
Actors Rice farmers and leaders of the Um Sang’s certified 
organic farmers’ organisation 
Supporting 
activities 
Sourcing input supplies, agricultural machinery, farming 
skills development  
Actors for the 
supporting activities 
The Um Sang’s farmers’ organisation, local agricultural 
extension workers (The Ministry of Agriculture, Kubota 
machinery company, organic certification office 
 
The Um Sang enterprise produces certified organic jasmine rice. Obtaining the 
organic certification involves monitoring and quality controls set out by the Thai 
Ministry of Commerce. The primary product is jasmine rice paddy, which is 
produced from the certified organic land and hence labelled as such. Also, the 
Um Sang enterprise farms alternative crops during the dry season such as soy, 
hemp and purple sweet potatoes that are also labelled as certified organic 
products. This provides a substantial competitive advantage that boosts farmers’ 
livelihoods (that the certification can be used for alternative crops as well). 
 
As a farmers’ organisation, the Um Sang offers two service functions in relation 
to rice farming activities. First, the organisation sources farm supplies and, 
second, the organisation aggregates and processes rice paddy. As a farm supplier, 
the Um Sang helps their members by sourcing farm input supplies while at the 
time of the field visit, the Um Sang was also building a new milling facility to 
increase its rice processing capacity (the impact of such expansion is not included 
in this thesis). Sourcing farm supplies is a significant factor in enabling the Um 
Sang to meet certified organic regulation and as such the operation offers double 
benefits for cost effectiveness and meeting organic certification standards. 
Certified organic rice seed sourced by the Um Sang costs just $21.6 per 25 kg 
sack (650 Baht) or $0.9 per kg. This is around 25 per cent lower than the price of 
typical rice seed sold by local farm suppliers. Photo 7.2 below shows certified 





Photo 7. 2 Certified organic Home Mali 105 seed 
Source: The Um Sang Facebook page, 2018 
 
In practice, local suppliers may not always carry organic farm supply stocks 
because they are more expensive and in less demand. The majority of rice farmers 
in the area use chemical fertilizer. A local supplier (Sisaket_supplier_07) 
described when asked if the farmers had to make an advance order for organic 
supplies: 
 
“We usually have [organic farm input supply] some stock but not so 
much. We know the people who do organic farming, so we carry enough 
supply just for them.” 
 
“No, they don’t need to order. We know them. They just come in to buy. 
You know, here people know each other. Organic supply is tricky! I give 
you an example of [organic] rice seed. Jasmine rice seed is already in 
limited supply, then they want organic [rice] seed! I also ordered it [rice] 
from my suppliers. Sometimes, it [rice] doesn’t yield properly. You know, 
because it is organic! So, they [farmers] complain and spread the rumour 
I sold bad stuff!   
 [..] Organic fertilizer is usually cheaper, but they need to be applied more 
frequency, so that adds to the price and hassle. Ones who use [chemical] 
fertilizers they can’t easily switch. Some tried but the yield drops when 
they switch, so they rush back to get [chemical] fertilizer.” 
 
 
Figure 7.1 and 7.2 provide a schematic illustration how the Um Sang holds a 
supply distribution point that offers price and supply quality competitive 
advantage to its members. The collective can achieve such an advantage due to 
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economies of scale and by reducing transaction costs. Table 7.1 compares price 
differences between the Um Sang’s members and individual local rice farmers in 
general. The Um Sang’s farmers’ costs are about $208.5 less than local farmers 
per hectare of rice production. 
 
 
Figure 7. 1 A simplified picture of connections between local farm suppliers and 
farmers  
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 
Figure 7. 2 A simplified picture of connections between the Um Sang and its 
members; and local farm suppliers and farmers  




Table 7. 1Average full costing of rice production by the Ban Um Sang organic rice 
community enterprise  
 
Items required per rai 
(= 0.16 hectare) 
Um Sang farmers 
production cost in $/hectare 
(Baht/rai)  
General rice farmers 
production cost in 
$/hectare (Baht/rai) 
Certified organic Hom 
Mali 105 seed, 10 kg 
$54.16 (260)  N/A 
Khaw Dok Mali 105 
seed, 40 kg – broadcast 
seeding 
N/A $135.42 (650) 
Organic fertilizer  $104.16 (500) N/A 
Chemical fertilizer N/A $164.58 (790) 
Chemical herbicide N/A $60.41 (290) 
Labour & machine rent $145.83 (700) $152.08 (730) 
Harvest machine rent  $125.00 (600) $125.00 (600) 
Farm insurance  $8.3 (40) $8.33 (40) 
Total  $437.5 (2,100) $646 (3,100) 
Source: The Um Sang’s farmers’ organisation and Sisaket’s DOAE, 2017 
 
Product and technology development involves processes and activities that allow 
improvements of products and production processes. For the Um Sang, these 
support activities involve a great deal of farmers’ field support enabling farmers 
to develop and apply new farming skills. Members attended regular skills training 
sessions through the Um Sang. Having farmers gathering in-place like a farmers’ 
organisation helps training arrangement manageable for responsible 
organisations. Photo 7.3, for example, offers an atmosphere of farm skill training 
at the Um Sang. In this event, the Sisaket DOAE trained farmers on the issues 
related to post-harvest farm management such as the downside of straw burning 
and use straw residue to enrich soil.  
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Photo 7. 3 Farm skill training organised by Sisaket DOAE at the Um Sang’s farmers’ 
organisation in January 2020 
Source: The Um Sang Facebook page, 2020 
 
According to a local agricultural extension officer [Sisaket_extension_01], 
forming a farmers’ organisation has a clear advantage by providing access to 
farming skills training, whereas an agricultural extension office has limited 
capacity to provide training and advice on an individual basis. As he described:  
“I always want to go out to train (farmers) or just casual conversation 
about looking after farm. But we are just a small team. Having farmers 
gather at their farmers’ organisation is the best option for both sides, for 
us and the farmers themselves. Often they learned and I also learned from 
someone who did well and share that knowledge.” 
[Sisaket_extension_01] 
 
For example, the Um Sang’s farmers mostly used “Na-Yod” or the dibbling 
technique, a technique to plant rice by individually dropping rice seeds in rolls, 
instead of broadcast seeding3. Also, a systematic planting technique helps farmers 
to visibly separate rice plants from weeds. As shown in Table 7.1 and 7.2, this 
technique helped farmers to reduce the cost of rice seed by around $13.3 (400 











Table 7. 2 Farm performance  
 
Farm performance Value 
Production cost, $/kg (Baht/kg)  $0.1 (4 Baht) 
Rice paddy yield, ton/hectare (kg/rai) 3.25 ton (520 kg)  
Farm gate price, $/kg (Baht/kg)  $0.5 (15 Baht) 
Profit, $/kg (Baht/kg) $0.36 (11 Baht) 
Source: The Um Sang’s farmers’ organisation, 2017 
 
Improving the product (rice paddy) through farm skills training also encourages 
the building of social capital and human capital among the members of the 
organization. Social capital naturally accumulates through interaction during 
skills training and regular meetings. For example, some farmers [such as 
Case1_05, Case1_09, Case1_18] expressed that, at the beginning, they only 
joined training programmes because they were enjoyable social gatherings with 
“gossip, delicious food and a good laugh, what more would you ask for?” 
[Case1_09]. However, once they applied the farm techniques and saw the 
difference, they started to take farming skills development more seriously. 
 
The Um Sang also offers a service for aggregating and processing rice paddy. 
This is a function that substantially benefits its members because they know farm 
gate prices in advance, and the Um Sang offers higher prices as they process 
certified organic rice. The members of the Um Sang are rice paddy suppliers as 
they feed rice paddy into the Um Sang mill. Despite having the same functions 
as a typical rice miller, the key difference is the relationship between the miller 
and farmers in the case. Typically, a miller and farmers are two actors operating 
their own business activities. The Um Sang enterprise integrates these two roles 
in an inclusive manner and benefits farmers through collective action.  
 
More specifically, the Um sang operates on a co-operative basis, which benefits 
its farmers. This may sound like an obvious point regarding a co-operative 
organisation, yet in practice the reality may not be as simple as it sounds. That is 
because a farmers’ organisation must prepare a large volume of cash to pay at 
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short amount of time during harvest season. Such cash reserve can be secured 
through business loans and profits, which is a financial challenge faced by all rice 
traders. Being a certified organic rice exporter, the Um Sang earns substantial 
profits as compared to trading only domestically, which allows it to offer higher 
farm gate prices to its members as a common practice. For example, in 2019 
harvest season, local millers bought at $400 per ton rice paddy while the Um Sang 
bought from its members at $500 per ton. The approach has substantially 
contributed to improving farmers’ livelihoods. Also, rice paddy is a perishable 
product. Without appropriate drying and storage facilities, the longer farmers 
keep rice paddy, the lower the price they can earn from it. This is where post-
harvest facilities play a crucial role in making it possible for the members to get 
a better farm gate price and not to rush to sell rice paddy immediately after it is 
harvested. In 2017, the Um Sang production capacity was 6 tons per day. This is 
small when compared to local millers but large among typical farmers’ 
organisations. However, as it was noted above, the organisation is working to 
expand its capacity. 
 
The age of farmers (over 50 years of age) and the small size of farmland have 
been some of the most commonly cited factors threatening the ability to earn 
better profits and to develop a sustainable livelihood. The average farm size in 
Sisaket province is 19.2 rai or 3 hectares per farmer household. Although this 
total land area seems manageable by a full-time farmer, many farmers are over 
50 years old. Working conditions are rough, especially as the average temperature 
in the region is 38 degrees Celsius. Therefore, additional labour and machine 
rentals are essential items of expenditure required to produce rice. These are 
perceived as threats to farmers’ income because due to their age they would 
seemingly need to hire extra labour, while the small farmland size means that 
only a small quantity of rice paddy is produced. 
 
However, empirical evidence from the Um Sang farmers offers a different 
understanding to such perceptions. In short, the observations with respect to age 
and income are similar to those in the BSCM case that age has an insignificant 
impact on income. This is under the condition that farmers are associated with 
farmers’ organisation, learn farming skills and use purified Khaw Dok mali 105 
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rice seed. Despite the age of farmers, they farm as a way of life, and this is an 
important life philosophy and a factor leading to their success. Farming has long 
been their daily routine, and they know their environment, quality of soil, how to 
manage weeds, i.e. older farmers would seem to be better at harnessing their 
skills, which compensates for reduced physical abilities. 
 
Procurement deals with activities that make resources or inputs available at any 
stage of production. It involves sourcing supplies from the right suppliers which 
helps to maintain the premium quality of organic rice production. It also involves 
sourcing and financing agricultural machinery to be used among the enterprise 
members. Such functions highlight the importance of vertical coordination 
among value chain actors. In this case, the most effective machinery can be used 
if the Um Sang have sufficient funds to purchase or to lease them. Procurement 
activities also involve sourcing input materials at best prices for the enterprise, a 
benefit that is not applicable to many Thai farmers’ organisations due to the lack 
of relevant organisational capability. For example, the enterprise has a lease 
contract with Kubota, a leading agricultural machinery company in Thailand, 
which has brought about many benefits not only in obtaining farm machineries, 
but also by increasing farm skills. Kubota organised demonstrations of farm 
machinery and farmers learned how to use such machinery for rice farming and 
also the right machines to use for dry season crops such as hemp. This has 
enhanced the chances of earning more in the dry season by increasing 
productivity of land that would otherwise be left unused waiting for the next rice 
cropping season. Farmers have indicated that dry season cropping proved to help 
increase rice productivity in the following year. 
Stage: Rice paddy processing 
 
Primary activity Rice paddy processing 
Actor The Um Sang farmers’ organisation 
Supporting activity Product development, technology development  
Actors for the 
supporting activities 
Rice farmers, workforce of the rice milling company 
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The Um Sang processes rice paddy into milled rice, as well as other rice products 
such as rice noodle, rice flour, and rice-based cosmetic product lines. The 
organisation produces and trades under the “Uncle Boonmee” brand and also 
operates an outsourcer for other companies such as Blue Elephant. The various 
business activities enable the Um Sang to capture higher profits as compared to 
the traditional rice paddy trade. Farmers sell rice paddy directly to the Um Sang, 
which means no profits are split with intermediaries (e.g., middlemen) in the 
process. The farm gate price is announced in advance and is typically higher than 
a local market price. For example, the Um Sang farm gate price for the 2017 
harvest (November 2017) was around $517 per ton of Hom Mali rice paddy at 
full-rate, while local rice millers’ farm gate price was $367 per ton of Hom Mali 
rice paddy. 
 
Moisture is a factor that deteriorates the quality of rice paddy and consequently 
lowers the sales price. For this purpose, sun drying is a traditional method to 
improve quality of newly harvested rice. Photo 7.4 shows a sun drying method 
before processing. It should be noted that one side of the road is left for 
commuting (Photo 7.4 b). It is a common but controversial practice in Thai rural 
areas due to negative implications for road safety. Rice processing is also labour 
intensive. For example, the sun drying method alone requires a large number of 
workers to operate, which can provide employment opportunities for farmers to 
earn non-farm income. The Um Sang has created jobs for their members by 





Photo 7. 4 Sun-dried rice paddy: (a) rice paddy spread on the area of a milling facility; 
(b) rice paddy on the side of a road 
Source: Fieldwork, 2017 
 
When selling rice to local millers, farmers obtain no price advantage of offering 
certified organic rice paddy, whereas the Um Sang offers about 30 percent higher 
prices than market price because the organisation can process and sell the end 
product as packaged certified organic rice. This allows the Um Sang to capture 
the commercial value and reinvest profit to improve its members' livelihoods. 
Farmers receive the dividend from the profits the Um Sang makes from rice 
products, such as packs of rice, noodles and rice-based cosmetics. The Um Sang 
also reinvests profit in the development of human capital and rice production 
facility. These include farming skills, farm machinery and farm input supply 
procurement. Besides business profits, the Um Sang also receives premium 
payments from the Fairtrade organisation for being its member. 
Stage: Warehousing and product distribution 
 
Primary activity Rice storage, and distribute products to markets 
Actor The Um Sang farmers’ organisation 
Supporting activity Product development, technology development, logistics 
Actors for the 
supporting activities 
Workforces of the Um Sang, trade partners, rice export 
brokers, organic certification organic officer, trade officer 
 
Warehousing and product distribution involve storage and logistics to deliver 
final products to customers. According to the Um Sang’s founder, about 80 per 
cent of its organic rice production is exported to international-based customers.  
 
Warehousing capacity has been a significant problem for storing rice paddy and 
processing rice products for the enterprise. As discussed earlier, certified organic 
rice farmers can earn organic price advantage only from facilities that market 
certified organic product lines. This makes it a challenge for farmers to earn more 
from certified organic farming. During a field visit to the Um Sang in 2017, a 
new warehouse and milling facility was being constructed. I was told that the Um 
Sang managed to secure a business loan from the BAAC for around $500,000 (15 
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million Baht) to invest in the facility expansion project. It was a small and 
medium-sized enterprises loan that requires established business credit history 
and ability to pay back the loan. One of the advantages related to the loan was 
business advice and support, which proved to be particularly beneficial to the Um 
Sang. For example, the BAAC’s business advisor guided the Um Sang to register 
as a limited company to replace its then farmers’ organisation registration. This 
gave an advantage to the Um Sang as a business entity in many ways, including 
the opportunity to apply for a quota to export rice. This directly enhanced the Um 
Sang’s competitive advantage by moving to sell to international markets.  
 
The Um Sang has a shop at the farmers’ organisation office, which is one retail 
channel the organisation has started using. However, the overall retail approach 
has faced difficulties. The main issue is high costs, including the cost of shelving 
products in modern supermarkets and delivery costs [Case1_04]. Trade-related 
government offices such as Thailand Post and the Office of Internal Trade 
launched a campaign in 2018 that helped waive these postal delivery costs for a 
limited time period. However, the campaign was not carried out long enough to 
change consumer behaviour. Many customers were eager to buy directly from 
farmers but once the campaign ended the cost of postal delivery became too high 
as rice is a relatively heavy product in relation to its value.  
Stage: Marketing and sales 
 
Primary activity Marketing, advertising and sales 
Actor The Um Sang’s farmers’ organisation 
Supporting activity Advertising, managing social media, public relations 
Actors for the 
supporting activities 
Um Sang, social media platform operator and trade partners 
 
Marketing and sales involve activities that encourage purchasing and customer 
loyalty. These activities can include advertisements, sales promotion and 
customer relationship management. The Um Sang has built a reputation as a 
leading farmers’ community enterprise over the past decade, making it one of the 
 189 
most well-known farmers’ community enterprises in Thailand. This reputation is 
a part of the Um Sang competitive advantage and it has built customer loyalty 
over time. The Uncle Boonmee brand name has economic value, allowing the 
enterprise to earn higher profit as compared to other similar brands with the 
equivalent product lines. Such a differentiation has attracted wholesale rice 
traders to source the Um Sang rice production under their brand names. This has 
partly enabled the enterprise to increase its profit margins that allow the 
organisation to offer 15 per cent dividends to its members, while most Thai 
agricultural cooperatives offer around 7 percent dividends. 
 
The Um Sang’s leader (Case1_01) expressed that he felt satisfied with the 
organisation’s business performance as it had secured advanced orders from 
international clients. Such advanced orders enable the Um Sang to offer and 
maintain high buying price. This helps farmers to earn high and more stable 
income. According to him:  
“Usually, we (the Um Sang) announce the price to our members quite 
early so we, both farmers and the Um Sang, can plan for the paddy rice 
buy process. We can do this because our rice has always been on high 
demand and we received advanced order. It has been beneficial for all of 
us. But we need to expand our milling facility to serve more members.” 
(Case1_01)   
 
This is important as the Um Sang trades in niche markets and, therefore, 
sustaining customer demand is a major issue for the farmers’ organisation. To 
build a strong market position, the organisation specialises in certified organic 
rice which also includes a medicinal rice variety. The trends set by health-
conscious consumers have resulted in increasing demand the products. Although 
the Um Sang is one of the biggest farmers’ organisation exporting rice, it is 
relatively small compared to other corporate rice exporters. Due to its small 
volume, the Um Sang is not usually seen as a rival to other rice exporters in Thai 
market operating at much larger scale. The organisation has thus been able to 
maintain good business relationships with other companies in the business 
environment, allowing them to increase heterogeneous resources.   
 
Establishing as a business enterprise requires administrative offices to run the 
activities. In general, Thai farmers’ organisations are self-managed in a home 
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office environment – typically in an organisation leader’s house. The quality of 
administrative tasks (e.g., accounting and related paperwork) depends heavily on 
people’s skills, often offered on a voluntary basis. In this respect, the Um Sang 
has set a trend new to farmers’ organisations. For example, it hires administrative 
personnel at a market rate and, for instance, has successfully attracted young local 
personnel who have administrative skills and are passionate to contribute to rural 
development of their hometown. As part of my conversation with an office officer 
at the enterprise, the person explained life back at home in a very interesting way. 
“… I did my undergrad and worked for a couple of years in Bangkok. I 
missed Bangkok’s vibe sometimes but I sure would not even think of 
returning. Here, I live with my parents [multi-family home] … the cost of 
living is low. Although I earned about half as much as when in Bangkok, 
I ended up save more.” [Case1_04] 
 
The interviewee [Case1_04] did highlight work-life balance and saving money 
as key reasons to stay in the rural area. From my observation (not part of this 
research, but everyday life), a large number of people working in Bangkok are 
rooted in rural areas and linked to a background in agriculture. There is a growing 
interest in returning to work in their hometown if they can find employment, due 
to varying working conditions and high cost of living in Bangkok. 
 
7.3 Rice value chain analysis 
 
This part of the analysis discusses value chain coordination and resource 
mobilisation as factors contributing towards building a capable farmers’ 
organisation. Value chain coordination yields results in terms of the efficiency of 
the flow of products and services, and by reducing barriers to market entry and 
by improved governance. Meanwhile, resource mobilisation enables a farmers’ 
organisation to become more prepared for tackling vulnerabilities (as discussed 
in Chapter 5), improving livelihoods and accumulating capitals and assets. 
7.3.1 Governance and coordination 
 
The efficiency of the flow of products and services is an ultimate goal of value 
chain governance and coordination. Value chain flowchart is a common 
illustrative tool used in most value chain analysis.  Figure 7.3 and 7.4 illustrate 
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the different levels of analysis and functions of value chains. On the one hand, 
Figure 7.3 shows the flow of physical inputs and outputs in terms of products and 
value-added from rice paddy production to marketing. This simplified illustration 
shows the collective action of 1,258 smallholder farmers as their enterprise’s 
activities. Meanwhile, Figure 7.4 shows the coordination of primary and support 
activities that creates and sustains the Um Sang’s competitiveness. These two 
aspects complement each other, making the analysis more rigorous. More 
specifically, Figure 7.4 shows how the coordination of primary and support 
activities help to build resilience for farmers during the jasmine rice farming 
stage. For example, the scarcity of harvesting machines has created vulnerability 
for many smallholder farmers as discussed in Chapter 5. An efficient coordination 
of firm infrastructure, financial management and procurement helps the Um 




Figure 7. 3 The Um Sang’s simplified rice value chain  




Figure 7. 4 The Um Sang’s coordination of primary and support activities  
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Across different stages of the rice value chain, human resource management plays 
a significant role in ensuring that organic farming standards are met and good 
performance is delivered. Coordinated human resource management is an 
important driver of the Um Sang success that helps maintain its performance. As 
an organisation, the Um Sang has three key operational areas: administration, 
factory and field operations. The administrative section involves oversight of 
overall administrative tasks including regulating organic certification 
requirements, accounting and licensing, managing finances and marketing. The 
factory deals exclusively with rice processing and packaging. The field section 
includes farming skills development training working closely with farmers and 
helping them to learn and apply farming skills and organic practices. These three 
aspects work hand in hand to maintain certified organic qualification, which helps 
to maintain the Um Sang’s competitive advantage. 
 
The Um Sang has attracted many young, educated officers to work with the 
enterprise. According to the Um Sang 2017 administrative data, the organisation 
comprised of three departments: 6 officers in administrative office, 13 officers in 
milling factory, and four officers in packaging department. The leadership team 
is led by a marketing manager and an enterprise lead who are the daughter and 
the son of Mr. Boonmee. Both are highly educated, one with Masters degree and 
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the other with a PhD. This can be considered as a rare phenomenon in Thai rural 
areas where the majority of farmers’ families would not encourage their highly 
educated offspring to work on the farm for economic reasons. Having direct 
experience in the rice-trade not only brings a better share of economic profits, but 
also improves entrepreneurial skills as farmers do not generally have in-depth 
knowledge of business and marketing. Being a rice trader offers an opportunity 
for a farmers’ organisation to develop such professional skills becoming a 
competitive trader. 
 
The current case is illustrative in this sense as the success of a farmers’ 
organisation in Thailand is a rare achievement and, in this sense, the results of the 
Um Sang could be used as an example among Thai farmers’ organisations. The 
enterprise receives frequent visits by farmers’ organisations from around the 
country. The Um Sang counts the Prime minister Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha among 
visitors to their organisation, as shown in Photo 7.4. According to Mr. Boonmee, 
becoming a successful farmers’ organisation is considered to be difficult to 
replicate. The idea of replication here is not to encourage copycats, but instead to 
use learnings from the case as a guideline. From this viewpoint, the discussion 
highlights the importance of an organisation as a resource. Therefore, it is crucial 
to understand the mechanisms that enable the Um Sang to achieve success and 
look at how the Um Sang can continue improving from its current stage. 
 
 
Photo 7. 5 Prime minister Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha visiting the Um Sang enterprise 
due to its success  
Left: Mr. Boonmee, second from left, holding microphone explained the work of 
the Um Sang 
Right: The Prime Minister participated in a farm 
Source: Thairath Newspaper, 24 February 2018  
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The Um Sang enterprise has learned unique lessons that can empower farmers’ 
organisations in many ways. It is important to highlight that the Um Sang has 
prioritised farming skills and quality of farmland as its development foundation. 
It has developed into an organisation from a collective action gathering and, 
further, into a capable organisation. From this standpoint, a capable farmers’ 
organisation enables farmers to gain assets facilitating access to capital. The 
outcome is reflected by the accumulation of Um Sang’s tangible (e.g., working 
capital) and intangible assets (e.g., trademark and brand recognition). 
 
The findings suggest that tangible assets can potentially help farmers to improve 
livelihoods in a more sustainable manner. These can include certified organic 
land, land ownership, high quality farm inputs, human and social capital 
development. Certified organic land and land ownership can be considered as the 
foundations of agribusiness among organic farm producers. The quality of land 
is an important asset for agribusiness, yet when the focus is solely on profit, land 
is often abused and mismanaged. For example, the excessive use of chemical 
fertiliser can harm the ecosystem, health of farm labourers and the quality of the 
soil. From this viewpoint, it is important to note that the focus of appropriate 
farming is not exclusively on converting to organic farming, but rather to apply 
good agricultural management in an ecological way. Certified organic farmland 
can offer benefits to farmers in many ways. It helps to rejuvenate soil nutrition, 
improve the quality of soil texture and the overall ecosystem. Any crops that are 
farmed on certified organic land can be labelled as organic produce, which 
provides a higher market price than ones without organic labelling. 
 
Low-cost farm production has been promoted as a key strategy to help farmers to 
reduce farm investment and improve livelihoods. However, improving 
livelihoods requires a series of factors to be in place. Lowering production costs 
alone may not have significant effect on return of investment. Other things need 
to consider, for example, such as productivity, the market price of paddy and soil 
fertility to yield rice the next cropping season. For the Um Sang, low-cost 
production can be considered as a competitive advantage as certified organic 
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practice. Having such legitimacy offers long term market advantage. All these 
maintain the sustainability of the Um Sang’s business performance.  
 
For the Um Sang, also intangible assets have played a crucial role in adding value 
and improving farmers’ livelihoods. The intangible assets include brand 
recognition and a trademark. These types of intangible assets have long been 
discussed for being subjective, making them difficult to measure. However, for 
farmers with limited assets, these types of intangible assets can be a great way to 
enter into markets, particularly a niche or specialty market.  Uncle Boonmee’s 
reputation and trade name have high economic value. As a result, the Um Sang’s 
members benefit financially from healthy business performance such as high 
dividends, to be discussed in following sections. 
7.3.2 Upgrading 
 
Value chain upgrading is a process of enhancing competitiveness. This can 
include making better products or developing more efficient processes. In a rural 
development context, enabling smallholders to better participate in the markets 
has often been a central aim of value chain upgrading (Riisgaard et al., 2010; 
Poole et al., 2013; Kilelu et al., 2017). In this sense, the Um Sang is a rare case 
of a farmers-led organisation that has developed into a competitive business 
enterprise. In the context of Thailand’s business environment, a farmer-led 
organisation is mostly perceived as an informal entity. Registering as a formal 
business entity is not a prerequisite, which this exempts the organisation from 
some legal requirements such as audit accounting. The aim of such exemption is 
to help smallholder farmers earn benefits from participating in markets. At the 
same time, better access to markets is a complicated endeavour, which is more 
difficult if one does not operate as a formal business entity that effectively 
prevents from participating, for instance, in international markets.   
 
Registering as a formal business entity is a major step for a farmers’ organisation. 
Such an action can turn an organisation from a social gathering into a pool of 
capital and resources, that is, from being an intangible asset into a tangible asset. 
This characteristic is considered as a capable organisation in which an such 
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organisational development enables famers’ livelihood enhancement. Being a 
business entity offers trade advantages to the Um Sang in many ways. For 
example, the organisation can apply for SME business loans and rice export 
quotas. These activities require a set of paperwork including a business entity 
registration, trade records and a credit history. These are all factors that have been 
perceived as barriers to entry into markets for many farmers’ organisations. In 
addition, trading as a business entity enables the Um Sang to gain economic rents 
from its assets in two ways. First one is the organic certification and the other one 
is the geographical benefit for the Tung-kula-ronghai plateu that has received a 
geographical indication (GI)4  from the World Intellectual Property Organization. 
The certification and consequent GI designation create a competitive advantage 
for the Um Sang placing in a strong market position compared to individual 
farmers or informal farmers’ organisations. The combination of certified organic 
farmland and GI makes the Um Sang products fit for specialty markets and gain 
high market price, which has attracted several partners and hence access to their 
networks. 
 
Transforming from a farmers’ organisation into a registered business entity has 
allowed the Um Sang to become a commercial enterprise trader, which has 
contributed to its repositioning in the rice value chain. This is an achievement in 
transforming farmers’ collective action into a capable farmers’ organisation. 
From a business viewpoint, the Um Sang has gained market positioning as a 
producer of a premium quality jasmine rice. It is noticeable that the business 
environment in the Sisaket rice market has been supportive to smallholder 
farmers.  For example, the Um Sang has been able to communicate and be 
involved in many significant programmes targeting the rice market, including 
interchanging knowledge with other large commercial scale rice traders. This 
emphasises the organisation’s ability to reposition itself in the value chain, which 
has resulted in the generation of profits to improve farmers’ livelihood. 
 
4 A geographical indication (GI) is a sign used on products that have a specific geographical origin 
and possess qualities or a reputation that are due to that origin. In order to function as a GI, a sign 
must identify a product as originating in a given place. In addition, the qualities, characteristics 
or reputation of the product should be essentially due to the place of origin. Since the qualities 
depend on the geographical place of production, there is a clear link between the product and its 




I asked the Um Sang founder for his opinion on possible joint ventures or 
mentoring other farmers’ organisations who might be willing to grow. He 
expressed that such an idea was viable: “I would be more than welcome this idea 
and to help, if I can, in any way.” [Case1_01]. Yet, such initiatives seem 
practically challenging because they involve substantial effort in working 
collaboratively and require often substantial funding. For example, the 
organisation’s rice processing facility would need to be expanded to 
accommodate such joint venture activities that would require extensive 
investment. In some ways, serving a niche or specialty market is a reputation-
driven approach. This means that quality plays an important role in consumers’ 
purchase decisions and consumer loyalty obstructs newcomers from entering 
markets. This suggests that the Um Sang can play a role in rent sharing where 
other farmers’ organisations could benefit through organisational collaboration. 
 
This is a significant finding as it suggests that strengthening policy agendas for 
inclusive market systems could change the way farmers’ organisations are formed 
and operate. In general, the aims of forming farmers’ organisations include 
achieving higher profits and building farming skills. Therefore, strengthening 
inclusive market systems should be a key objective of supporting the formation 
of farmers’ organisations. In other words, improving the market system is the 
core mechanism, while increasing farmers’ profits is an outcome of such a 
developmental process. Rice traders can welcome farmers into an entrepreneurial 
ecosystem, which can increase farmers’ human and social capital by involving 
them collectively in the production and trade of rice. This finding agrees with 
fundamental knowledge that human and social capital can help farmers achieving 
sustainable livelihood.  
7.3.3 Distributional outcomes 
 
From rice farmers’ standpoint, distributional outcomes concern income 
improvement (i.e., higher and more stable), wider access to human and social 
capital, and better access to physical and financial capital. Such outcome can 
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strengthen value chain activities and minimise vulnerability, subsequently 
facilitating improved livelihoods.  
 
This case study found that the ability of the farmers’ organisation to access 
capitals has a strong link to the quality of value chain governance and upgrading. 
Such development helps improve value chain activities and prevent or minimise 
shocks or factors that may deteriorate farmers’ livelihoods. Considering from an 
organisational standpoint, such understanding can sustainably strengthen 
business operations. Most importantly, this section's discussion highlights that 
farmers’ organisation itself is the most valuable asset. 
Wider access to human and social capital development  
 
Results from the Um Sang’s rice value chain show that human capital can 
empower farmers to achieve improved livelihoods. Human capital development 
requires funds to organise skills training. For the Um Sang’s members, this is a 
great advantage. They receive support that has a direct impact on income 
increments and cash-flow management. The training programmes include 
farming skills development and financial literacy (e.g., household/farm 
investment accounting). Farmers have applied what they have learned to improve 
rice cropping and have tried out alternative crops in dry seasons such as sweet 
purple potatoes and sun hemp (Crotalaria juncea). These crops are in high 
demand in local markets and also help to improve soil quality. In addition, this 
creates alternative income and youth employment opportunities, as farmers 
[interview label: Case1_01, Case1_04, Case_05, Case_06] explained that young 
people work on the farms during their school break between March to May, when 
farmers require labour to prepare the soil for the new cropping season. In addition, 
an opportunity to try out different crops and new markets would offer a better 
perspective to consider diversification of farming activities. 
 
Considering a workforce as a human resource, the Um Sang benefits from having 
skilful administrative officers which increases diverse knowledge within the 
organisation. The Um Sang can provide human resources by investing in the 
hiring of permanent employees, as discussed earlier. These paid workers are a 
powerful resource, enabling the Um Sang to modernise and trade profitably. They 
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work to maintain the superior standards of the organisation such as organic 
certification and high farm gate price commitment to members. This is evidenced 
by the profits that allows the Um Sang to offer usually significant dividends to its 
members. The Um Sang offers a farm gate price in the region of $0.5/kg of rice 
paddy. This is about 30 percent higher than what local millers offer in regular 
markets. The stable market price enables farmers to plan for their farming and 
finance. It also results in product and technological development opportunities 
such as expanding product lines, including rice-based cosmetics and rice snacks. 
It also includes reaching out to new types of customers such as rice oil 
manufacturers and soya sauce manufacturers. This has encouraged farmers to 
grow soybeans after the end of the rice cropping season in the dry season (when 
the land is usually deserted). Such alternative crops help to increase income and 
improve soil quality. 
Better access to physical and financial capital  
 
In general, farmers’ organisations receive support from Thai government and 
wider public as a way to help farmers’ communities to maintain better 
livelihoods. However, farmers’ organisations can only seize market share in the 
long term under certain conditions. These include products meeting standards and 
customers having access to them. These conditions are difficult to attain, resulting 
in many Thai farmers’ organisations failing to make profits.  
 
The Um Sang’s story of a farmer-led enterprise has inspired people to feel there 
is a path out of poverty. The combination of its organisational story and the 
premium quality of certified organic rice products generates high market value. 
It has built a reputation as a leading farmers’ community enterprise in recent 
years, making it one of the most well-known farmers’ organisation enterprises in 
Thailand. This reputation is part of the the Um Sang’s competitive advantage and 
it builds customer loyalty over time. The Uncle Boonmee brand name has 
economic value, allowing the enterprise to earn a high price compared to other 
firms with the same product lines. This differentiation has attracted wholesale 
rice traders to source rice from Um Sang. This achievement has enabled the Um 
Sang to make a decent profit margin that has allowed to offer up to 15 percent 
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dividends to its members, while most Thai agricultural cooperatives offer up to 7 
percent dividends. 
 
Sources of finance in this stage include enterprise profits and business loans. 
These are being used to run the enterprise value chain activities, including buying 
rice paddy and paying staff payroll. The Um Sang’s farmers’ organisation 
involves production, marketing and administrative jobs. It has people with the 
right training and skills to do the work which is a new aspect among typical farm-
led organisations. This is made possible due to effective recruitment and available 
hiring budgets. These recruitments include a factory manager, technician, 
accountants and agronomists, which highlights an importance of capital 
accumulation to reinvest in an organisational development. 
 
Harvest season is a crucial time for any type of miller when it comes to cash-flow 
management. Business loans are common for millers to manage their cash-flow 
during harvest season. To obtain a loan approval requires an excellent credit and 
trade history, and a collateral, making it unlikely that farmers will be able to 
access such loans, often leading to the failure of farmers’ organisations.   
 
Premium certified organic jasmine rice is a specialty market segment. It is 
demanding and requires attention to detail, particularly in terms of quality. The 
Um Sang has made this possible by having sufficient cash-flow in the business. 
Cash-flow management comes from profit and loans provided by the BAAC’s 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) business loan scheme. Obtaining 
such loans are a great achievement for a farmers’ enterprise. This has allowed 
running a profitable business and reinvesting to maintain performance, showing 
a healthy business model to lenders. This results in the banks (e.g., BAAC) being 
willing to lend money to the enterprise based on its business performance and 
ability to payback. This is important lesson which can be passed on to other 
farmers’ organisations. 
 
Business loans and business performance are the key investments enabling the 
Um Sang to develop organisational infrastructure. The Um Sang obtained 
business loan totalling around $500,000 (15 million Baht) from the BAAC for a 
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post-harvest facility construction, expanding its rice milling factory with 
sufficient storage for rice paddy and processed rice products. According to the 
BAAC’s manager, this sum is believed to be among the largest loans in the history 
of Thai farmers’ organisations. The Um Sang, like rice exporters, obtains advance 
orders from international markets, so it can forecast future income and cash-flow. 
Presenting such a business plan is deemed necessary to secure loans. To this end, 
business loans and personal loans are two different things. Without good planning 
for what to do with the money, personal loans can be a risky for individual 
farmers. This type of loan requires personal responsibility and personal ability in 
financial management. So, it is up to the farmers. 
 
In the case of the farmers’ organisation, this can be a game-changer. Business 
loan packages come with a business advisor who helps guide and recommend 
directions to achieve profits. A business advisor can provide the most needed 
support in term of business guidance. For example, a change from being a 
farmers’ organisation to a registered business entity has made the organisation 
more easily recognised in markets. This is the area where farmers’ organisations 
have struggled the most in the past. Although farmers’ organisations receive 
certain tax advantages and support from government, their business sustainability 
should rely on product quality.  
 
Access to organic supplies, quality assurance and legal requirements are elements 
the Um Sang invests in to achieve benefits of economies of scale. First, it sources 
organic inputs of supplies at a reasonable price. Members pay less than market 
prices due to the advantage of economies of scale. For example, members could 
save up to $7 (200 Baht) per 25 kg sack of Hom Mali 105 seed as compared to a 
common retail price. In addition, the Um Sang covers the cost of quality 
assurance and legal requirements to maintain organic certifications and business 
licensing. Second, the Um Sang reinvests its profits to lease heavy agricultural 
machinery such as harvesting machines. It also purchased trucks to use for 
logistics purposes such as transport rice from farms to its rice mill. As a company, 
the Um Sang can benefit from getting corporate contracts that mostly offers better 
deal than individual purchases. Members are also better able to hire such 
machines owned by the Um Sang. They could save up to $33 (1,000 Baht) in each 
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cropping season when compared to the typical machine hiring price. It is 
important to note that for certified organic farms, hiring random harvest machines 
can cause impurity in their farmlands due to stringent regulation in organic 
certification. Therefore, such a collective action offers double benefits for 
farmers’ finance and maintains the quality of organic farming.  
 
Third, warehousing and product distribution involve delivering products to 
clients in domestic and international markets. This is an area that highlights the 
strength of the Um Sang as it has commercial-scale infrastructure, which is rare 
among Thai farmers’ organisations due to the lack of finance, human resources 
and business capability. It has a commercial scale warehouse to store rice paddy 
purchased from farmers at the rice milling stage, as well as to store milled and 
packed rice. Products are required to be warehoused before being delivered to 
customers both in domestic and international markets. This was a threat of the 
Um Sang as it has a large amount of rice paddy at harvest season. As the Um 
Sang had insufficient warehousing and milling facilities, their members had no 
other options but to sell their organic rice to local rice millers at the market price. 
This can discourage farmers from continuing organic farming as the price 
difference between an organic rice paddy, and a typical rice paddy can be 
substantial, in the region of $66 - $166 (2,000 - 5,000 Baht) per ton.  In order to 
continue improving, the Um Sang would need more finance to expand its milling 
facilities. Although it has secured business loans, the Um Sang founder explained 
that the loan amount was still insufficient to invest on an optimal milling facility. 
Without further expansion, the members would have no other choice but to sell 
rice paddy to other millers where certified organic rice is not priced. 
 
 7.4 Conclusion 
 
Building a capable farmers’ organisation requires a wide range of capabilities. As 
a limited company, resources and skills are required to operate tasks such as 
business administration, accounting and licensing. The Um Sang case offers some 
important observations on how a farmers’ organisation as a business entity then 
contributes to improving farmers’ livelihoods. It shows that the model and 
behaviour of an organisation play a significant role in achieving resource 
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mobilisation and effective capital allocation and signifies how and in what ways 
the value chain and organisational model links to organisational behaviour. The 
importance of proper organisational models and behaviour is reflected in business 
performance and value chain upgrading. To this end, certified organic rice is a 
product that illustrates the Um Sang’s business plan, organisational behaviour 
and practices. It differentiates value-added activities from conventional rice 
production and accounts for different aspects ranging from farming to business 
development. At the same time, being a business entity helps to access markets 
and financial resources.  
 
For a government intervention programme aiming to support smallholder 
farmers, agricultural machinery and post-harvest facilities are interventions that 
can immediately boost farmers’ livelihood as they are most needed. In addition, 
having essential facilities in place could encourage farmers to develop their 
entrepreneurial abilities. Creating an effective organisation can be an agent in 
transforming farmers’ value creating activities. In agribusiness, practical methods 
for value creation can result in increased productivity, enhanced small producer 
market participation, and increased access to finance. Building human and social 
capital through implicit learning in an organisational setting should also be 
considered as a benefit of farmers’ collective organizing. Smallholder farmers 
may learn and develop new ways of thinking, skills and behaviour without 
realising it. The learning process is not limited to a formal setting. The key is 
effective communication through which essential skills can be transferred. 
Policies takes place at the macro-level, but debt is an individual problem and 
linked strongly to individual decision making and responses to factors affecting 
the decision making. Farmers’ self-organisation can help manage debt in farmers’ 
households. Moreover, farmers’ organisations are an engine to help process 
knowledge and practice as well as a way to apply such knowledge into their 
farming. Therefore, self-organisation can be more effective if it is communicated 
among farmers’ organisations. 
 
Findings from the Um Sang case suggest that partially merging farming 
operations with peers into a farmers’ organisation instead of running them 
individually can offer financial advantages and extend resources. This puts 
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forward an idea of multiple community enterprise as the new model of farmers’ 
organisation. Considering the conditions in which most farmers live, it is 
undeniable that building a thriving farmers’ organisation can be a difficult task. 
Instead of each collective group building their own farmers’ organisations, 
creating multiple community enterprises could be a model helping less able 
farmers groups to participate in markets. Many farmers have indicated that they 
could not switch to organic farming, despite realising its benefits, due to the lack 
of processing facilities. Having such facilities would help farmers to move 
























Chapter 8 Learning from experienced farmers’ organisations to 
improving organisation performance: the case of Sisaket 




This case study is incomplete due to the lack of data availability. The attempt to 
draw this case is to guide a possible benefit a facilitator-driven farmers’ 
organisation model can bring in this business environment. It can also help guide 
further study and planning of the Sisaket AMC.  
 
Approach 
Research methodology, in this case, was different from the other two case studies 
due to the lack of data. Desk-based analysis was used to review secondary data 
such as documents and news. For analysis, the shift has made from looking at the 
rice value chain to understand a farmers’ organisation into discussing lesson 
learned from other experienced farmers’ organisation to help improve an 
organisation performance. This approach makes this analysis particularly 
relevant to development practitioners such as farmers’ organisation 
administrators, managers, government officers and the like. It can offer some 




This case responds to the recent report by Thailand’s Corporation Promotion 
department (2018) that the Sisaket AMC has been running business loss. The 
report suggested that improving organisational structure and trade capacity would 
be needed. However, an explicit recommendation was not given. The case study 
offers an analysis to shed light on which direction would benefit the Sisaket 
AMC’s organisational adaptation. This case highlights that the AMC has a unique 
position with plausible leverage power supported by Thailand’s Bank for 
Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives. It has access to resources such as 
knowledge, market and finance. Although underutilised, such leveraging power 
has the potential to help facilitate and develop farmers’ livelihoods. 
 
Theoretical contribution 
A facilitator-driven farmers’ organisation model, mainly supported by 
government agencies, has an unprecedented leverage for empowering farmers. It 
can i) mobilise resources to tackle farmers’ problems such as post-harvest 
facilities and the barrier to entry into the market; and ii) facilitate two ways 
communications between farmers and government agencies.   It is noticeable that 
such a facilitator-driven model is a somewhat bureaucratic company, which is 
rigid and less effective than the business company (e.g., the BSCM). 
 
Practical contribution  
The AMC is a facilitator-driven farmers’ organisation implemented in Thailand 
to help farmers cope with farm products’ price fluctuation. Understanding its role 
and improve its organisational structure can potentially help improving farmers’ 
livelihood on a large scale. 
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8.1 Case profile: The Sisaket Agricultural Marketing Co-Operative Limited (AMC) 
 
The Sisaket Agricultural Marketing Co-Operative Limited (AMC) is one of the 
four provincial AMCs which produce Jasmine rice on the Thung Kula Rong-Hai 
plateau. The four provincial AMC are Surin, Buriram, Roi-Ed and Sisaket. The 
rice products are accredited for geographical indication (GI) grown on the Thung 
Kula Rong-Hai plateau. The rice paddy feeds to the AMC rice production trade 
under the A-rice trade name, shown in photos 8.1 and 8.2. The A-rice brand is 
sold by the Thai Agri-Business Company Limited (TABCO). The TABCO is a 
joint venture partnership between the BAAC and Thailand’s Cooperative 
Promotion Department (CPD). 
.  
Photo 8. 1 5kg packed 100% jasmine rice of A-rice brand 
Source: Thailand Post-mart (2019)  
 
 
Photo 8. 2 Workers managed packed rice at the milling facility 
Source: Rakbankerd, 2013 
 
The Sisaket AMC was established in 1991. However, the rice milling service 
began in 2008. It has members totalling around 220,000 farmers who are the 
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BAAC customers residing in districts of Sisaket province. The Sisaket AMC 
business services that are relevant to rice include i) selling farm input supplies to 
members; ii) aggregating and processing rice paddy to produce A-rice brand 
products; iii) provision of a service of agricultural machinery procurement. Rice 
milling is situated in Rasri Salai district, while the main office is located in Meung 
district (Meung means City Centre). Rice milling has a commercial-grade 
processing facility with a production capacity of 40-ton paddy per day. Storage 
capacity for rice paddy is 500 ton (Rakbankerd, 2013). The Sisaket AMC uses a 
price guarantee policy, which would add about USD 7 (200 Baht) to the market 
price. Members can earn a 1% dividend, which is paid from Sisaket AMC profit. 
According to the Sisaket AMC, all Sisaket-registered farmers can sell at the AMC 
without being directly registered with the AMC. However, the Sisaket AMC has 
reported a financial loss. Thailand’s Cooperative Promotion Department has 
classified the Sisaket AMC and the other 27 provincial AMC in a category that 
runs a loss but has the potential to develop (Thailand’s Cooperative Promotion 
Department, 2017). 
 
8.2 Data collection   
 
The purpose of data collection was to harvest relevant data and information to 
answer the research question. Stakeholder interviews and documents were the 
critical empirical evidence collected for this thesis. However, the AMC case was 
the only case that I could not interview with persons working for an organisation 
despite several attempts to arrange appointments, as discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
A farmers’ organisation was taken as an entry point and the nexus of data 
collection. Due to the inability of retrieving primary data and information from 
the management of AMC, I used desk-based analysis using secondary data. The 
shift was made from looking at the rice value chain to understanding a farmers’ 
organisation and discussing the organisation model and its leveraging power. 
With this shift, the use of secondary data can maintain research validity. Some 
stakeholder interviews were conducted to use across cases, for example, the 
branch manager of Sisaket’s BAAC and the director of the ministry of commerce, 
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Sisaket provincial office, as listed in table 8.1. Documents were mainly retrieved 
from news archives and the BAAC. 
 
 
Table 8.1 List of stakeholders relevant to Sisaket AMC case study  
Affiliation  Number of 
informants 
Stakeholders involve with Sisaket AMC  40 
The Sisaket’s Agricultural Cooperatives for Marketing 
- Leadership team 
0 
The Sisaket’s Agricultural Cooperatives for Marketing 
- Farmers 
10 
Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives – 
Sisaket provincial branch 
2 
Agricultural Cooperatives - Sisaket 1 
Ministry of Commerce Sisaket provincial office 1 
A local miller in Sisaket province 2 
Local agricultural suppliers  3 
Rice paddy middlemen  4 
Farm Women Group Association 4 
Sole traders in morning market  12 
Ubon Ratchathani Rice Research Center 1 
Relevant stakeholders involve in selected rice value 
chains 
24 
Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives – 
Headquarter  
4 
Department of Rice, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives  
1 
Kasertsart university 3 
Thai Rice Exporters Association  3 
The Land Bank Administration Institute (Public 
Organization)  
1 
Department of Land Development, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives 
2 
Siam Kubota Corporation Co., Ltd. 1 
Shipping broker companies – rice exporting logistics  2 
Agricultural machineries  2 






The relationship between rice farmers and the Sisaket AMC as a farmers’ 
organisation is different from the other two cases previously discussed. In this 
case, membership eligibility is based on being the BAAC clients. As a result, over 
220,000 Sisaket farmers are automatically considered the Sisaket AMC members. 
However, the AMC has a rice milling capacity of 80 tons per day. The 
organisation’s milling capacity can service only a small volume of paddy rice. 
Also, the AMC serves as an input supplier to farmers, the same role as district 
co-operative organisations. It may distract the AMC focus and divert resources 
from the marketing mission, causing profit loss as reported.  
 
According to an interview with local farmers who sold their paddy rice to the 
Sisaket AMC (Case3_02, Case3_03, Case3_04, Case3_05), they expressed the 
following: roles of Sisaket AMC has been helping to earn higher paddy price, but 
less helpful as an input supplier. Because it easily accessed their local cooperative 
and input supply shops.  
“The [Sisaket] AMC is not a shop, and I had to call before to make sure someone 
is there” (Case3_02).  
 
There was no significant change in the rice paddy production process. The 
difference can be observed as the Sisaket AMC offered paddy rice aggregation 
service as an alternative to local rice millers. According to interviews with the 
Sisaket AMC members, the farmers indicated that the price advantage offered by 
the Sisaket AMC was somewhat insignificant compared to the market price. Input 
supplies sold by the Sisaket AMC offered no price advantage as compare to local 
suppliers. Besides, farmers indicated that they felt unwelcome, with the 
conversation style such as “don’t you know how much work I have” (Case3_03). 
In this case, it can contribute to customers’ decision not to buy the products. This 
discovery is something the AMC may want to review, considering that they faced 
accumulated loss of profit. This coincides with what Thailand’s Corporation 
Promotion department (2018) has identified as internal structural transformation, 





8.3 Lesson learned from other farmers’ organisations to advance the Sisaket 
AMC 
 
It is widely accepted that farmers’ organisations have roles in improving 
smallholder farmers’ income and productivity (Bizikova et al., 2020). In other 
words, a farmers’ organisation business performance reflects how well it is 
capable of helping farmers’ livelihood improvement. Making a profit is a good 
indicator signalling that the business is going in the right direction. By contrast, 
a farmers’ organisation that runs a business loss is less likely to help develop 
farmers’ income and productivity. It is the essence of this case analysis.  
 
The Sisaket AMC has been repeatedly reported to be running a business loss over 
the years (Thailand’s Corporation Promotion department, 2018). There have been 
several attempts by responsible organisations to turn around such business 
performance. For example, the Sisaket’s Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperatives and the Sisaket’s Cooperative Auditing Office organised joint 
meetings to address and tackle the Sisaket AMC’s long term business loss 
(Sisaket Provincial Cooperative Office, 2020). Although detailed of the 
discussions were not disclosed.  
 
The consequences of business loss prevent the AMC from achieving its mission 
to help farmers benefit from the paddy rice market. For example, farmers were 
turned down at the selling point as the Sisaket AMC did not have sufficient 
capacity of the post-harvest facility to buy a large volume of incoming paddy rice 
during harvest season. Being turned down at the point of sale can negatively 
affect farmers in many ways, as described by respondents Case3_03 and 
Case3_04. The transportation cost added up due to more trips. A farmer is likely 
to be offered a lower price than the market price at the second point of sale, which 
can be considered as a “desperation or distress sale” (Case3_04). The Case3_04 
respondent explained that when a miller turned down paddy rice at point of sale, 
the middlemen would know it. Such information communicates among 
intermediaries who worked for millers. With such well-connected networks, 
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farmers are bound to lose due to the lack of negotiation power and post-harvest 
facility.   
 
Such a situation is not unique to solely Sisaket AMC. During harvest season, most 
millers face challenges in managing paddy rice in different ways. The problems 
often involve post-harvest and cash reserve management. Problems linked to 
post-harvest management involve farmers lack of dryer and storage facilities. 
Thus, they need to sell paddy straight from farm to mill, regardless of price 
fluctuation. Cash reserve management is a challenge faced by millers as they need 
to pay in full at the sale point. All these problems contribute to market price 
fluctuation.  
 
This following plan and recommendation is specifically for the Sisaket AMC, 
which draw from lesson learned from the other two case studies. The objective is 
to guide the direction for possible development from its current stage. Other 
similar farmers-related organisations establishment can take this exercise as a 
guide to suit their development purposes.  The AMC has potential to play a 
significant role in enhancing farmers’ livelihood by achieving more evenly and 
wider distributional outcomes. This recommendation is specific to the Sisaket 
AMC and could offer some lesson learned for other AMC branches. Such system 
thinking can offer a pattern leading to a more successful planning and execution. 
It is important to take note that data is insufficient. The figure and calculation are 
for example purpose, actual data is required for explicit planning.  
 
Problem 1: Insufficient size of milling facilities as compare to the beneficiary 
population. These include 80 tons/day milling production capacity; 500 tons rice 
paddy storage; and 1,500 square metres of sun-dried area 
Problem 2: Using a commercial intermediary for business activities such as 
marketing 
Problem 3: Overlapping business activities with districts co-operative 
organisations 




Problem 1: Insufficient size of milling facilities as compare to the size of the 
Sisaket AMC’s farmers. These include 80 tons/day milling production capacity; 
500 tons rice paddy storage; and 1,500 square metres of sun-dried area. 
 
This suggestion uses some lesson learned from the Um Sang and the BSCM. 
Building on lessons learned from the previous cases, it is evident that the farmers 
and the Sisaket AMC could work in partnership to construct a post-harvest 
facility. The investment capital could be allocated through the Sisaket AMC 
leveraging power. To offer a valid response, this part will discuss with reference 
to the paddy rice production and value-added management planned for the Roi-
Et provincial co-operative (Watjanawatra, 2014). Rio-Et province is one of the 
four provinces that organised AMCs to focus on jasmine rice production from the 
Tung-Kula-Rong-Hai plateau.     
 
I used the Roi-Et provincial co-operative as a guide to planning for paddy rice 
production and value-added management, as shown in figure 8.1. The following 
discussion will highlight a possible planning of how the Sisaket AMC could 
leverage resources and serve as a key actor to negotiate for post-harvest facility 
construction. With careful planning, some data from figure 8.1 can help the 
Sisaket AMC construct a planning to improve farmers’ livelihoods. The AMC 
can serve as a negotiator or a policy planner who can coordinate with the 
government and farmers.  
 
The calculation can be more complicated than presented here, but the analytical 
foundation remains the same to improve farmers livelihood. It is a puzzle - why 
does the government implement a costly subsidy programme that does not ease 
foreseeable and seasonal problems? Poapongsakorn (2019) offers a response in 
an “Overview of rice policy 2000-2018 in Thailand: A political economy 
analysis”, as follows. 
 
“The interesting questions are why do all governments have to provide the 
costly subsidy and what are the consequences on the future of Thai agriculture 
and government debt? There are at least three reasons for the popularity and 
prevalence of agricultural subsidy policy, i.e. farmers being the largest group 
of voters, the ease and availability of subsidy financing, and the failure of 
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professionals and government agencies to respond to the farmers’ needs and 
problems.” 
Poapongsakorn, 2019:p. 12 
 
The effectiveness of policy formation and implementation is a complicated 
matter. It can offer an alternative way to make the most agricultural subsidy by 
maximising season cash support into a long-term facility. Such a planning 
discussed here can be an example of how professional and government agencies 





Figure 8. 1 Paddy rice production and value-added planning, managed by co-
operative group of Roi-Et province 
Source: Watjananawatra, 2018 (in Thai) 
 
Note for figure 8.1: Aggregation target of the 400,000 tons paddy rice  
 
i) Loan for rice paddy aggregation and delay selling 400,000 tons of paddy was budget for 186.66 
million (about USD 466/ton). However, the majority of paddy rice of 370,000 tons use the 
traditional sun-dried method. At the same time, about 30,000 tons of paddy goes to dryers at 
capacity. Intermediaries (e.g., middlemen) play an essential role in helping to aggregate paddy. 
ii) An average farm size of a rice farmer household in Sisaket province is 3 hectares (National 
Statistic Office – Sisaket provincial branch, 2017). An average paddy rice yield is 2.5 ton per 
hectare (Office of Agricultural Economics – Sisaket provincial branch, 2016). With provided 
statistic, it would take about 53,333 rice farmers households to produce 400,000 tons of paddy 
rice.  
iii) Regarding the 2017/18 delay selling paddy rice subsidy, the government offered a maximum of USD 
330 per rice farmers’ household. The total budget is approximately USD 17.6 million per cropping year.  
The pitfall, as mentioned earlier, that farmers and their farmers’ organisation did not fully benefit from 
such policy due to the lack of storage to delay selling.  
iv) Concerning figure 8.1, it suggests that such a budget can be used more sustainably by building a post-
harvest facility, instead of giving in the form of cash transfer to individual farmers.    
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v) Once post-harvest facilities are put in place, it can smooth the other value chain stages. For example, co-
operatives can trade paddy rice with other trade partners only if they have a paddy stockpile (figure 8.1). 
Results of such value activity can offer 20% additional and dividend to farmers who are shareholders. 
Such negotiation requires a negotiator who is in a position to do so. It shows the uniqueness of Sisaket 
AMC for being a facilitator-driven farmers’ organisation model. It can help to leverage and mobilising 
resources. It is incredibly impactful because leveraging power is a step toward value chain upgrading. 
For example, the farmers’ organisations will trade paddy rice with millers and rice traders. It can result 
in better incomes in the form of higher profits and dividends. 
 
Also, the expansion of milling facility may encourage farmers to move forward 
to organic farming. One of the reasons that discourage farmers from switching to 
organic farming is the milling facility. Price advantage is the key mechanism to 
encourage farmers to switch to organic farming. As evidence shown in the Um 
Sang case that, a large number of farmers would like to join the Um Sang 
enterprise. However, the Um Sang has reached its current capacity to accept more 
members. Therefore, milling expansion would encourage farmers to switch to 
organic farming. This will give direct benefit to farmers by reducing the 
production cost, improving farmland ecosystem and earning a higher return. 
 
Problem 2: Using a commercial intermediary for business activities including 
marketing 
 
Using intermediary means more transaction cost. The current law and regulation 
restrict the AMC’s ability to trade (Cooperative Promotion Department, 2018). 
As a result, it set up the TABCO as a commercial intermediary. Having control 
over their own business can allow the Sisaket AMC to become more focus and 
pay more attention to detail. For example, the CPD (2018) indicated that 34.2% 
of inventory have found to be unidentified loss and oversupply of products. This 
highlights the need for regulation change to give more power to the provincial 
AMC. Otherwise, a commercial intermediary should be established for the 
Sisaket AMC business activities. The commercial intermediary needs to be 
decentralised. It is likely to compromise business performance if all AMC 







Benefits from expected outcomes 
 
 
2a. Change of regulation that 
limit commercial activities of the 
AMC  
 
2b. If regulation cannot be 
changed in the near term, the 
Sisaket AMC should be endorsed 
to register a sister company to 




2a. In the current law and regulation 
that limit the AMC to trade, the 
Sisaket AMC may register a business 
entity as a spin-out company to lead 
the role in trading for the Sisaket 
AMC. 
 
2b. The Sisaket AMC would be able 
to trade locally and internationally. 
This has direct impact on how to 
plan for accounting and budgeting. 
Opportunity to trade locally include 
aggregating rice paddy from farmers, 
selling dried paddy to millers and 
trading rice milled to wholesalers and 
retailers both domestic and 





Further explanation of proposed solutions: 
• The structural transformation of government agencies is not entirely new. 
The Thai government has implemented such an attempt by establishing 
the types of hybrid organisations to increase efficiency. For example, the 
public organisation has been introduced by many ministries such as the 
Science and Justice. The higher pay scale successfully attracts competent 
candidates to work for such organisations.   
• The role of the AMC is beyond trading. Its success would signal the 
business environment for the strengthening of collective farmers. This is 
vital to balance out farmers negotiation power in the markets in the given 
business environment. 
• Having a sister company to operate just for the Sisaket AMC would allow 
creativity and practice plans for marketing. For example, the Sisaket 
AMC may expand the product line to sell dried paddy to local millers. It 
may also consider seeking endorsement from the government to have rice 
products include in tax return category. This suggestion has arisen after 
the government implement an economic stimulus package by allowing 
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tax return for shopping bill at a maximum amount of $1,000 (30,000 Baht) 
(Ministry of Finance, 2019). 
 
Problem 3: Overlapping business activities between the Sisaket AMC and 
districts co-operative organisations 
 
The Sisaket AMC, like the other AMC in general, offers a wide range of services 
including farm supply business to farmers. It means the AMC would need to 
allocate its focus on many businesses activates providing that it already has a 
limitation on workforce competency. In practice, farmers have a more direct 
association with its registered district co-operatives. It would be likely to be more 
effective if business transaction arranges between district co-operatives and 
provincial AMC at an organisation level. For example, the district co-operatives 
may arrange with rice farmers who willing to sell rice paddy to the Sisaket AMC 
as a group arrangement. This approach would offer a more systematic 




Benefits from expected outcomes 
 
3a. Focus on marketing role through 
arrangement as discussed in problem 2 
 
3b. If other tasks required, it is more 
efficient to arrange at organisational 
level – meaning between the Sisaket 
AMC and district co-operatives, instead 
of individual farmers 
 
3c. Emphasis on creating new market 
channels to distribute products 
 
 
3a. This approach would allow the 
Sisaket AMC to focus on marketing 
role. Expected outcome can include 
helping farmers to earn profit from rice 
paddy trade regardless of government 
price intervention.  
 
3b. This should result in improving the 
AMC organisational efficiency. As CPD 
(2018) identified some problems 
concern unidentified loss and 
oversupply (34.2%) and products 
expired or damage (26.3%). The 
internal business adjustment would 
likely improve these current issues  
 
3c. It would help the Sisaket AMC to 
minimise risk of running lost. New 
market opportunity can help to 





Dried rice paddy can offer a potential market channel, for the Sisaket AMC to 
trade with local rice millers. At some point during the off-season, rice paddy can 
become scarce, causing price volatility. In practice, most millers would try to 
stock rice paddy as much as their capital and storage capacity allow. If that was 
true, how might dried paddy create market opportunity?   
 
Many millers experienced hardship to secure sufficient funds from banks to buy 
rice paddy. It caused cash-flow problems during a short but critical time of 
harvest season (around the end of October to mid-November). The Thai rice 
industry has changed immensely after the rice-pledge scheme (implemented 
between 2011-2015). Consequences of the rice-pledge scheme can include strict 
bank regulations on loans for small to medium-sized rice millers. Many millers 
indicated that they could not find sufficient fund to buy rice paddy, the same way 
it used to be in their parent generation. On the one hand, the Sisaket AMC can 
take advantage by trading dried paddy to millers, providing they have storage 
space to stock dried rice and access to the BAAC. On the other hand, this 
approach can benefit small to medium-sized millers because the stages between 
buying wet rice up and process dried rice may not be straight forward. There are 
many factors involve complicating the process such as quality of rice paddy, 
logistics and supply chain management and market manipulation between traders. 
Buying dried rice would minimise risks as mentioned. Besides, it would require 
less storage space and a smaller size of capital. 
 








4a. The Sisaket AMC can become a 
successful entrepreneurial company  by 
investing in professional workforce. This 
includes hiring, on-the-job training 




4a. All the above requires professional 
workforce to handle different tasks 
effectively, but coordinate as one 
organisation. The outcome can be 




Human resource management is central to changing from bureaucratic company 
to entrepreneurial management. It is the mindset that moves an organisation into 
the direction where its behaviours lead. Evidence from the Um Sang case shows 
how resource heterogeneity enables the organisation to create values. Some 
lesson learnt from the Um Sang, and the BSCM can offer practical examples to 
the Sisaket BSCM. These examples can include investing in skilful employees 
and leadership team and regular on-the-job training. These workforces are 
powerful drivers enabling the enterprise to modernise and trade profitably. 
 
Conclusion 
This case shows that an organisational model is a crucial factor of value creation 
for an organisation. Although the Sisaket AMC has been running a business loss, 
its unique organisational model shows great potential to improve farmers’ 
livelihoods. Value perspective could span further from profit generation and 
product development in the value chain. The leveraging power is a unique ability 
a farmers’ organisation can use to achieve livelihood improvement. As a farmers’ 
representative, the abilities to coordinate and negotiate can enable change-making 
















Chapter 9 Discussions and Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter discusses the findings across three case studies of farmers’ 
organisations in Thailand and consolidates the contributions of the study. The 
primary focus is to draw together findings on how capable farmers organisations 
have improved farmers’ livelihoods through capability development, resource 
accessibility and post-harvest infrastructure development. The chapter starts by 
discussing a farmers’ organisation as a mechanism for resource mobilisation. 
Followed by the cross-case analysis, the key findings are summarised and 
discussed across the three cases of organisational development. Then, I turn to 
the developmental patterns that have led to profitability and sustainability among 
smallholder rice farmers. The discussion of the patterns involves the precursor 
factors that lay the foundation for the determinants of organisational 
development.  These precursor factors are commitment and trust; organisational 
models and behaviours; shared value; and capacity development and resource 
mobilisation. Consequently, the process and outcomes of a capable farmers’ 
organisation influenced by such precursors are organisational routines; 
repositioning farmers in the value chain; reconfiguration of value chain finance 
and value chain upgrading. Such pattern offers a guide for policy formulation and 
implementation such as replication and scaling up purposes, which contributes 
towards filling that gap in the institutional change literature. 
 
9.1 A capable farmers’ organisation as a mechanism for resource mobilisation 
 
This study has analysed how the development of farmers’ organisations improves 
farmers’ livelihoods by using three organisation models in Sisaket province of 
Thailand as empirical evidence. The livelihood improvement materialised when 
a farmers’ organisation successfully became a nexus for capability development, 
resource accessibility and post-harvest infrastructure development. Such an 
organisation accumulates resources and capital from its profits and by gaining 
access to resources through one of an arrangement of organisational models, 
leading to rice value chain development. Although the development may occur 
gradually and with subtlety, such a process can be observed (or explained) from 
the perspective of organisational models and organisational behaviours.  
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The three cases of farmers’ organisations were purposefully selected to represent 
different types of farmers’ organisational models. There are the producer-driven 
(the Um Sang), buyer-driven (BSCM) and facilitator-driven (the Sisaket AMC) 
model. They are all situated in the same province which largely controls for 
factors such as government intervention, financial regulation and geography. 
These factors shape the business environment shared by all three studied farmers’ 
organisations. The findings reveal that organisational models have direct 
influence on organisational routines and business performance, in ways that can 
lead to improved livelihoods through higher returns on investment and better 
access to farming resources. In addition, farmers’ organisational models are 
found to be a catalyst towards change processes in the rice market system. This 
change has direct benefit to farmers by being included in the change process; the 
study shows that such change processes occur due to farmers being repositioned 
in the value chain. The change of roles played by the farmers in the value chain 
happen as a capable farmers’ organisation gains negotiation power, which results 
in farmers gaining access to resources and other factors that improve their 
business performance. This finding is important since some scholars, such as 
Mahoney and Thelen (2010), have raised concerns that despite the fact that 
institutional analysis has received significant attention in the literature, there is 
still a lack of guidance and sensemaking on the actual institutional change 
process. This study contributes toward filling that gap in the literature.  
 
To this end, the current analysis uses value chain approach to represent and 
capture phenomena that occur during to the change process. The approach takes 
the business environment as a system boundary illuminating an abstract idea of 
the market institution through something more concrete and more observable and 
in this way the power of negotiation can be recognised as being a part of the 
change process. Where farmers used to be excluded from the market institutions, 
the process of repositioning them in value chain and reconfiguring finance can be 
a pragmatic approach to agricultural development policy. Such new knowledge 
is particularly significant when discussing livelihood improvement and poverty 
reduction strategies. Considering from a value chain development standpoint, 
farmers could be better off from policy interventions that aim at repositioning 
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farmers in value chains, instead of focusing on value-added or value chain 
upgrading of the production process alone. Here, the practical meaning of 
repositioning value chain can include having resources or access to resources – 
empowerment - in ways that improve farmers’ livelihoods. Repositioning in this 
meaning concerns being less vulnerable, having more economic opportunities 
and wider access to resources, and can result in a more extensive asset 
accumulation as shown in Figure 9.1. Tangible examples will be further discussed 
in the cross-case discussion in Table 9.1. 
 
To illustrate the approach adopted in this study, it is useful to revisit the DFID’s 
Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets (2001) and Poole’s Livelihoods assets 
hexagon framework for agricultural development (2017) that can offer an 
operative image of practical way to translate theory into practice. Figure 9.1 
shows an adapted livelihoods assets hexagon framework for agricultural 
development with an insertion of a capable farmers’ organisations as farmers’ 
livelihood assets. As business activities, capacity building and networking 
activities are performed in such an organisation, it helps to generate capitals that 
spill over to creating multiple benefits. This is a process of which a capable 
farmers’ organisation accumulates its entropy by having heterogeneous 
resources. It represents a path for vulnerable actors to become resilient and 
independent. 
 
Figure 9. 1 Livelihoods assets hexagon framework for agricultural development 
Source: Adapted from Poole, 2017 
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It is noticeable that improving and expanding value-creating activities can play a 
role as a turning point towards better livelihoods for farmers. The findings 
highlight that the turning point of improving livelihoods has often been 
underpinned by more effective use of factors of production and resource-based 
organisational arrangements. For example, land value has been enhanced by 
attaining organic certification. This activity has allowed farmers’ organisations 
to achieve breakeven and eventually earn rent. Besides, the empirical evidence 
suggests a strong relationship between farmers’ organisations and their members 
as they influence each other on behaviours and attitudes. Looking from a farmers’ 
livelihood perspective, rice value chain development can offer more than 
additional profits in financial terms. Instead, it can offer an integrated perspective 
into societal, ecological, health and human development. 
 
9.2 Cross-case analysis 
 
This section discusses selected key findings across the three case studies as 
summarised in Table 9.1. Empirical findings of the three cases highlight a 
significant misperception between building an organisation versus implementing 
a business model, which might have led to misleading interventions. Teece 
(2010:172) defines a business model as a tool which “… describes the design or 
architecture of the value creation, delivery, and capture mechanisms [a firm] 
employs. The essence of a business model is in defining how the enterprise 
delivers value to customers, entices customers to pay for value, and converts 
those payments to profit.” (Teece, 2010: 172). The definition points to some 
critical aspect of how the business is executed, which can then result in profit 
generation. The case studies were purposefully selected as exemplary cases from 
this perspective. In particular, they portray the importance of building farmers’ 
organisation as a capable organisation, not just a straightforward implementation 
of a business model. A capable organisation that serves as farmers’ livelihood 
assets towards capacity development, capital accessibility and infrastructure 
development, as shown in figure 9.1. 
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From this viewpoint, a collective group of farmers or policy planners needs to 
decide whether to create a capable farmers’ organisation and, if so, what new 
products to create. If the aim is to earn higher profit through value addition, then 
creating a new product can be a good start. Because farmers would not need to 
deal with the whole variety of business activities and would not need to invest in 
post-harvest infrastructure such as dryer, milling and storage facilities, a farmer’s 
organisation can open new opportunities for this. It would allow farmers to begin 
with lower business risk and start-up costs. Choices can include renting a 
processing facility from rice millers. Another plausible option is to partner with 
another well-established farmers’ organisations. This approach may suggest an 
idea of multiple organisations – i.e., a group of farmers may form a joint venture 
business activity with an experienced and successful farmers’ organisation.  
 
With regards to investment in post-harvest infrastructure, a government might be 
in a position to act more cost effectively than individual farmers’ organisations 
due to the capacity to facilitate financial investment and human resources. This 
is an area where farmers would significantly benefit from government 
intervention. If the choice was to consider long term action that builds farmers 
resilience, building farmers’ collective action into a business enterprise is 
appealing, because it would help to expand resources, assets and capabilities. 
However, creating farmers’ organisations may not be suitable for all groups of 
farmers. Thus, a discussion on whether to build an organisation or implement a 
business model is a helpful preliminary check for groups of farmers considering 
forming an organisation. 
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Table 9. 1 Key findings for the cross-case analysis 
Case/key analytical 
factors 
1: The BSCM 2: The Um Sang 3: The Sisaket ACM 
 








Operational format A shared value partnership between 
farmers and a miller 
 
The initiative is managed by the BSCM, 
while farmers are not part of the 
management.   
 
A self-organised farmer’s enterprise 
upgraded from an informal farmers’ 
organisation to a registered business 
entity  
 
The organisation is managed by the Um 
Sang members.   
 
A provincial agricultural co-operative 
organisation with a focus on marketing 
 
 
The organisation is managed by the 
Sisaket ACM leadership team. Being a 
farmer or member is not prerequisite.  
 
Product to sell by farmers 
to a miller 
Purified jasmine paddy rice 
 
 
Certified organic jasmine paddy rice 
 
Jasmine paddy rice 
  
Product that is sold to 
consumers 
Packaged rice under Golden Phoenix 
brand 
 
Note: Farmers do not share profit/loss 
from retail or consumer sales 
 
Packaged rice under Uncle Boonmee 
trademark 
 
Note: Farmers share profit/loss from 
packaged rice sales 
Dried rice paddy and packaged rice  
 
Besides rice products, the Sisaket ACM 
also markets other products such as 
cashew nut 
Activities that create 
value 
Purified rice seed, dibbling technique, 
mechanised agriculture, processed and 
packaged rice, advanced supplies with 
interest-free and organised trainings 
 
Organic certification, dibbling 
technique, mechanised agriculture, 
processed and packaged rice, pay 
dividend and organised trainings  
Price intervention, dry rice paddy, 
processed and packaged rice 








- Uncle Boonmee brand is traded in a 
niche market 
Moderate 
- Rice brand that is new to markets 
Resource mobilisation 
and capital allocation to 
Resource leveraging 
 
Resource leveraging  
 
Not applicable, but has potential due to 




Source agricultural machinery, lend the 
BSCM company infrastructure and 
human resources to help meet the needs 
of participating farmers  
Source agricultural machinery, 
collaborate with research institutions 
such as a university and a rice institute, 
partner with manufacturers such as soya 
sauce company to create market for dry 
season crops (e.g., soybean) for 
members 
 
Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperatives 
Livelihood improvement  
includes increased return 
of farm investment and 
reduced level of 





Many improvements associated with 
farmers’ livelihood have been achieved 
e.g., better farm-gate price, skills 
development, better negotiation power 
and more income channels 
 
Farmers can earn better market prices 
from quality of rice paddy without 
government’s price intervention policy  
Highly likely 
 
Many improvements associated with 
farmers’ livelihood have been achieved 
e.g., better farm-gate prices, earn 
dividends from organisational profits, 
skills development, better negotiation 
power, and more income channels 
 
 Farmers can earn decent market prices 
from quality of paddy rice without 
government’s price intervention policy 
 
Not applicable, due to insufficient data 
to analyse business activities 
Farmers’ involvement as 
a part of rice value chains 
Mainly paddy rice production stage but 
receive substantial incentives and 
support as a part of dibbling initiative 
Mainly paddy rice production stage but 





Upgrading in the value 
chain 
Achieved product, process and channel 
value chain upgrading 
 
Work in partnership between farmers 
and millers. Quality and ethical process 
as shared value partnership between 
farmers and corporation   
 
Achieved product, process and channel 
value chain upgrading 
 
From conventional farmers’ organisation 
to a registered limited company as a 
certified organic enterprise 
Not applicable, but has potential to 
achieve process, product, functional and 
channel upgrading due to organisational 
support by the Bank for Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives 
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Accessibility to resources  Good access that is made possible by the 
BSCM funding for the initiative and 
company networking 
Good access that is made possible by the 




Relationship between rice 
farming stage and rice 




For example: trainings where the BSCM 
can communicate their product quality 
expectation, and farmers can request 
some support to meet the standards 
Well connected 
 
For example: trainings and farmers 
meetings where the Um Sang can 
communicate their product quality 
expectations. Farmers can use their 




Number of members  
(as of 2018) 
Approximately 400 farmers Approximately 1,200 farmers Approximately 220,000 farmers 
 
Note: All registered BAAC’s customers 





Note: Um Sang and 
Sisaket AMC record 
processing capacity per 
day 
250,000 tons paddy per year 
 
 
6 tons paddy per day  
(before the new phrase of milling facility 
opens in 2019) 
 
 
80 tons paddy per day 
 
 
Yield (tons rice 
paddy/hectare) 
Approximately 2.4–2.8 tons 
paddy/hectare (0.38–0.45 tons paddy per 
rai)  
Approximately 2.5–3.4 tons 
paddy/hectare  
(0.4–0.55 tons paddy per rai) 
Approximately 1.87–2.8 tons 




price (per ton rice paddy) 
Production cost: 166–200 $/ton paddy 
(5,000–6,000 Bh) 
 
Farm-gate price: 350–590 $/ton paddy 
(10,500–17,500 Bh) 
Production cost: 133–183 $/ton paddy 
(4,000–5,500 Bh) 
 
Farm-gate price: 500–633 $/ton paddy 
(15,000–19,000 Bh) 
Production cost: 200 – 366 $/ton paddy 
(6,000–11,000 Bh) 
 




Price premium  
 
Price premium (%) = 
[Brand x price ($) - 
Benchmark price ($)] / 
Benchmark price ($) 
 
Using $1.3/kg (40 bh) 

















 Tung-Kula-Ronghai geography 
  
Purified Khaw Dok Mali 105 seed 
Tung-Kula-Ronghai geography   
 
Certified organic rice 
Tung-Kula-Ronghai geography   
 
Transaction costs Lower transaction costs as farmers trade 
paddy directly with the miller without an 
intermediary 
 
Low transaction costs for the use of 
financial product and services due to 
interest-free finance 
Lower transaction costs as farmers trade 




Not applicable, due to insufficient data 
to analyse business activities 
Sources of finance Privately funded by the BSCM  Business loans and organisation profits 
 
 
Business loans from the BAAC 
Financial instruments, 
products and services 
For the organisation: 
The BSCM has options of business loans 
with commercial banks. There is no 
financial benefit from organising the 
dibbling initiative. The BSCM funded 
initiative activities from its own 
resources. 
 
For individual farmers: 
Input supplier credit: An interest-free 
loan option for participating farmers 
For the organisation: 
 
The Um Sang takes business loans from 
the BAAC 
 
For individual farmers: 
Dividends and savings: Farmers will 
receive dividends from the Um Sang’s 
profit. Members have an option to keep 
in saving.  
Farm loan: The BAAC is a typical 
microfinance institution that most Thai 
For the organisation: 
 
The Sisaket AMC receives business 
loans from the BAAC 
 
For individual farmers: 
Farm loan: The BAAC is a typical 
microfinance institution that most Thai 
farmers are eligible to ask for a 
microcredit. 
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who may wish to pay back after 
harvesting.  
Farm loan: The BAAC is a typical 
microfinance institution that most Thai 
farmers are eligible to ask for a 
microcredit. 
Farm insurance: Most farmers are 
eligible for government’s farm 
insurance. 
 
farmers are eligible to ask for a 
microcredit. 
Farm insurance: Most farmers are 
eligible for government’s farm 
insurance. 
Farm insurance: Most farmers are 
eligible for government’s farm 
insurance. 
Organisational models 
contribute to farmers’ 
livelihood improvement 
Buyer-driven model putting emphasis on 
improving quality standard by building 
farmers’ farming skills and increasing 
resource accessibility to farmers 
 
Results in human capital development, 
resilience to vulnerability factors, and 
improved income and livelihood for 
farmers 
Producer-driven model putting emphasis 
on developing farmers’ skills (e.g., 
farming and finance). Business 
performance supports better livelihood 
for farmers including high farm-gate 
price, high dividends, dry season crops 
and organic certification.  
 
Results in human and social capital 
development, resilience to vulnerability 
factors, and improved income and 
savings 
 
Not applicable as discussed in Chapter 
8. 
 
However, the scenario-based planning 
suggests that the proposed milling 
facility could achieve a better business 
performance that can potentially 
contribute to higher sale price than 
market in a less price fluctuation trend. 
Organisational routines – 
the impacts of resources 
and capabilities on 
organisational 
coordination  
Transition stage  
 
- Routine activities take place mostly 
between the BSCM and the members but 
less among members themselves  
- Cultural capability contributes to social 
and human capital development – 
moderate, but progressing positively 
once farmers see benefits they can earn  
Advanced 
  
- The Um Sang motivates and have 
frequent interactions among members 
leading to smooth-functioning routines  
- Cultural capability (beliefs and 
perceptions - high quality standards, 
responding to challenges) contribute to 
social and human capital development  
Unclear 
 
- The ACM only concerns market 
intervention. It does not include farming 
skills development in rice paddy 
production phase. 
- Cultural capability not applicable 
because of limited involvement of 
farmers in the value chain activities 
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Organisational routines – 
heterogeneous resource 
advantage   
Although partnership can be considered 
a new initiative, the BSCM has a large 
pool of experienced human resource 
with various skills to promote the 
development of the group of farmers and 
a wide network for extend support  
Progressive 
- In terms of enterprise as business 
identity, still growing and learning but 
making progressive market 
developments  
- Human resources – management team 
is competitive as compared to typical 
farmers’ enterprises that are mostly self-
organised by farmers   
Limited  
Organisational routines – 
the relationship between 
learning efficiency and 
the presence of leadership 
Progressive   
 
- The management team of the dibbling 
partnership routinely report to top 
management of the company (the 
chairman) – involved in the 




- The management team involved in the 




- The ACM is a policy-based 
intervention. Each provincial ACM has 
to report to higher management team. 
Based observations and available 
documentation, the initiative involves 
mostly top-down commands from the 




Product differentiation - Jasmine rice grown on the 
Geographical Indication of the Tungkula 
plateau  
- Purified Khaw Dok Mali 105 to 
produce jasmine rice by farmers of the 
dibbling initiative 
- Intangible assets such as 
branding and reputation   
 
 - Jasmine rice grown on the 
Geographical Indication of the Tungkula 
plateau  
- Certified organic rice  
- Intangible assets such as branding and 
reputation 
- Jasmine rice grown on the 
Geographical Indication of the Tungkula 
plateau   
Laws and regulation - Hom Mali rice standard  
- The possession of an export license 
- Hom Mali rice standard 
- The possession of an export license 
- Acquired certified organic labels  
- Hom Mali rice standard 
- Can apply for an export license 
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9.3 The development process for building a capable farmers’ organisation 
towards livelihood improvement   
 
The findings suggest a novel development process of building a capable farmers’ 
organisation towards livelihoods improvement. The resulting capabilities can 
develop into rice value chain upgrading, enhancing farm performance, and 
offering new market opportunities to farmers. The path of building a capable 
farmers’ organisation can yield profitability and sustainability. The findings also 
suggest the pattern of building a capable organisation at a more detailed level. It 
involves certain precursor factors that lay the foundation of the determinants of a 
capable organisation. As shown in Figure 9.2, the precursor factors are 
commitment and trust; organisational models and behaviours; shared value; and 
capacity development and resource mobilisation. Consequently, the process and 
outcome of a capable farmers’ organisation are organisational routines; 
repositioning farmers in the value chain; reconfiguration of value chain finance 




Figure 9. 2 The development process of building a capable farmer organisation  





9.3.1 The precursor factors  
a) Commitment and trust 
 
Commitment and trust are the first and foremost precursor factors gearing 
towards building a capable farmers’ organisation. Commitment builds trust, and 
trust sustains a commitment to carry on value activities. It creates the dynamics 
that maintain interaction between value chain actors. The analysis of commitment 
and trust is evidenced by the case of the BSCM and the Um Sang of which faced 
difficulties in early stages of their associations. Initially, the BSCM faced a drop-
out of a large number of participating farmers. This seemed to provoke 
considerable difficulties for continuing the initiative, provided that abundant 
resources had been poured into the dibbling initiative. However, the initiative 
team persisted in continuing to work with the remaining farmers. They studied 
the causes of drop-out, and their commitment has gradually gained trust from the 
remaining farmers.  
 
For the Um Sang, the collective group faced financial problems as no financial 
institution was willing to lend at the early stage of the enterprise establishment. 
The Um Sang’s leader led the group by using his own land to set up a farmers’ 
organisation office to run the business activities. Seeing the commitment of its 
leader, the rest of the members then voluntarily put together their funds to run the 
enterprise. The first three years was privately funded until they successfully 
secured an enterprise loan from the BAAC. Once the trust was formed and built 
a commitment to carry on, a farmers’ organisation was ready to move forward to 
achieve their goals. A rough start was experienced by both farmers’ organisations 
that developed well since then.  By contrast, farmers of the Sisaket AMC felt the 
level of commitment was unclear. Two reasons caused them to be sceptical. First, 
the Sisaket AMC production capacity is insignificant in comparison to the size of 
associated farmers and support received from the BAAC as showed in Table 9.1. 
Second, the Sisaket AMC buying price is similar to local millers. There is no 
clear price advantage to selling to the AMC, which has caused doubts about its 
usefulness in the long term. Side-selling is, of course, widely noted phenomenon 
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among farmers’ organisations (Donovan, Stoian and Poole, 2008; Poole and de 
Frece, 2010).  
 
Commitment and trust form a significant foundation in building a capable 
farmers’ organisation. They are essential but intangible components that have not 
been as much acknowledged as compared to physical and financial resources in 
general. Trust is the foundation of a healthy business environment. It would 
extend into integrity and commitment across time and space over the stages of 
value chains. With trust and commitment, financial hardship in the context of 
agricultural development can turn into a lesson learned of choices for actors to 
choose what to do and not to do. That is a thing in common that actors in the rice 
value chains experienced. The challenge lies in who would respond in a 
meaningful way as illustrated by the Um for becoming one of the highly regarded 
farmers' organisations in Thailand. Similarly, the BSCM demonstrates an 
unprecedented association of farmers and a rice trader partnership. The choice 
the BSCM made has challenged the whole Thai rice industry, both the domestic 
millers as well as international traders for engaging in leveraging resources and 
market interventions in a more meaningful way. 
 
b) Organisational model and behaviour 
 
Creating a capable organisation is a choice needing collective decision-making 
towards sustainable agriculture and livelihood. An organisational model that is 
suitable for a farmers’ organisation helps influence sound behaviour and 
pragmatic routines. Such attributes are fundamental to reinforce the ground for 
sustainable livelihood. At the centre of a farmers’ organisation are the members 
who play a key role contributing to its growth and development. A model of a 
farmers’ organisation can be a powerful tool when operated by determined 
leadership and committed members. Such a combination is likely to bring change 
as cases discussed in each case study. This understanding is crucial because it 
guides building a capable farmers’ organisation. However, as the benefit are not 
always easily quantifiable, this knowledge may not be captured from typical 
value-added perspective.  
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It is noticeable that both the producer-led and buyer-led organisational models 
have been shown to enable repositioning farmers in the value chain and to 
facilitate reconfiguring value chain finance. Yet, these characteristics were not 
found in the facilitator-led model. Increasing farmers involvement in markets and 
access to finance and resources lead to farmers earning better incomes, which are 
a clear outcome of producer-led and buyer-led organisational models. These 
models are also found to have direct influence on organisational routines and 
business performance. This result does not indicate that a facilitator-led 
organisation cannot bring about improved livelihood, because it was operated 
under different conditions. From this perspective, it is an interesting empirical 
question whether a facilitator-led model could offer similar results when the 
organisation is led by committed members.  
 
The decision whether to build an organisation or to implement a business model 
may affect the appropriate type of policy intervention. This means that groups of 
farmers would be better off to receive a type of policy intervention promoting 
growth and development. This would as well benefit a government by avoiding 
wasting public money on interventions that are less likely to succeed. For 
example, farm-gate price intervention may not be most helpful for a farmers’ 
organisation that processes and markets its own rice products. It could be, for 
instance, more helpful to gain financial access to expand post-harvest 
infrastructure. From this viewpoint, a collective group of farmers or policy 
planners need to decide whether to create a capable farmers’ organisation or to 
create products. If the aim is to earn higher profit from value addition, then 
creating a product can be a good start. Because farmers would not need to deal 
with all sorts of business activities and would not need to invest in milling and 
storage facilities. It would allow farmers to begin with lower risk and start-up 
cost. Designing appropriate policy supports would more efficient and effective 






c) Shared value 
 
In a food and agricultural context, the notion of shared value partnership can be 
exemplified in a meaningful way. Agriculture can become a new shared frontier 
of rural and urban interaction which spans common responsibility for social, 
economic and environmental issues. In the food industry, food traceability has 
gained momentum among consumers. Having agriculture as the centre of 
interaction between urban and rural matters can make a substantial impact. For 
example, organic produce and organic farmland can offer shared value along the 
supply chain for agriculture and, ultimately, offer a greater health benefit to 
consumers. At the same time, better profits for farmers could mean less 
dependence on a government subsidy. This can then mean reducing public 
budgets to supporting farmers. It is quite likely that rural-urban interaction can 
offer more holistic benefits to a wider society.  
 
The BSCM ’s dibbling initiative builds on a shared value partnership foundation. 
It is not just doing good but working together to improve existing problems. This 
distinguishes it from corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. Many 
businesses use CSR as a public relation strategy to manage good public 
relationships. Such activities may not necessarily enable vulnerable actors such 
as farmers to become better off. For example, some chemical fertilizers 
companies may organise CSR activities by organising a charity lunch at orphan 
houses. However, such activities do not contribute to resolve fertilizer impacts 
on farmers such as high price and damage to health. In other words, such CSR 
activity does not accelerate innovation or dealing with direct impact caused by 
company products. This also highlights that CSR can be the initiative of an 
organisation. Share valued partnership has evidence to be an important element 
of the change process. The change agent is the actor who initiates change in the 
development process (DiMaggio1988, Garud et al., 2007, Battilana et al., 2009).  
Shared value partnerships have been sometimes considered from somewhat 
narrow perspectives limited to, for instance, an organisation model or 
determinants of organisational development. The BSCM case demonstrates how 
a shared value partnership can be successfully implemented in practice and it 
reveals an unexpected finding that the shared value partnership can be employed 
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as an institutional innovation strategy. A new form of organisational setting can 
innovatively improve farmers’ livelihood while building human and social 
capitals at the same time. 
 
From the perspective of Coase’s transaction costs (1937), shared value is a 
practical strategy that enables farmers’ organisations and their partnership 
companies to minimise the cost of transacting. It could offer a more cost-effective 
solution as compared to setting up an intermediary firm to help reduce transaction 
costs. As discussed earlier, the challenge is to notice the difference between a 
farmers’ organisation being used merely a business model or being developed as 
a resource pool. In addition, it should be noted that setting up a farmers’ 
organisation is no different to a company – it is a challenging task for those with 
limited business experience. As a result, many farmers’ organisations have not 
been able to resolve issues of transaction costs and trade facilitation (Poole and 
de Freece, 2010; Poole, 2017).  
 
Effective cost control is one aspect of shared value. In agriculture, it is defined, 
for instance, by investment costs without compromising yield, quality of input 
and output, transaction costs, market price and economic rents. It could perhaps 
be seen as one of the informal screening conditions for farmers to associate with 
an organisation. Effective cost reduction may be the first step building interest 
shared value. There are many costs that can be more effectively managed when 
dealing as an organisation. Learning from cases, these include input supplies, 
agricultural machineries, business licencing, accounting, to name but a few. Put 
simply, a capable organisation can help farmers achieve the benefit of economies 
of scale.  
 
The BSCM dibbling initiative can deploy effective cost control from a trader 
perspective. Low quality jasmine rice paddy is not good for both the BSCM as a 
trader and the farmers themselves as discussed in Chapter 6. However, investing 
large sums of money to help farmers improve their productivity is not an easy 
example.  Asking local millers about whether they were willing to follow an 
example of the BSCM, a local miller said: 
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“It is a good cause. I am happy when I see someone doing it. I wish I could 
help. But it can be troublesome. Haven’t you heard how much work Chia 
Meng [the BSCM] put into it. I don’t know if I would do the same even if 
I would be a big trader like it. If I can be honest. I don’t think many 
[millers] want to do it. But if government wants this to work, they should 
give some help. Something like tax benefit or loan benefit. Give us 
something. You know since Cham num khaw [the Yingluk 
administration’s rice pledged scheme] it has been difficult to get business 
loan from banks. I need load of money to buy rice and usually we clear 
up [business loan] in 6-12 months. Thing has been difficult! I even think 
to sell my mill.” [Interview code: Sisaket_miller_05] 
 
This opinion from a local miller was very helpful to understand the issues 
concerning shared value partnerships. It helps to identify what are obstacles that 
obstruct millers to adopt such programmes. The main thing is that it does not have 
to be the same level of what the BSCM has invested. The lack of effective cost 
control may offer a reasonable explanation why the farmers of the Sisaket AMC 
were not committed to the organisation. Among farmers, effective cost reduction 
and pricing appear in two stages: production and processing. Without 
experiencing an improved cost structure for farming, the farmers’ association can 
become trivial. By contrast, the cases that show evidence of effective cost control 
may gain commitment from their farmers. It enables the process of organisational 
development to carry on, as shown in the outcome of organisational development. 
 
It considers the co-benefits farmers’ organisations have on ecological, social, 
economic and human development grounds. For example, the certified organic 
production of the Um Sang offers effective costs to farmers and environmental 
regeneration in many ways. These include the environmentally friendly approach 
to the soil ecosystem as farmers can notice an increase in rice production in the 
latter years. Omitting the use of chemical fertilisers can mean better human health 
conditions. Although there is no statistical record, farmers indicated that many 
who practise chemical-based farm faced health problems such as cancer, detailed 
by a farmer (interview code: Case1_01). They feel that organic farming has 
contributed to their better health condition. This has a direct impact on their 
household savings as healthcare costs can cause a considerable loss of savings. 
For some families, taking a loan to pay for healthcare can threatening good 
livelihood due to a long-term debt. 
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d)  Capacity development and resource mobilisation 
 
Insufficient resources and skills have been significant problems among the 
workforce in the agriculture sector. Among rice farmers, these involve the lack 
of appropriate farm inputs and farming skills. Yet, many Thai farmers may 
disagree with this claim, providing that there are several farm input suppliers in 
the rural area around the country. Most districts of Thailand have an extension 
office with extension officers on duty. The argument is not about the existence of 
the farm supply channels and agriculture extension offices. It is more about the 
quality, efficiency and mobility of the existing resources. When considering the 
workload of extension offices and the ratio of an extension workers per farmers, 
the extension officers raised a similar concern about the limited availability of 
critical resources, as described by a local extension worker (interview code: 
Sisaket_extension_01). Farmers incapability can then result in the lack of 
competencies to deal with vulnerabilities resulting from various shocks. At the 
same time, improving farmers’ livelihoods is a problem that requires an 
immediate response, albeit that results may take time to take effect. 
 
In the rice business, the miller is an actor who often has the right resources to 
contribute to the job. If the debate is about available resources and market 
competency, the miller can often facilitate both production and market systems. 
For instance, the BSCM’s dibbling initiative has dealt effectively with these 
issues. More generally, the empirical evidence demonstrates that the acquisition 
of new capabilities was the driver geared towards improved livelihoods. 
Improved livelihoods in this meaning are not exclusively dependent on farming 
rice, but rather having an opportunity and capacity to choose what kind of 
business the farmers want to pursue. Being independent is partly a state of mind, 
freedom to go about without shame, and to mentally think and physically do 
things – earning the power to make the right decision for the farmers themselves.  
 
The transition from farmers as sole traders to collectively trade as a farmers’ 
organisation, such as the Um Sang, has highlighted the importance of effective 
use of resources. The farmers had limited resources at the initial stage of a 
farmers’ organisation establishment, and it is noticeable that the resilience-
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building process occurred gradually over time. The Thai rice market can be a 
challenging marketplace, testing how well farmers are able to harness their 
capabilities. Farmers can experience price fluctuations, natural disasters such as 
drought and floods occasionally, and political interventions. Evidence suggests 
that such shocks are factors that continue to worsen livelihoods. To deal with 
such circumstances, it would require the ability to adapt and capacity to deal with 
changes and shocks. The challenge is that it is a dynamic, fast-changing 
environment, whereas having associated with a capable farmers’ organisation 
would likely mean that farmers stay updated with correct information. Moreover, 
education is the backbone of every economy. Farmers can have a 
misapprehension about formal education and on-the-job training. It is vital to 
adjust the perception of becoming professional farmers. A professional farmer 
can be defined as a person who acquires and applies farming skills effectively. 
On-the-job farm training can be a part of the continuing education, which 
includes both farming skills, accountancy, business management and financial 
literacy. 
 
The link between the stage of dependence and democracy is a surprise finding. 
The fact is that rice farmers are among the largest groups of Thailand’s population 
and rice policy has been repeatedly used as a primary election tactic during the 
past decades. Being independent would likely help farmers to exercise their 
democratic rights based on their political opinion rather than perceived 
immediate financial incentives. This suggests that market institutional 
reconfiguration could also shape the outcomes of the democratic process. When 
vulnerable people, such as farmers, can vote from their true opinion, not based 
on short-term incentives, this may contribute to a new development of Thai 
democratic system. Besides, it is expected that at a certain stage farmers’ 
resilience can challenge the existing market institutions. This suggests that such 
a change process of market institutional reform can offer a new facet of 
agribusiness in Thailand context. If the change eventually happens, this might 
change agricultural policy into more long-term thinking, such as focusing on 
building infrastructure instead of short-term populist policy implementation. This 
could eventually prevent farmers from worsening livelihoods. 
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9.3.2 The process and outcome of a capable farmers’ organisation influenced by 
the precursors  
a) Organisational routines as an improved livelihood pathway  
 
The findings feature the link between organisational routines and value chain 
governance, the way in which relationship and coordination pay significant roles 
in capacity development. Organisational routines on skills development and 
capacity building enable farmers to systematically improve their livelihoods in a 
sustainable manner. The three cases highlight that organisational routines are the 
outcome found in the BSCM dibbling initiative and the Um Sang cases, showing 
evidence of livelihood improvement. By contrast, relevant organisational 
routines were not found in the case of Sisaket AMC, due to the lack of good 
coordination between farming and processing stages. The farmers of the 
progressive organisations found themselves in a much-upgraded position to deal 
with their vulnerability context. For example, farm loans have become a 
productive debt that enables these farmers to make a living from the farm and 
create a better livelihood. For instance, they forbid the use of farm loans for 
household consumption and record household spending accounts. 
 
The routines developed by these farmers’ organisations can include farming skills 
training, two-way communications between farmers and the organisation 
leadership team, new cropping routines, social networking activities, to name but 
a few. I want to elaborate these details here because these are simple, yet practical 
routines that have brought about great impact on better livelihood. Farming skills 
training is a good learning environment, particularly when organised by the 
farmers’ organisation itself. It is also a self-reinforcing process. From my 
observation, farmers are likely to benefit more from training when they do it with 
familiar peers, particularly in the presence of some respectful fellow farmers. 
 
Organisational routine is defined here as a collection of activities enabling 
livelihood improvement. This helps to explain why they were not found in the 
Sisaket AMC case. The lack of relevant organisational routines in the case 
equates with the lack of a pathway helping farmers to follow and practice new 
behaviours. Routine is instrumental in building capabilities from existing 
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resources. It emphasises the coordination of organisational routines and resource 
heterogeneity. This suggests that the more abundant resources an organisation 
has, the more likely farmers would flourish, on the condition of having the right 
routines that harness those resources. In this sense, routines act as intermediaries 
to make use of resources into farmers’ capabilities. This claim can be observed 
by the case of Sisaket AMC where the organisation has resources providing that 
the BAAC supports it. However, the lack of organisational routines between the 
AMC and farmers can be recognised as a drawback and an obstacle to livelihood 
improvement.   
 
Developing an argument based on the above rests on the contention that routines 
are recurrent interaction patterns. Literature (e.g., Becker, 2004; Pentland et. Al., 
2010) characterises routines as repetitive by recurrence, persistent, leading to 
predictable interaction patterns. This has been proved by the time of the rice-
pledge scheme implemented during the year 2011–2015. The time when the 
majority of farmers financially suffered was due to the long-overdue pay cheques 
for pledged rice by the government. The Um Sang was able to survive the 
misconduct of the government’s rice-pledge scheme. 
 
Like the old saying, old habits die hard. The prolonged absence of good farm 
investment routines has become an old habit. Also, government price intervention 
can be perceived as a routine intervention on which farmers rely. If the market 
price is deemed unsatisfactory for an extended period of time, some form of 
political pressure tends to be put on the government, which has eventually made 
price intervention to become a typical routine. This has created subtle habits 
among farmers, making them become gradually more dependent on the 
government. The stage of being dependent can cause deliberate damage to 
creativity and entrepreneurism, as well as democracy. The longer the old 
unproductive habits exist, the harder they die out among farmers. Evidence from 
the cases reveals the characteristics of organisational routines that become 
knowledge and help transform the farming culture. Over time, this can transform 




b) Repositioning farmers in the value chain  
 
Much of institutional theory and organisation studies agree that individual actors 
are the driver of institutional change (e.g., North 1991 & 2016; Beckert, 1999). 
However, little is known about the precise mechanisms on how individuals 
influence collective arrangements (Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 2000). The 
precursors discussed earlier have illustrated such mechanisms. For example, 
empirical evidence demonstrates how the precursor factors, such as 
organisational models and resource mobilisation, contribute to repositioning 
farmers in the value chain. In general, smallholder farmers are perceived as 
vulnerable actors with limited resources. As a result, they have limited access to 
economic opportunities and earn a small margin of profit in the value chains. 
Therefore, repositioning is a significant outcome for farmers enabling them to 
seize economic opportunities. To do this, farmers will need good access to 
resources, whereas resourceful actors can advance the evolution of the business 
environment. Creating business cooperation can offer a great opportunity for 
smallholder farmers to engage in markets. The cases demonstrate conclusively 
several of these conditions. The unexpected discovery was that the outcome of 
the shared value could be a mechanism for repositioning farmers in the value 
chain. 
 
The goal of repositioning is for farmers to be better-included in the market 
systems. Inclusive market systems can offer farmers the possibility of livelihood 
improvement. It is the marketplace where more economic opportunities are 
available to vulnerable actors such as farmers (UNDP, 2010; Poole, 2017). Figure 
9.3 shows the schematic representation of a marketplace where such 
opportunities are available and would be likely to result in more job creation and 
provision of affordable goods and services for the poor. Practically, it can help to 
lower production and transaction costs, increase profit margins and increase 




Figure 9. 3 Marketplace and market opportunity 
  
Relationships in the figure 
 
1 =  Rice farmers borrow from financiers: the BAAC, Co-op, and other formal 
and informal lenders 
2 = Financiers lend to rice farmers 
3 = Rice farmers buy farm supplies from suppliers – payment methods can 
include immediate payment or advanced credit for farmers to pay after 
harvested.  
4 = Farm suppliers sell products to rice farmers – note, farmers’ suppliers are a 
part of the farm supply value chain. The details of farm supply value chain are 
excluded in this study. 
5 = Rice farmers sell rice paddy to local rice millers 
6 = Local rice millers buy rice paddy from farmers 
 
 
The case studies demonstrate several practical methods for farmers to reposition 
in the value chains. One is improving the quality of the product, which allows 
increasing demand for the product. Such examples include rice products 
produced by a certified organic rice method and by purified rice seeds, as 
discussed in the case of the Um Sang and the BSCM dibbling initiative, 
respectively. Another is by upgrading farmers’ roles in the value chain. This is 
illustrated by the way the Um Sang upgraded from a farmers’ organisation to an 
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SME status. Upgrading to a formal business entity is a legitimate way to declare 
the capability to compete in the market more independently. The findings 
highlight that repositioning farmers can occur where the business environment 
includes purposeful actors with a fundamental approach towards shared value and 
entrepreneurism. The findings also suggest that repositioning farmers can 
succeed where farmers’ organisational models function well in respect of 
productive behaviours and routines as discussed earlier. Capturing market 
opportunities can be difficult for individual farmers, particularly the poor. It 
requires some form of support to realise most opportunities. A capable farmers’ 
organisation takes a lead role in empowering farmers to seize market 


















Figure 9. 4 A new marketplace landscape after repositioning farmers 
Relationships in the figure 
1 = Rice farmers borrow from financiers, mainly from the BAAC and Co-op 
2 = Financiers lend to rice farmers 
3 = Rice farmers buy farm supplies from suppliers – payment methods can include 
immediate payment or advanced credit for farmers to pay after harvest.  
3 = Farm supply distributors sell farm supplies to the farmers’ organisation at a 
corporate rate  
4 = Farm suppliers sell products to rice farmers – note, farm suppliers are a part of the 
farm supply value chain. The details of the farm supply value chain are excluded in 
this study. 
5 = Farmers’ organisation buys rice paddy from farmers 
6 = Farmers sell rice paddy to farmers’ organisation  
7 = Farmers repay loans to lender(s) 
8 = Farmers deposit money into saving accounts with financier, usually the same 
institution where they borrow. 
9 = Farmers receive dividends from farmers’ organisation  
 
A = Financiers lend to a farmers’ organisation, loan comes with a business advisor 
B = A farmers’ organisation buys a large volume of farm supply from a distributor to 
distribute to farmers 
C = Consumers can buy rice products directly from a farmers’ organisation 









c) Reconfiguring value chain finance  
 
To reconfigure the flow of finance is a challenging task. It involves factors 
enabling debt settlement, repayment for goods and services, and reinvesting in 
the business. Findings show that precursor factors contribute to reconfiguring 
value chain finance. For example, microfinance has played a part in mitigating 
farmers’ long-term debt. The findings demonstrate that the loan is too small to 
manage profitably for the entire cropping season and household spending. The 
BSCM case features a shared value partnership in a way that enables the 
reconfiguration of value chain finance. The main financing approach switches 
from cash borrowing to providing effective use of farm input supplies helping 
farmers to earn more profit. The novelty lies in the fact that enterprise loans can 
be more profitable for a group of farmers rather than each farmer borrowing 
individually from microfinance institutions. This is because an enterprise loan 
offers financial and business advice to guide and recommend farmers’ business 
activities to become more profitable. 
 
Finance has a connection to the means of production. For example, the Um Sang 
case shows that forming an organisation allows a collective group of farmers to 
own their means of production. Farmers have collectively started to own their 
means of production, which links to their market and negotiation power. The case 
suggests that some forms of asymmetric information could be minimised due to 
farmers’ ownership of post-harvest facility, as shown in Figure 9.4. This explains 
the lender’s behaviour when it lends to individual farmers and farmers’ 
organisations. Smallholder farmers are positioned as a part of the workforce in 
the rice industry – they sell their labour in the form of produce. This process can 
be interpreted as semi-employment by the government through the policy 
interventions which encourage smallholder farmers to remain as a labour force 
for rice paddy production.  
 
The rice industry does not face a crisis of overproduction because in Thailand 
demand exceeds the supply of rice in the markets. However, farmers are almost 
always affected from asymmetric information and price intervention influences 
by other actors in the rice value chain. Millers are known to stockpile paddy rice 
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to gain power to negotiate lower the farm-gate prices. The paddy rice price is 
monitored but stockpiles are not, as there is no database about the rice stock of 
each miller in the country. So, farmers can be manipulated by market actors that 
are gatekeepers to the market for milled rice (i.e. domestic and international). 
This locates the domestic market within another more extensive market system. 
For example, considering that millers are likely to have paddy rice in their stock 
already, buying more paddy can aim to maintain their paddy storage. That should 
not alter the price of paddy rice too much in the real market according to the law 
of demand and supply. Looking at milling capacity for the entire country, it is 
possible that demand disequilibrium is one reason that threatens market price. 
This can happen because farmers have limited negotiation power in the market. 
d) Upgrading the value chain   
 
The empirical evidence suggests that upgrading value chain which can be a 
change agent in the inclusive market participation. Distributional outcomes are 
measure empowering actors and to upgrade existing value chain activities. Such 
activities should result in a more effective value chain management and improve 
farmers’ livelihood. It helps farmers’ organisations to maximise value chain 
development benefits such as value chain upgrading and the creation of 
organisational partnerships. On the other hand, it helps through resource 
mobilisation to prevent or minimise shocks or factors that may cause 
deterioration in farmers’ livelihoods. These activities can then result in 
minimising the risk of vulnerability.  
 
Considering evidence from the BSCM case, product and process value chain 
upgrading enable factors of production to be employed more effectively. This 
particularly concerns a market where there is a large gap between the negotiation 
power of resourceful actors and vulnerable actors such as farmers. It is noticeable 
that the change process can be observed when the key actors use their market 
power in favour of vulnerable actors. Findings suggest that the BSCM enabled 
farmers to perform their business activities more sustainably. It would result in 
vulnerable actors successfully repositioning themselves in the value chain, as 
evidenced in the Um Sang and the BSCM cases. The most striking feature was 
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that when farmers have less financial pressure, they started to utilise the factors 
of production more effectively and in a responsible manner. The rice value chain 
upgrading enables the improvement of the business environment by progressing 
production and market systems.  
 
 
Figure 9. 5 Potential economic rents generated through the BSCM’s dibbling 
initiative 
 
Figure 9.5 shows potential economic rents generation using the BSCM case as an 
illustration. The figure indicates four types of rents: organisational, technology, 
human resource, relational and market. These elements of rents contribute to 
competitiveness of a farmers’ organisation and can be described as follows:  
 
Organisational rent – possessing superior forms of an organisation. In this case, 
the partnering of farmer and the BSCM is an unorthodox but successful approach. 
Without understanding its partnership mechanism, the partnership may look 
similar to a typical development project by which one big company sponsors 
development activities. However, on a closer inspection, the case shows a form 
of mutual relationship that benefits both parties. 
 
Human resource rent – having access to better skills than at its current stage. This 
highlights a mutual relationship the two partners have from each other. Rice 
farmers have professional skills support from the BSCM, which is a scarce 
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resource among most farmers. The BSCM then gets access to purified jasmine 
rice paddy which is considered superior to typical jasmine rice grown in the area. 
 
Technology rent – having command over scarce technologies. Purified jasmine 
rice seed and agricultural machinery (i.e. dibbling machine) are considered 
among scarce technologies for smallholder farmers due to high cost and limited 
availability in the market. 
 
Relational rents – in this case, specific relationships point to government 
agencies, banks, agricultural machinery companies and the public. The 
partnership with BSCM enables farmers’ voices to be heard and to be amplified 
by the BSCM. The latter is a leading global rice exporter and therefore impactful. 
 
Marketing rent – farmers always have limited negotiation power in the market. 
Partnership with BSCM has granted them marketing capabilities that were 
previously largely non-existent.  
 
From this ‘rents’ viewpoint, it is noticeable that these are factors that contribute 
to repositioning farmers in the value chain and reconfiguring value chain finance. 
This highlights the significant role of value chain upgrading as a crucial element 
to bringing success in policy implementation.
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9.4 Policy recommendations 
 
In general, Thai farmers receive cash subsidies in different forms seasonally 
concerning the incumbent government's policy implementations. Examples of cash 
subsidies include helping to pay for harvest costs and delaying paddy rice sale, as 
discussed earlier. Although cash subsidy is helpful, there is some pitfall due to 
seasonal and one-off support without offering long-term development. This thesis's 
recommendations focus on capacity building and post-harvest infrastructure 
development, aiming at immediate and long-term development. These are i) 
conditional offer on cash subsidy; and ii) optional offer on post-harvest 
infrastructure development. First policy recommendation: Conditional offer on cash 
subsidy link to capacity building 
 
The objective is to use a cash subsidy encouraging farmers to participate in farm 
skills and capacity development programmes. Currently, Thai farmers receive cash 
subsidies without condition. On the one hand, it may sound fair for all farmers to get 
access to such support. On the other, long-term financial subsidy without career 
development may lead to the lack of self-confident.  
 
For Thai jasmine rice farmers, the months after rice cropping seasons (i.e., January 
to May) is the optimal time to train new skills as they prepare for the new cropping 
season, starting around May-June. Cash payment can serve as a conditional offer as 
farmers have anticipated some cash subsidy forms from the government during 
cropping season (June – November). Therefore, skill training during the pre-cropping 
season can be a prerequisite towards receiving cash subsidies for the upcoming 
cropping season. The aim is to encourage skilled farmers to become professional 
agriculturalists. Such a purpose should be communicated to boost farmers’ self-
confidence. Having such confidence and pride, it is more likely that many farmers 
would develop self-esteem. In return, this may result in regular skill participation and 
better farm performance. 
 
Collective training can also encourage social capital development-boosting long term 
participation in capacity building. It can help farmers to maintain a sustainable 
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livelihood. This claim is supporting by evidence and lesson learned from case studies 
in this thesis. Social capital is not only benefits farmers at a personal level but also is 
supporting farmers’ organisation performance. Many agricultural development 
scholars have agreed with this view. For example, Uphoff and Wijayaratna (2000) 
and Ruben and Heras (2012) highlight the relationship between farmers’ cooperative 
performance and bonding social capital to lift cooperatives’ ability to establish trust 
and maintain commitment among members.  
Second policy recommendation: Optional offer on switching cash subsidy to post-
harvest infrastructure development.  
 
Farmers’ organisations can offer many benefits towards economic inclusion, social 
inclusion, and the business environment's influence (Kachule, Poole, and Dorward, 
2005). Such economic inclusion has implications on the economy of scale and 
leverage market power, while social inclusion can advance capacity building, 
democratic governance, and gender equality (ibid.). These imply that working 
collectively offers a considerable advantage to farmers. 
 
The reality is that the Thailand government and the BAAC carry a heavy load on 
financial support to farmers nation-wide. Farmers’ organisations should eventually 
become self-sustainability. At present, some seasonal rice policies can include 
offering loans for aggregating and value-added activities to the agricultural 
institutions (Thairath, 2017). For example, during the 2017/18 cropping season, the 
government allocated $416 million (12,500 million Baht) budget loaning to 
agricultural co-operatives to buy rice paddy between 1 October 2017 to 30 September 
2018. The government helped to pay 3% interest, and agricultural co-operatives 
organisations were charged 1% interest (ibid.). Each year, Thailand produces about 
40 million tons of paddy. An estimated over $6,700 million (200,000 million Baht) 
feeds in markets to an aggregate rice paddy. Government support can cover only 6% 
of actual market spending. It highlights the need for agricultural co-operative 
organisations to becoming profitable and self-sufficient. 
 
This thesis has highlighted how post-harvest infrastructure plays a central role in advancing 
farmers’ livelihood through farmers’ organisations. As discussed earlier, dryer and milling 
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facilities are among post-harvest infrastructures enabling high-value addition to paddy rice. 
Rice farmers almost always gain low farm-gate prices due to the high volume of paddy 
rice floods into the market during harvest season. To ease this problem, the Thai 
government has employed loans and a subsidy to delay the sale of paddy rice (USDA, 
2017; Poapongsakorm, 2019). Thai governments have implemented it in the form of either 
loan or cash transfer to support rice farmers. For example, the 2017/18 cropping year under 
Gen Prayuth Chan-Ocha administration offered USD 33 (1,000 Baht) per ton paddy rice at 
the maximum of 10 tons per household (Thansettakij, 2018). They could receive a 
maximum of $189 per hectare for participated farmers, no more than $303 per household. 
However, the Chan-Ocha administration prohibited farmers and their farmers’ 
organisations from renting privately owned facilities to store paddy rice as a corruption 
prevention measure. In other words, farmers’ organisations that have such storage would 
benefit from such an intervention. As a result, many farmers and farmers’ organisations 
could not fully benefit from such delay selling paddy intervention due to the lack of dryer 
and storage facilities. The lack of financial investment and the post-harvest facility's need 
are both obstacles and opportunities for policy development. 
 
This recommendation builds on the policy mentioned earlier, from the prospect that 
farmers receive seasonal financial intervention to delay selling paddy rice. Such 
intervention may achieve its aim where individual farmers and farmers’ 
organisations have dryers and storage to improve paddy quality and store them 
appropriately. These are essential post-harvest facilities that can help farmers delay 
selling paddy rice and still keep them in good quality required by markets.  
 
This thesis recommends an option for farmers and their respective organisations to 
turn a seasonal subsidy into a post-harvest infrastructure to overcome such 
constraints. It can be made a volunteer programme in ways that farmers and their 
organisations can collectively choose to invest in infrastructure instead of taking 
individual cash subsidy. Offering counteroffers can empower farmers through such 
policy. This intervention approach would allow farmers to get involved in the 
decision-making process. It would add value to incentives and promote development 
for the long term. As learned from the Um Sang, a milling facility is a key to enabling 
farmers to participate in markets. It can ensure quality control and trade standards. 
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In practice, such implementation can deliver voluntary and conditional financial 
subsidies. It means farmers’ organisations have some flexibility to choose between 
individual pay-outs or grants towards farmers’ organisations infrastructure 
development. The latter would encourage farmers’ involvement in their farmers’ 
organisational development. A conditional financial subsidy can be an instrument to 
encourage farmers to participate in capacity development programmes. Thus, 
capacity building puts in place as a conditional measure to receive a financial 
subsidy. Such conditional measure is essential for sustainable agriculture because it 
supports both access to financial capital and capacity development. 
 
Having some post-harvest facility such as dryers benefits not only to farmers but also 
to local millers, especially small and medium-sized millers. There are 20 Sisaket 
millers with a production capacity of under 200 tons per day (DIW, 2019). This group 
can consider as SMEs. Trading dried rice paddy could offer a new trade opportunity 
for SME millers, the AMC, and farmers. Typically, millers would buy wet rice from 
farmers, then process them. This method can involve many complications, as 
discussed earlier. Buying dried rice paddy can benefit millers in many ways, such as 
the smaller size of capital and reducing the burden to store dried rice. As a result, this 
would allow millers to run businesses with lower capital. Besides, it helps to reduce 
workload from the aggregating wet rice paddy. These activities come with costs. 
Buying dried rice paddy would allow millers to control cost more effectively. It 
would benefit the Sisaket AMC to distribute dried rice to buy the maximum quantity 
of wet rice from farmers. The government, through the BAAC, may offer aggregating 
loans for those who willing to buy dried paddy from the AMC. This recommendation 
would bring benefit to all relevant parties. 
 
As this discussion takes a delayed selling paddy policy to discuss, farmers and their 
respective farmers' organisation will havethea flexibility to decide whether to take the 
subsidy amount onan  individual basis or to take it collectively to improve post-harvest 
infrastructure. As discussed in chapter 7’s the Um Sang cas, manyy farmers inquired 
joining the Um Sang. Unfortunately, it has reached capacity to service more members. 
Considering such circumstance, the implementation of such intervention can pay toward 
existing farmers’ organisations or millers who can flourish, such as the Um Sang, the 
BSCM, and the Sisaket AMC. Although such a recommendation would require more 
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details to debate and analyse correctly, it is clear that such intervention has leverage power 




This thesis has examined how a capable farmers’ organisation improves farmers’ 
livelihoods.  By meaning improved livelihood, the focus was on how capacity 
building enhancement and post-harvest infrastructure resulted in improvements in 
income, farm productivity, access to capitals, and market participation. With 
enhanced product and service linkages and finance and information flows, a farmers’ 
organisation has potential to improve its business performance. The capability to 
deliver success is significant. Such development process and dynamic are what this 
thesis called a capable farmers’ organisation. 
 
The rice value chain framework used in this thesis emphasised three key analytical 
aspects. These were i) value chain governance and organisational model; ii) 
upgrading; and iii) distributional outcomes. This enables the analysis to narrow down 
to which direction the farmers’ organisations would be most likely to achieve 
livelihood improvement. Such a conceptual framework is particularly significant in 
respect of academic and development practitioners contributing to effective policy 
formulation and intervention. The three cases of farmers’ organisations were 
purposefully selected to represent different types of farmers’ organisational models. 
These are the producer-driven model (the Um Sang), the buyer-driven model (the 
BSCM), and the facilitator-driven model (the Sisaket AMC). These cases operate in 
a business and political environment that largely is defined by government 
intervention, financial regulation, and geography. 
 
An organisational model arrangement directly impacts value chain governance, the 
ability to upgrade, and the efficiency of distributional outcomes. All these lead to 
rice value chain development. On building a capable farmers’ organisation, the 
discussion puts forward the pattern observed from the three farmers’ organisations 
as a process to increase capability. It can also serve a purpose of replication. The 
pattern involves the precursor factors that lay the foundation for the determinants of 
organisational development.  These precursor factors are commitment and trust, 
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organisational models and behaviours; shared value, and capacity development and 
resource mobilisation. Consequently, the process and outcomes of a capable farmers’ 
organisation influenced by such precursors are organisational routines, repositioning 
farmers in the value chain, the reconfiguration of value chain finance, and value chain 
upgrading. The significance of each factor may vary, but the firm foundation depends 
on the combination of precursors and processes. 
 
It is evident from the study of the three cases that a farmers’ organisation is a means 
to improve members’ livelihoods through leveraging power and resulting in value 
chain upgrading. Upgrading is a key mechanism enabling farmers to get access to 
capital, capacity development, and market participation. The most striking feature is 
that some upgrading activities such as registering a farmers’ organisation as a formal 
business entity can turn the power of social capital into a tangible asset in the form 
of product value and business performance. 
 
One of the principal outcomes is that the quality of value chain governance has a 
causal relationship to functional upgrading. A good relationship among value chain 
actors offers operative coordination towards value activities. The models of the Um 
Sang and the BSCM have shown good governance and effective coordination, 
resulting in effective results from the interdependent business relationships of the 
production and milling stages of the value chain. By contrast, the Sisaket AMC 
lacked good coordination between the farmers and miller, resulting in the lack of 
livelihood improvement. 
 
Functional upgrading, where there is production and processing integration, is a 
powerful element for developing farmers’ organisations.  An integration of such 
chain activities adds value to products and enhances capacity development, access to 
capitals, and market participation—such integration results in minimising power 
asymmetry with other chain actors and optimising more evenly the distributional 
outcomes. Such integration implies coordination of management activities. As a 
result, a capable farmers’ organisation can create more value (i.e., high-value 
products and make a profit) as it receives better flows of chain information.  
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Such knowledge about organisational capability building within value chain 
development processes can improve business performance as well as guide policy 
intervention. Based on functional upgrading evidence, the recommendation is to seek 
financial intervention from state sources to specific types of farmer organisation 
which enable them to invest in value chain functions and thus integrate these 
functions into the organisation, and establish interdependent business relationships 
with value partners, essentially buyers and distributors of processed quality rice. 
Post-harvest infrastructure such as dryer and milling facilities is vital to manage 
demand and supply of paddy rice and hence market price. Having such control, the 
farmers’ market position would become stronger. Such an outcome would offer long-
term improved livelihood. 
 
The BSCM also demonstrates that a buyer-driven model can offer a good alternative 
model of interdependency for smallholder farmers instead of setting up farmers-led 
organisations without business experience. It emphasises that relationships and chain 
coordination are crucial to the integration of rice production and processing and 
organisation capability-building. This understanding is important because 
traditionally, farmers’ organisations are mostly formed by independent farmer-led 
groups. Partnering with the business entity can enable farmers to gain market 
participation and narrow information asymmetry, which normally favours traders. 
 
One of the significant outcomes of a capable farmers organisation is offering high 
and stable farm-gate prices to farmers. The Um Sang has demonstrated such an 
example. It signals to the rice markets that farmers can become independent from the 
unfair market arrangements. It implies that putting post-harvest infrastructure in 
place can offer many benefits. The high income may seem like the main outcome. 
Considering a long-term perspective, such investment would offer the balance of 
power between traders and farmers regardless of price intervention. This can offer a 
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